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This thesis is a contribution towards an explanation of how and why 
multiculturalism has been successful as a political ideology. My central focus is 
on the rise of a particular manifestation of multiculturalism in Britain: equality 
and diversity; more specifically, I trace the evolution of an equality and diversity 
ideological framework as the latter evolves over time to play a significant role in 
a wider neoliberal hegemony. I focus, in particular, on the role played by the 
concept of diversity, and later the concept of cohesion, as a response to the 
conflicts generated by the promotion of radical, redistributive equality policies in 
society. In order to carry out this investigation I analyse – both conceptually and 
empirically – a set of texts taken from seven case study organisations. 
 
Taking the debate between Laclau and Zizek as my theoretical starting point, I 
go on to provide a historical context for the case study material by looking at the 
origins of multiculturalism in Britain. I then use two of the case studies to 
develop a conceptual picture of an equality and diversity framework. Following 
this I identify, in the remaining case studies, various themes that I consider in 
detail: the emergence of equality and diversity as a business-led endeavour, the 
rise of equalities legislation, the relationship between class, social exclusion and 
diversity, and the more recent focus on cohesion. Throughout these case study 
chapters the aim is to map the development of equality and diversity, both as a 
historical phenomenon and as a functioning ideology. The picture that emerges 
is of equality and diversity as a way of depoliticising redistribution, and this, I 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
The last three decades have seen a remarkable rise to prominence in Britain of 
two ideas: equality and diversity. More specifically, as a combination (equality 
and diversity) they have come to define a single field of activity that has a firmly 
institutionalised place within many different areas of society: in politics and law, 
social policy, the public sector, business, trade unions, art, culture, and so on.1 
A prominent analyst of this development, Judith Squires, has described the 
promotion of diversity as 'ubiquitous' in the UK (2005: 1), and equality and 
diversity as the subject of an 'increasingly common public affirmation' (2007: 
532). Another well-known writer on the subject, Tariq Modood (2007: 88-9), has 
similarly noted how what he calls the 'egalitarian acknowledgement of 
difference' has been making 'steady progress' over the years, advancing across 
the political spectrum from left to right into the 'mainstream political and 
managerial consciousness' throughout society. 
 
Take, for example, the workplace. This is where the increasing presence of 
diversity in society has probably been most visible to the majority of people, with 
equality and diversity teams now operating in many businesses and public 
sector organisations. The rise of equality and diversity in this area is illustrated 
by the 2009 launch of a body responsible for regulating and supporting those 
working in these teams: the Institute of Equality and Diversity Practitioners.2 
Two years earlier, a non-departmental public body, the Learning and Skills 
Council, conducted research into the feasibility of such a body. According to this 
revealing report the 'enormous proliferation of Practitioners in the field over the 
last ten yearsEhas been staggering'. What began as a 'handful of practitioners' 
working in race relations up to the 1980s has now, through the growth of 
legislation brought in by New Labour coupled with the increasing interest paid to 
the 'business case for diversity' by the private sector, led to a situation in which: 
'[i]ndividual specialists and formal bodies in the gender, sexual orientation, faith, 
                                                 
1
 Due to the way in which two concepts have been brought together, I refer to 'equality and diversity' 
in the singular, as well as simply 'diversity' as a shorthand term to refer to the same field of activity 
and the ideological formation underpinning it. This means that, unless I say otherwise, the term 
'diversity' does not refer to the demographic fact of diversity. This last point is more complex than 
might at first be thought, however, and I will return to it below. 
2
 See the Institute's website for a brief description of, and background to, the organisation 
(http://www.iedp.org.uk/About/History.aspx). 
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age and disability fields now complement those in the race and ethnicity fields. 
Individual consultants have combined to form practices or companies working in 
one or more of these fields'. In short, the 'whole E&D [equality and diversity] 
concern has become a mandatory part of public and private sector corporate 
life' (Focus Consultancy, 2007: 10). 
 
 
1.1 Diversity and Multiculturalism 
 
The rise of equality and diversity is, of course, not limited to Britain but has 
taken place in different ways and with different intensities in many different 
national contexts.3 It is also a phenomenon that seems to have outlived closely 
related terms such as 'multiculturalism' and 'identity politics'.4 While 
multiculturalism is widely considered to have suffered a 'backlash' in the first 
decade of the new century (see the collection edited by Vertovec and 
Wessendorf, 2010b), and while prominent politicians such as David Cameron 
(British Prime Minister's Office, 2011) and Angela Merkel (BBC, 2010a) have 
put forward strong criticisms in the current one, equality and diversity does not 
appear to suffer from such mainstream criticism. This point is sharpened by 
examples of centre-left figures who are clearly supporters of equality and 
diversity, but at the same time critics of multiculturalism. Take, for example, 
Trevor Phillips: he is a very prominent figure in the equality and diversity field in 
Britain yet has famously suggested that under the influence of multicultural 
policies 'we are sleepwalking our way to segregation' (quoted in Hasan, 2010: 
1). The significance of this last example is that while David Cameron may hold 
back from an explicit critique of equality and diversity (in contrast to 
multiculturalism) for reasons of political prudence, Trevor Phillips is, and 
continues to be, a firm ideological proponent of equality and diversity.5 
 
                                                 
3
 A collection edited by Healy et al (2011) includes chapters on aspects of equality and diversity in 
Ireland, Scandinavia and Germany, as well as Britain, and Peter Wood (2003) offers a full-length 
analysis of the rise of diversity in the United States. Also, see Bellard and Ruling (2001) for an 
analysis of the incorporation of a corporate-influenced 'diversity management' discourse into 
Germany and France. 
4
 I use the term 'identity politics' as more or less synonymous with 'multiculturalism' – though the 
latter can be thought of as a later, more institutionalised version of the former. 
5
 He is the former head of the Equality and Human Rights Commission. See also Alibhai-Brown's 
(2000) rejection of multiculturalism but not equality and diversity. 
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Is it possible to distinguish between multiculturalism, on the one hand, and 
equality and diversity, on the other, and thereby justify a critique of the former 
but not the latter? Both terms clearly signify highly complex and overlapping 
sets of ideas, policies and institutional arrangements with sociological, 
economic and political dimensions; this is therefore not an easy question to 
answer. However, we can say that both agendas clearly share the notion that 
human differences are important. The basic argument is that societies contain 
certain differences among people that are to be variously recognised, 
celebrated, promoted, accommodated and, where necessary, modified. This 
attention to difference is thought to be important to individuals, communities that 
gain their identity from these differences (e.g. the Jewish community), and 
society at large – the container of these differences. Crucially, this 'recognition 
of difference' necessitates action on the part of the state and other 
organisations in order to promote this vision against – what is seen as – a now 
outdated project to construct a single, homogenous national culture. 
Furthermore this new attention to difference is said to be not a replacement of, 
or reaction to, the right to equality, but rather an important dimension of the 
egalitarian and, more broadly speaking, liberal-democratic project.6 
 
Many of the policies and practices that follow this central animating ideal, 
grouped under the terms 'multiculturalism' and 'equality and diversity', remain 
much the same as well. These are various and may include: measures to 
promote equality of opportunity between groups such as positive or affirmative 
action, the funding of distinct group-based facilities and cultural activities, official 
statements recognising the variety of groups that constitute a political 
community, changes to educational curricula that seek to make the latter more 
inclusive, and so on.7 Steven Vertovec and Susanne Wessendorf argue that 
these kinds of policies are continued in much the same way under both 
agendas: 'uses of “diversity” in today's policy documents are wholly 
interchangeable with earlier uses of “multicultural”. That is, “diversity” is the term 
                                                 
6
 An already cited work, Modood (2007), is a good, succinct and relatively recent defence of this 
position. Older, often-cited, defences of multiculturalism and diversity include Kymlicka (1995) and 
Parekh (2000). Bhikhu Parekh is an especially important figure in the development of 
multiculturalism and equality and diversity in Britain: he chaired the Commission on the Future of 
Multi-Ethnic Britain (CFMEB, 2000) whose report, of the same name, is another important text in 
the defence of multiculturalism. I analyse this report in chapter three. 
7
 See Kymlicka (2010: 36-7) for a summary of multicultural policies, many of which could come 
under the label 'equality and diversity'. 
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now meant to do much of the work that “multicultural” used to' (2010a: 19).8 In 
this sense, it would appear that the rise of equality and diversity amid the 
growing rejection of multiculturalism is simply a rhetorical shift, a shift that hides 
the continuing 'recognition of difference' as well as many of the same policies 
and practices. 
 
However, while there is certainly substantial overlap between the two agendas 
there are also important differences of emphasis. Most obviously, if we look at 
the terms themselves, multiculturalism implies a conception of difference that is 
specifically cultural rather than referring to the other ways in which human 
beings can be differentiated from one another.9 This emphasis on culture is 
reflected in public debates about multiculturalism which tend to focus on a clash 
or supposed clash between majority and minority cultural practices, the 
consequences of this for national cohesion, and how the state should respond 
to the issues involved. 
 
More recently, some commentators have suggested a transformation from 
official multiculturalism to 'multifaithism' with religion replacing culture as the 
source of the differences being promoted (see, for example, Hasan, 2010: 9). 
Certainly in the last ten years or so it is the specific issue of Muslim integration 
that has been at the centre of public debates about multiculturalism (this is a 
central theme in Modood, 2007). These controversies have involved not simply 
the question of the compatibility of Western culture and Islam, but also, with the 
attacks on New York in 2001 and London in 2005, issues of security and 
terrorism. For example, David Cameron launched his recent critique of 
multiculturalism at a security conference in Munich and drew a connection 
                                                 
8
 The authors give the example of the Home Office report 'Improving Opportunities, Strengthening 
Society' (2005) in which the term 'multiculturalism' and 'multicultural' are entirely absent, while 
'diversity' is mentioned 34 times within a 54 page document (Vertovec and Wessendorf , 2010a: 18). 
I look at this report, and the broader community cohesion discourse that it represents, in chapter 
eight. 
9
 There are a huge variety of such differences – two of the most immediately obvious are age and 
gender. Although it should be noted that the complexity of the term 'culture' is such that both of 
these characteristics may, in fact, be taken to signify a cultural difference of some kind: we can think 
of the obvious example of youth sub-cultures, while Iris Marion Young has alluded to a distinct 
'women's culture' (cited in Barry, 2001a: 278). I will return to the question of the precise meaning of 
'diversity' in chapter four. For now, my point is simply to compare the narrower definition of 
difference implied by multiculturalism with the broader definition of difference implied by diversity. 
 10 
between, what he sees as, the failure of multicultural policies and the problem 
of Islamic extremism (British Prime Minister's Office, 2011). 
 
In contrast, equality and diversity promotes an idea of human difference that is, 
on the surface at least, more about variety and multiplicity than is the case with 
multiculturalism. In policy terms, the former is associated less with issues 
surrounding cultural difference and national identity, and more with the relatively 
mundane problem of implementing equal opportunity policies in the workplace. 
Equality and diversity is also often associated with the corporate 'repackaging' 
of equal opportunity policies and the corresponding emphasis on the individual 
in place of overly-politicised group identities. This is a characteristic feature of 
diversity that Vertovec and Wessendorf (2010a: 18) in fact point to prior to 
suggesting, as mentioned above, that in most senses there is a basic homology 
between diversity and multiculturalism: '[b]ehind many emergent “diversity” 
policies there is the idea that, rather than treating members of ethnic minorities 
as ever-representative of bounded collectives, institutions should recognize 
cultural differences as an individual trait'. This focus on the individual is crucial 
as it appears to sidestep the question of groups and group-based claims that 
has consistently dogged the theory and practice of multiculturalism over the 
years. In its place we get a more anodyne vision of economic subjects made up 
of a variety of cultural and non-cultural differences.  
 
This difference in tone and emphasis between equality and diversity, on the one 
hand, and its 'more rambunctious form',10 on the other, helps to initially mark out 
the subject area of this thesis. Much of what follows is an examination of the 
changing nature of equality policies as the idea of diversity begins to take hold – 
most forcefully within the corporate sector but, as we shall see, in other 
domains as well. To further clarify, however, I am principally interested in 
equality and diversity as an ideological phenomenon. In other words, while this 
thesis includes an important historical and institutional component (a point I will 
return to shortly), my main concern is with the concepts themselves and the role 
they play in society. In particular, it is the concept of diversity – as the novel 
partner of the more familiar concept of equality – that is at the centre of this 
thesis: what does the concept of diversity actually mean, especially when it is 
                                                 
10
 Wood's description of multiculturalism in relation to diversity (2003: 241). 
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combined with equality such that each term implies the other? How exactly 
does it relate to the concept of equality, as well as other concepts such as that 
of cohesion or unity? Can equality and diversity be understood as ideology in 
the critical sense of the term – in other words, does it help to hide the true 
nature of reality in some way, or help to reproduce unequal or unjust social 
relations? 
 
The concept of ideology, of course, adds an extra level of complexity to the 
thesis. I'll look at some of the issues involved in my use of the term both below 
and in chapter two. Here, I want to flag-up another important distinction that 
should be considered when approaching the subject of diversity: its use as a 
descriptive term and as a prescriptive term. Kenan Malik (2010) has argued for 
the importance of distinguishing between, on the one hand, the 'lived 
experience of diversity' and the recognition of a 'society transformed by mass 
immigration...that is less insular, more vibrant and more cosmopolitan', and, on 
the other hand, 'multiculturalism as a political process'. For Malik, the latter 
involves policies that aim to 'manage diversity by putting people into ethnic 
boxes, defining individual needs and rights by virtue of the boxes into which 
people are put, and using those boxes to shape public policy'. As is clear from 
the passages quoted, Malik regards the former as an undeniable good, but the 
latter as a largely negative phenomenon in society. 
 
Though Malik here contrasts diversity as a social reality with multiculturalism as 
a political project,11 another author already mentioned, Peter Wood, draws a 
similar distinction in relation to the more specific set of policies that diversity 
implies in the context of 'equality and diversity' (as outlined above). Wood 
contrasts diversity as the social variety that has always existed in the United 
States to the more recent practice that imposes a 'new kind of regimentation 
that fixes people into artificial categories and dispenses rewards in proportion to 
the size and political muscle of social groups' (Wood, 2003: quote taken from 
the back cover). Whether these kinds of criticisms are accepted or not, the 
                                                 
11
 See, also, Barry who draws a similar distinction (2001a: 22-3; 293). Stuart Hall (from a less 
critical perspective) has also distinguished between the adjectival and substantive use of the term, 
between the 'different cultural communities [that] live together and attempt to build a common life 
while retaining something of their "original" identity' and the 'problems of diversity and multiplicity 
which multi-cultural societies throw up' (quoted in Pitcher, 2007: 41). 
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important point is the distinction itself as this helps in clarifying exactly what it is 
that is being analysed. 
 
In this thesis I will be seeking to unravel the meaning and social significance of 
diversity in the prescriptive sense of the term: as a political idea that guides the 
formulation of a range of policies and institutional arrangements. As I've said 
above, I will also be following Wood in concentrating on the specific role 
diversity has played in the reformulation of equal opportunity (and other, similar) 
policies. However, my approach is more substantially theoretical than Wood's 
book. At the same time, it is also more empirically-focused than another book 
by an American writer on equality and diversity: The Trouble With Diversity by 
Walter Benn Michaels (2006). This book tends to use empirical examples 
merely to illustrate the main critical charge levelled against diversity: that it 
diverts attention from class inequalities thereby helping to sustain 
neoliberalism.12 In contrast, my aim is to develop a more systematic 
investigation of equality and diversity in Britain and how it has evolved over 
time, and to bring this together with a theoretical analysis of the key concepts 
involved. In this sense, while I am in broad agreement with the general critical 
trajectory of Michaels' analysis, my approach differs in that I treat equality and 
diversity less as a logically incoherent or normatively wrongheaded political 
theory, and more as a functioning, yet unstable, ideology, institutionally 
embedded within a particular society: Britain. 
 
In order to conduct this more systematic historical- and empirically-focused 
enquiry I have chosen a number of case studies: organisations that reflect a 
broad range of interests in society and which have clearly had a role to play in 
the development of equality and diversity in Britain. To be clear though: the 
objective of the case studies is not to analyse each individual organisation itself 
and its inner workings, nor is it to develop a sociological description of how 
equality and diversity policies operate at this level. Rather, the idea is that each 
organisation provides a kind of institutional reference-point for mapping out and 
understanding a broader ideological formation. I have therefore used the texts 
produced by these organisations, from the 1960s to the present day, to produce 
                                                 
12
 It should perhaps be noted that this book is written as a polemic, one that brings some of the 
arguments made in an earlier, more theoretical, book by Michaels (2004) to a wider audience. 
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this map. This has involved both the analytical task of dissecting the key 
concepts that arise in the texts and tracing their interaction, as well as the 
empirical task of providing a picture of the evolution of equality and diversity 
over time. The latter task has, in turn, involved looking at the problems that lay 
behind the emergence of diversity, the solutions the idea offered as an 
ideological framework,13 and the kind of conflicts and tensions that emerge as 
this framework develops. 
 
Alongside the theoretical questions addressed, then, this thesis is also an 
attempt to contribute towards our understanding of a particular empirical 
phenomenon: the rise of equality and diversity in Britain. This empirical aspect 
is not intended to merely provide a historical context to the theoretical 
arguments, nor is it meant simply as an illustration of these arguments. In this 
sense I have tried to follow the advice of Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000: 5) in 
avoiding the 'twin pitfalls of empiricism and theoreticism'. For these two authors, 
while theoretical frameworks and concepts are crucial, each case of analysis 
nevertheless involves not an automatic application of a preconstituted theory 
but rather an articulation of concepts 'in each particular enactment of concrete 
research'. An important part of the way in which the empirical feeds into the 
theoretical in this thesis lies in the specific history of equality and diversity that I 
have chosen to focus on. As we will see, an analysis of this history helps to 
refocus some of the theoretical questions that surround the significance of 
difference in contemporary society, questions more commonly treated – 
especially in a critical way – in relation to the broader topic of multiculturalism. 
 
 
1.2 Chapter Outline 
 
I begin by looking at the thought of two influential theorists of ideology: Ernesto 
Laclau and Slavoj Zizek; both have greatly influenced my approach to 
understanding the world and therefore form the natural starting point for the 
                                                 
13
 In much of the rest of this thesis I simply use the term 'framework'. This term is designed to denote 
a relatively small-scale ideological structure – i.e. something with less scope than an ideology in the 
sense of a 'world view'. I have drawn on Erik Bleich here and his definition of a 'frame' (2003: 26-9). 
As I have said, I will discuss the concept of ideology and related issues in more detail both below 
and in chapter two. 
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thesis. However, Laclau and Zizek are important for a second reason: issues in 
relation to diversity and multiculturalism have become perhaps the most 
significant point of divergence between the two thinkers over recent years. 
Exploring the debate between them helps to bring out some of the philosophical 
issues that lie behind the critique of diversity. More specifically, I argue that 
while Zizek's more recent focus on the economy is justified as an alternative to 
Laclau's conception of discourse, there is in fact quite a significant parallel 
between the two ontologies. Focusing on this can then help us reformulate 
some of Laclau's concepts such as myth, antagonism, and dislocation. This is 
useful as, in my opinion, these concepts are more readily applicable to an 
empirical analysis of the social world than Zizek's psychoanalytic concepts. 
 
In the following chapter I then provide a broad historical overview of the rise of 
diversity in Britain by highlighting three key sociological developments: 1) the 
origins of multiculturalism – focusing, in particular, on its emergence in local 
council politics in the 1980s; 2) the decline of class as a central reference point 
in society and the neoliberal policies that helped precipitate this decline; 3) the 
role that critique has played in the historically dynamic nature of multicultural 
politics. I do not intend in this chapter to explain the rise of diversity nor to 
provide a comprehensive historical description of the roots of equality and 
diversity; rather, the aim is simply to provide a context for the themes that 
emerge from the chapters that follow. I should add that in this chapter I often 
refer to 'multiculturalism' rather than 'equality and diversity'. This is because the 
distinction I have drawn above between the two agendas also has a historical 
dimension. Equality and diversity, to the extent that it is distinctive, can be seen 
as something that arises out of and, as a reaction to, earlier multicultural 
initiatives. Given this, it might perhaps be better to view the relationship not as a 
case of two distinct, yet overlapping, agendas, but rather as a case of a broader 
historical movement (multiculturalism) encompassing a variety of smaller sub-
trends, of which equality and diversity is one. 
 
Returning to the chapter outline, in chapters four to eight I present and analyse 
the findings from my case studies. In chapter four I look at two civil society 
organisations – the Runnymede Trust and the Fawcett Society – that campaign 
on the issues of race and gender equality respectively. The aim of this chapter 
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is somewhat different to the following chapters: I conduct a largely conceptual 
analysis of the texts produced by these two organisations in order to describe 
the basic ideological framework of equality and diversity. In the following 
chapters I then describe how this basic model is modified as it is taken up within 
the other organisational discourses. 
 
In chapter five I look at the corporate-influenced variant of diversity (which, as 
I've said, is probably the best-known influence on the rise of equality and 
diversity): 'diversity management'. Taking the texts of an employers' 
organisation, the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), and an equality and 
diversity consultancy firm called Schneider-Ross, I trace the rise of diversity as 
a modification of the traditional equal opportunity policies pursued in the 
corporate context. Alongside the (already mentioned) emphasis on the 
individual, rather than the group, as the proper subject of equality policies, I also 
look at two related ideas that are prominent: firstly, the 'business case' for 
equality policies in which the latter are presented as profitable to the 
organisation and not just a legal or moral demand; secondly, the importance of 
changing the culture of the organisation so as to be more receptive to equality 
and diversity policies. 
 
Following this, in chapter six, I trace the influence of diversity on the evolution of 
equality legislation through an analysis of texts produced by the New Labour 
government. I look at a number of developments such as the broadening scope 
and radicalism of legislation, and the attempt to tidy up the vast array of 
different acts in order to present a streamlined, modernised legal framework. 
Important parallels between this chapter and the previous one emerge: in 
particular, the link between diversity and a focus on the individual. The changed 
context however means that here it is the individual as a legal subject of rights, 
rather than as an economic subject in the workplace, that is most clearly 
articulated.  
 
In chapter seven the questions raised by the problem of socio-economic 
inequality, although touched on in the previous chapter, are here dealt with in 
more detail. I consider two case studies in which this issue is central: the TUC 
(Trades Union Congress) and the New Labour social exclusion discourse. I 
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track the rise of equality and diversity in both sets of texts in order to analyse in 
more detail the relationship between, on the one hand, identity-based 
inequality14 and, on the other, socio-economic and class inequality. More 
specifically, central issues include the decline of class conflict as a visible 
discursive presence, and the interaction between social exclusion and diversity 
as two different policy agendas dealing with inequality. In both case studies we 
see that the relationship between diversity and class inequality is somewhat 
more complex than might at first be thought, and it is these complexities that I 
try to bring out. 
 
The last of the case study chapters, chapter eight, looks at the way in which two 
discourses aim to respond to the problem of conflicts that appear to be caused 
by the increasing presence of equality and diversity in society. Firstly, I look at 
the EDF (Equality and Diversity Forum), which was set up as an umbrella body 
to represent equality and human rights organisations in Britain; the EDF 
emphasise human rights and other, non-legal, approaches to the problem of 
conflict. Secondly, I look at the New Labour community cohesion discourse: a 
modification of the traditional multicultural approach to race relations that 
emphasises the importance of a shared national identity and shared values 
among different communities in Britain. The aim here is to describe and contrast 
these different solutions offered, and to show how equality and diversity, 
understood as a unified discourse and field of activity, registers and responds to 
perceived problems that affect it. 
 
In the final chapter I bring the various threads of my argument together – both 
empirical and theoretical. My aim here is to do more than just summarise the 
findings of the previous chapters, it is to refine and extend the analysis in a 
number of ways: 1) by making explicit a process of integration, and the role 
played by the concept of diversity within that process, that has only been implicit 
                                                 
14
 'Identity-based inequality' is the term I use to refer to inequality suffered by the various non-class 
'minority' groups recognised within equality and diversity discourse: women, ethnic minorities, the 
disabled and so on. Women, of course, are not technically a minority in the sense that they compose 
more than half of the population. However, in the context of equality and diversity they can be 
included under the term as they are treated as a disadvantaged group in much the same way as the 
other groups mentioned. Conversely, while, depending on the definition, the working class could be 
understood as numerically a minority, there are significant differences in how they are recognised 
within the discourse, as I will show in detail in the following chapters. On the discursive difference 
between class and what I am calling identity-based inequality, see Coole (1996). 
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in previous chapters; 2) by linking my analysis to contemporary, especially 
critical, thinking on diversity and multiculturalism, specifying the key points – 
both substantive arguments as well as hypotheses for future research – that I 
hope this thesis will contribute to this line of thought; 3) by clarifying the limits of 
my analysis and the kinds of questions raised that I did not have the space or 
time to pursue. In the final section I have also added some brief reflections on 
the future trajectory of equality and diversity in Britain, and the likely impact of 
the present coalition government. 
 
 
1.3 Method and Research Design #1: The Critique of Ideology 
 
The overall tradition in which this thesis most obviously sits is that of ideology 
critique and, more precisely, the critical Marxist tradition, which sees discourses 
as 'ideological systems of meaning that obfuscate and naturalize uneven 
distributions of power and resources' with the 'critical task of exposing the 
mechanisms by which this deception operates' (Howarth, 2000: 4). This tradition 
is, of course, not as strong as it once was. Most obviously, this is due to the 
decline of Marxism and the pursuit of a materialist, scientific critique of ruling 
ideas. If Zizek has helped to resuscitate Marxism in recent times his work is 
certainly not a return to an orthodox critique of ideology, and, following this, I 
would not wish to place myself unproblematically in this tradition. Nonetheless, 
there are three general features of the Marxist critique of ideology that have 
clearly influenced me in relation to my method. 
 
Firstly, we can distinguish between two elements of ideology critique as an 
approach to the analysis of ideas: one task is to evaluate whether a particular 
example of discourse is an ideology in the critical sense of the term i.e. does it 
help to reproduce inequality or injustice in some way? The second task is to 
explain, if this is the case, how this mystification, in practice, works. In this 
thesis I concentrate on this second question. In other words, my focus is less on 
the question of whether or not equality and diversity serves to 'obfuscate and 
naturalize' social inequality, and more on uncovering the way that this happens, 
the precise 'mechanisms' that can account for the success of equality and 
diversity as a functioning ideological formation. 
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This less critical-evaluative, more explanatory, approach to the question of 
diversity helps explain my emphasis on the novelty of diversity as an ideological 
concept, rather than its connection to pre-existing ideological traditions. This is 
in contrast to existing critiques of diversity and multiculturalism: Michaels and 
Malik, for example, have both stressed the similarities between contemporary 
conceptions of difference and more traditional forms of racial thinking. They 
argue, in different ways, that diversity gives old-fashioned, essentialised racial 
differences a new, more acceptable cultural veneer, while the fundamental 
structure of racial thinking nonetheless remains intact (see Malik, 1996: 
especially chapter six, and Michaels, 2006: especially chapter one). Brian Barry 
(2001a: 9-11), to take another example, has argued that multicultural thought 
sits within a tradition of anti-enlightenment reaction alongside figures such as 
Burke and de Maistre, while Zizek (1997: 43-4) has placed multiculturalism 
within the context of capitalist and imperialist ideology. The point here is that the 
critical method shared by these writers – despite their many differences – is to 
debunk the progressive appearance of the multicultural appeal to diversity by 
linking it to a more obviously reactionary tradition. While adopting this approach 
has undoubtedly generated some very useful results (I believe there is some 
truth in all of the arguments I've just cited), it does, I believe, leave space for 
more detailed investigations into what distinguishes diversity from previous, 
right-wing, ideological traditions.15 
 
The second aspect of my method that owes something to the Marxist critique of 
ideology is an emphasis on the historical, dynamic and changing nature of 
equality and diversity. I am not referring here to the question of how the rise of 
diversity fits within the broader historical process – this is not a question I deal 
with in any substantial way in this thesis.16 Rather, I mean the treatment of this 
                                                 
15
 This is not to suggest that critics of diversity have not also tried to define its specificity in this 
sense – I will contrast some of these critics' ideas with my own results in the concluding chapter. It is 
rather to say that, in my opinion, this constitutes a less developed area of critical thought on the 
subject. 
16
 Though it's perhaps worth noting some of the historical factors involved in existing explanations 
of diversity and the wider development of multiculturalism: neoliberalism (Michaels, 2006); the 
decline of class politics, the Left and Marxism (Zizek, 2000a; Gitlin, 1995: chapter three; Barry, 
2001a: 3-4); from a more positive point of view it has also been placed in the context of the rise of 
human rights and anti-racism (Kymlicka, 2010: 35-6), and conceptions of social citizenship and 
integration (Rex, 2004). I also discuss another factor (though very much related to issues of class and 
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development (the rise of diversity) as itself a historical process. More 
specifically, as a process in which contradictions and conflicts play a crucial role 
in driving forward change. In the chapters that follow, then, I am concerned less 
with the precise periodization of the history that I describe, and more with 
drawing the links between the signs of instability and tension that emerge at 
specific points in the texts, and the various developments that I chart. In this 
sense, throughout this thesis, I approach the relationship between diversity and 
equality – and, albeit to a lesser extent, cohesion – as a contradictory unity that 
forms initially as a response to social instability, but which tends to lead to new 
instabilities as it evolves. 
 
While, as I've said, I will explore some of the theoretical questions regarding the 
concept of discourse in chapter two, it's worth emphasising a third aspect of the 
Marxist approach to the critique of ideology that I subscribe to in my approach: 
the idea that texts and discourses constitute only one aspect of reality. This is in 
contrast to poststructuralist approaches that see reality as discursively 
constructed. While, as will become clear in chapter two, I am well aware that for 
Laclau the concept of discourse is used to mean something much broader than 
language in the sense of speaking and writing, here I reject this approach and 
use the term solely in the narrower sense. In this thesis, then, discourses are 
viewed alongside other dimensions of the social such as the state and the 
economy, and I look for the ways in which those discourses interact with these 
other entities, the way they 'reproduce and transform the material world' 
(Howarth quoting Parker, 2000: 3). In this sense I have taken the texts as both 
evidence of an underlying historical process that I try to document, and as 
having an effect on that process itself. 
 
In fact we can go further than the previous sentence and say that the case 
study texts in this thesis provide the material for three dimensions of analysis, 
dimensions that have been outlined by Michael Freeden as constituting the 
study of ideology. In a useful review-article on the subject, Aletta Norval (2000: 
321) writes that Freeden's 'morphological approach' requires: 'the conceptual 
analysis of political theorists, the empirical and contextual analysis of the 
                                                                                                                                               
citizenship) in the conclusion, which may be a fruitful line of future inquiry: the rise, especially post-
war, of efforts to redistribute resources and opportunities in response to social inequality. 
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historian, and an investigation of the morphological patterns that contribute to 
the determination of ideological meanings'. This is a helpful way of describing 
the three ways in which I use the case study texts in the following chapters: as a 
way of teasing out the meanings of the key terms involved, particularly 
'diversity'; as source material for a historical analysis of the rise of equality and 
diversity as an ideological framework; finally, I have also used the texts to 
analyse the specific contribution of discourse to that rise by locating the way in 
which the texts themselves have structured the semantic field and thereby 
helped to produce ideological meanings. 
 
In a broader sense (as mentioned above) the aim has been to combine the 
theoretical and empirical in approaching my subject-matter. In other words, I 
have attempted to traverse the space somewhere between an analytical study 
of the central concept of diversity – and related terms that appear within the 
texts (equality, cohesion, identity etc) – and an empirical study of those 
concepts at work in particular organisations, over time. Of course, there is a 
danger here of falling between both an analytical and an empirical study without 
producing a sufficient version of either. I think this risk is worth taking though 
because, if successful, my approach should in fact do the opposite: contribute 
to both types of understanding by highlighting the important relationship 
between ideological concepts and their historical and institutional context. 
Again, we can look to Michael Freeden's approach to the study of ideology and, 
specifically, how it should be distinguished from a purely political-theory 
approach. According to Norval (2000: 322), Freeden sees the analysis of 
ideology as a 'focus on the patterns, continuities and discontinuities political 
thinking displays, and the manner in which they shape what is politically 
possible. Intellectual effort should not be aimed at perfecting reality through 
thought-practices that distance one from it, but should aim to interpret its 
intricacies'. Freeden's approach therefore 'seeks to bridge the gap between, on 
the one hand, concrete explorations of ideologies, which have tended to be 
insufficiently analytical, and, on the other hand, theoretical treatments of 
ideology, which are silent about the differences in the nature and forms of 




1.4 Method and Research Design #2: The Case Studies 
 
In relation to how I have selected the texts that would support such an analysis, 
I should say firstly that I have chosen a multiple case study approach. As has 
been pointed out, a case study has the advantage of allowing in-depth study of 
a particular phenomenon. In this thesis this approach has enabled me to gain 
an insight into the way in which equality and diversity has developed in 
interaction with specific organisational goals in a way that a more general, 
across-the-board, approach wouldn't have. The disadvantage, however, is that 
wider generalisations cannot be drawn from a case study (Burnham et al, 2008: 
63-5). Taking multiple cases is therefore an attempt to correct this by combining 
relatively in-depth studies of particular organisations with a broader picture of 
the varied social locations in which equality and diversity has had an impact. 
Even so, given the limitations of time and space I have had to be as cautious as 
possible in drawing general conclusions from the evidence that I have collected 
here. One function of the concluding chapter is to suggest some more tentative 
ideas that have emerged from my research, ideas that would require more 
empirically detailed research to corroborate them than I was able to undertake 
here. 
 
In deciding which organisations to look at I aimed to ensure a varied selection 
by choosing from three areas of society: the state, the economy and civil 
society. I felt that seven organisations constituted about the right balance 
referred to in the previous paragraph: allowing a relatively in-depth look at each 
organisation while, at the same time, enabling a wider picture to emerge. The 
New Labour government was the obvious choice in relation to the state, but as 
there was such a wealth of material here – with a number of different strands of 
policy in which equality and diversity has been relevant – I accordingly treated it 
as three separate case studies (as described in the chapter outline above). In 
relation to the economy, the CBI and TUC represent employers and employees 
respectively and therefore provided a useful contrast, while Schneider-Ross, for 
their part, have a relatively strong presence as an equality and diversity 
consultancy company – most notably writing (at least what they claim is) the 
first book in Britain to argue for a diversity management approach to equal 
opportunities. Representing civil society, the Runnymede Trust and the Fawcett 
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Society are both prominent campaigners against the two types of inequality that 
have probably had the most politicised presence in society: race and gender 
respectively. Finally, the EDF, as an organisation, represents a unique attempt 
to bring an element of cohesion to a bewildering variety of NGOs (non-
governmental organisations) in the field and therefore also seemed a good 
choice in relation to this area of society. 
 
In general I tried to ensure that while interesting, the case study texts would be 
fairly representative of the wider equality and diversity discourse that they 
inhabit. In other words, while I've picked organisations from a variety of social 
locations my focus was squarely on the mainstream version of the discourse 
and not more radical or oppositional currents within it – though I do highlight the 
existence of these in the course of my discussion of the texts. It is also worth 
saying that with limited time and space there were, of course, many 
organisations that would have undoubtedly made useful case studies that I 
could not include. In particular, one key omission that should be mentioned is 
the previously existing equality commissions – the CRE (Commission for Racial 
Equality), the gender-focused Equal Opportunities Commission, and the 
Disability Rights Commission – as well as the single overarching commission 
into which they have been merged: the EHRC (Equality and Human Rights 
Commission). One reason for this – apart from simply the limits of time and 
space – is that, as non-departmental public bodies, they fell somewhere 
between civil society and the state, and these two areas of society were already 
represented in my case study choices. 
 
I should also add that, in relation to the state, I have not included any local 
councils despite the fact that this is the level at which equality and diversity 
policies are often administered. It should be kept in mind that my focus in this 
thesis is on equality and diversity as a relatively recent ideological 
phenomenon; I therefore felt that central government would be a better place to 
look for developments, to the extent that it is the latter that tends to provide the 
broader thinking behind the implementation of policies at a local level. However, 
as I have said, I do look briefly at the earlier local council policies of the 1980s 
in chapter three: an example of the reverse process in which novel ideological 
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trends appeared first at the local level, and were only later taken up by the 
government. 
  
Once I had selected the organisations to study I then chose from a number of 
different types of text produced by each organisation: reports were the main 
source of information, but I also looked at books, pamphlets, speeches by key 
figures within the organisation, website content, and so on. Bearing in mind the 
different dimensions of the analysis of ideology outlined above and the number 
of case studies, I felt that a largely qualitative analysis of these materials was 
sufficient to provide the results that I required.17 With this in mind, my aim was 
to take a representative sample of texts from each organisation rather than a 
fully comprehensive selection. This meant looking at the different types of 
source just mentioned, as well as texts from different periods in the history of 
each organisation. I also made an effort to include, in my sample, different 
voices within each organisation, in order to bring out any internal tensions. 
While, it must be said, most of my case studies were relatively consistent in this 
sense, this approach produced some useful results in relation to the TUC 
where, as we will see, there are some significant differences over the 
desirability of a 'diversity approach' to equality. 
 
I should also mention the fact that I analyse each individual case study as a 
single organisational discourse in a broad sense. By that I mean that I include 
as 'Fawcett texts' or 'EDF texts' pieces commissioned or produced by that 
organisation but not written by them, as well as talks at conferences by people 
not from the organisation in question. As I've said above, my primary aim in this 
thesis is to use the case studies to gain a picture of a broader social 
development, not to gain an in-depth understanding of the organisations 
themselves. With this in mind, I've treated each case study more as a 
reference-point within a wider discourse, representative of overlapping trends 
within that field, rather than as a unique voice. 
 
Finally, I should also mention the time-frame I've chosen from which to select 
the texts: the 1960s (for those case study organisations that existed at that 
time) to 2010. The 1960s marks the beginning of significant efforts to legislate 
                                                 
17
 For an example of a quantitative analysis of equality and diversity discourse, see Oswick (2011). 
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against race and gender equality and is therefore a good place to begin in 
charting the rise of equality and diversity – bearing in mind the important role 
played by legislation in that development. Equally, the New Labour government 
has been influential in pushing this legislation to the heights of the 2010 Equality 
Act, as well as generally giving unprecedented attention, for a government at 
least, to promoting the equality and diversity agenda in British society. 2010, 
which marked the fall of this government, therefore seemed a natural end-point 
for the period under study. 
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Chapter Two: Zizek, Laclau and Antagonism 
 
There is no doubt that Slavoj Zizek's work has had a huge impact on 
contemporary thought. His use of Lacanian psychoanalytic concepts, such as 
fantasy, jouissance, the real and so on, has produced a sophisticated model of 
subject-formation, which, as Vighi and Feldner (2007a) make clear, challenges 
both the classical Marxist critique of ideology and the poststructuralist reduction 
of ideology to discourse. This theory revolves around the centrality of the 
Lacanian real and the traumatic impact of a failure of our symbolically structured 
reality to which ideology constitutes a response, literally producing reality 
through the structuring of images and representations that 'suture' and make 
complete, and thereby 'liveable', an always-threatened symbolic order. This 
introduction of the real means that ideology can be understood in a critical 
capacity – i.e. it is a social phenomenon that can be criticized for its 
maintenance of a particular social order through its obfuscation of the cracks 
and fissures of that order (unlike in poststructuralism, it might be argued, where 
ideology is replaced by a concept of discourse that simply describes the fact of 
our symbolically-mediated world). However, it differs from the Marxist critical 
account by designating the non-ideological, from which a critical purchase on 
ideology is made possible, in negative rather than positive terms. As Zizek 
(1989: 49) sums up the difference in The Sublime Object of Ideology: 'in the 
predominant Marxist perspective the ideological gaze is a partial gaze 
overlooking the totality of social relations, whereas in the Lacanian perspective 
ideology rather designates a totality set on effacing the traces of its own 
impossibility'.18 
 
However, while there is a substantial literature assessing the theoretical 
foundations of this project,19 there has been much less attention to the question 
of the potential utility of Zizek's theory for an empirically-minded analysis of 
ideology (as well as society and politics more generally). This is no doubt partly 
due to the fact that, as John Thompson (1984: 232) points out, ideology tends 
to be a subject more commonly approached on the theoretical rather than the 
empirical level. However, I think it would be fair to say that the problem also lies 
                                                 
18
 Emphasis in the original – this will always be the case in this thesis unless otherwise stated. 
19
 See, for example, Vighi and Feldner (2007b) and Sharpe (2004). 
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at the level of Zizek's thought itself. The two, connected, issues in this respect 
are: a) his central concepts are psychoanalytic and work, not done by Zizek, is 
involved in translating them into usable concepts for the properly social field 
(this criticism is made by Ernesto Laclau, 2004: 315); b) his general approach is 
too formal so that while Zizek criticizes those approaches that substantialise 
society – on the grounds that the latter are unable to come to terms with the 
'traumatic kernel' of social antagonism (something that both Marxism and 
poststructuralism are, in their different ways, guilty) – he fails to answer how we 
should go about analyzing actually-existing 'substantial' societies (this criticism 
is made of the psychoanalytic approach to ideology more generally by Aletta 
Norval, 2000: 345-6). 
 
My aim in this chapter, then, is to try to correct this by developing some 
concepts from Zizek's thought that will be more helpful in analysing a concrete 
phenomenon: multiculturalism and, more specifically, the ideological framework 
underpinning the equality and diversity agenda in contemporary Britain. 
However, the argument I will make in order to do this involves elements of both 
Zizek and Laclau's respective ontologies. If, on the one hand, Zizek's concept of 
class antagonism is at the heart of my theoretical approach, it is Laclau who has 
developed concepts more applicable to understanding the social and political 
field, concepts that have been utilised in numerous empirical studies.20 
 
With this in mind, this chapter is split into two parts. In the first part, I look in 
more detail at the concept of antagonism at the heart of both Laclau and Zizek's 
social ontologies. In order to make sense of Zizek's move to an emphasis on 
class antagonism, I suggest, what I believe is, a useful homology between 
discourse theory and the Marxist tradition in terms of the idea of a social form or 
logic that moves from being applicable to a particular region or set of social 
practices (language in Laclau, the economy in Zizek) to having a more universal 
function as a way of conceiving of the social totality. This homology allows us to 
understand not only Zizek's critique of discourse theory, but also what Zizek's 
critique might gain from discourse theory in the task of elaborating concepts 
more suitable to empirical analysis. In the second part I focus on the task of 
deriving these concepts. The key terms I take from Laclau's work are: 1) the 
                                                 
20
 See, for example, the collection edited by Howarth et al (2000). 
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distinction between dislocation and antagonism or struggle; 2) myth and social 
imaginary; 3) the logics of equivalence and difference. All these terms have to 
be reworked in the context of the different Zizekian starting-point of class 
antagonism, though in this chapter I will concentrate largely on the first two sets 
of concepts listed here and leave the third set to the concluding chapter. 
 
A final point before I begin: my aim here is not to provide a full elaboration or 
assessment of Laclau or Zizek's thought. A proper study of either thinker, or 
indeed a full treatment of the philosophical questions that I touch on in this 
chapter are beyond its scope.21 What I have tried to do instead is pursue – in a 
far more single-minded manner (but, I should add, as rigorously as possible) – a 
particular line of thought that emerges from the dialogue between the two 
thinkers, a line of thought that I believe can provide some useful concepts for 
analysing the particular phenomenon under investigation. I have not therefore 
attempted to defend their thought directly from one of the more obvious 
criticisms: that their shared emphasis on contingency and subjectivity comes at 
the expense of a realist conception of social structure. While Zizek's criticisms 
of 'discursive idealism' clearly suggest a move in the direction of realism, I have 
had to largely sidestep this complex issue.22 
 
 
2.1 Class Antagonism 
 
I will begin with Laclau's key concept: antagonism.23 As he uses the term, it is 
more than simply a way of conceptualising political struggles, it pertains to the 
very core of social scientific enquiry: the constitution of objectivity itself. As 
Thomas Brockelman puts it: antagonism 
 
does not point to the 'inevitability of struggle' in a fashion pushing us in the proto-
fascist direction of Schmitt and social Darwinists but to a radical heterogeneity. The 
Other can never be reduced to an other, can never be only a particular being. Being 
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 Along with those books already cited on Zizek, see Torfing (1999) and Smith (1998) for full-
length studies of Laclau's thought. 
22
 See Callinicos (2006: 182-96) for a detailed discussion of this subject.  
23
 I refer to Laclau alone in this thesis – apart from where specific references are made to works 
authored jointly with Chantal Mouffe – not to discount her contribution, but rather because it is 
Laclau who has had the more sustained dialogue with Zizek. 
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itself is punctured by non-being and it is this 'punctuation' at the location of the term 
representing the whole that is the true 'antagonist' both in Hegemony and in Zizek's 
understanding. In other words, the truth of society is that its identity does not exist. 
As Laclau himself puts it, the point of antagonism is the 'impossibility of Society' 
(2003: 189). 
 
The idea, then, is that antagonism points 'beyond the positivity of the social'24 
and is part of a larger poststructuralist project that, as Alex Callinicos (2006: 
116) puts it, 'sees attempts to suture social relations into a closed totality 
constantly subverted by the inherent tendency of signification to exceed itself 
and thereby to escape all attempts to limit it'. Laclau's specific target within this 
broader intellectual movement is, of course, Marxism. The latter representing a 
good example, for him, of the way in which antagonism might be said to have 
been 'domesticated' in classical modernist epistemologies – that is, reintegrated 
within a rationally mastered totality revolving around objective laws of history 
and formal contradictions that do not threaten the basic integrity of society.25 
 
Now, the key task of this chapter is to establish the precise difference between 
Laclau's concept of antagonism as outlined above, and the very different way in 
which Zizek conceives of it in his later work. One way of approaching this 
question, and therefore the complex debates surrounding this concept, 
concerns the ambiguity of its meaning in Hegemony: as Thomassen (2005: 
635) puts it, antagonism is 'supposed to both prevent the fullness of identity and 
arise from the failure of fullness'. Zizek (1990) links his Lacanian criticism of the 
same ambiguity to Laclau and Mouffe's inadequate theorisation of the category 
of subject as simply a dispersion of subject positions. For the latter, the subject 
exists only as a discursively constructed subject-position whose fullness within 
a system of differences is threatened by the establishment of an antagonistic 
other and reconstituted on the basis of chains of equivalence – this is 
antagonism in the weaker sense. For Zizek (ibid: 250-2), on the other hand, the 
more radical potential meaning of antagonism is that it designates not simply 
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 This is the title of chapter three of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001) – I 
will refer to this book simply as Hegemony from now on. 
25
 'Marxism is not only a discourse of negativity and the opaqueness of the social, it is also an 
attempt – perfectly compatible with the Enlightenment – to limit and master them…It is from this 
mastery of totality that the moment of negativity loses its constitutive and foundational character: it 
shone for just a brief moment in theoretical discourse, only to dissolve an instant later into the full 
positivity which reabsorbed it' (Laclau, 1990: 94-5). 
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the antagonistic other that threatens your identity as discursive subject position, 
but rather pertains to the blocked nature of the subject before its subjectification 
– the Lacanian barred subject. Here the antagonism of the threatening other is 
simply a discursive manifestation of the subject's own inherent self-blockage – 
antagonism in the 'real', Lacanian sense. 
 
While Laclau welcomed Zizek's critique and reformulated the concept of 
antagonism by distinguishing dislocation as the limit of objectivity from 
antagonism as a discursive response to this dislocation (Laclau, 1990), it would 
nonetheless be fair to say that problems remain, that it continues to have an 
'ambiguous character' in his writings (Thomassen, 2005: 637). Part of the 
problem is that, as Brockelman (2003: 189-90) indicates, Zizek's critique points 
to more than a terminological problem. Rather, the concept of antagonism in its 
stronger sense 'entirely subverts the anti-essentialism and conventionalist 
historicism of Hegemony and subsequent texts'; or, to put this another way, the 
'problem with "subject-positions" is by no means accidental to the approach of 
Hegemony as a whole'. The basic problem is that the project of a radical and 
plural democracy and the post-Marxism that Hegemony introduces relies, at its 
core, on a plurality of different antagonisms within the social – i.e. different 
possible points of rupture as against the 'oneness' of Marxism and class. 
However, it is easy to see that this reintroduces the possibility of society as the 
'container' of these different antagonisms, a non-antagonistic space through 
which they can relate to each other as a plurality of different antagonisms prior 
to their overdetermination. As Brockelman puts it, continuing his description of 
Zizek's critique: 
 
Hegemony remains beholden, argues Zizek, to an Althusserian vision of the 
subject, one which conceives of society as constructed of various 'subject-positions' 
each of which brings its own 'point of view' on political matters. Such a vision of the 
political, however, implicitly already substantializes society – suggesting a master 
'viewpoint' of the social itself, a viewpoint from which all the discourses of the 
'subject-positions' are exposed as limited and ideological. 
 
For Zizek, on the other hand, the concept of antagonism 'disallows the 
constitution of society as substantial' (ibid: 190). 
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The key concept here is that of form. What Zizek (and Brockelman in his 
account of Zizek's position) are suggesting is that Laclau's concept of 
antagonism lacks a certain radicalism when it comes to the way in which it 
affects form in relation to society as the object of investigation. In other words, 
social forms continue to be successful in some way despite Laclau's focus on 
their 'impossibility'. In this chapter I want to argue that a useful way of 
conceptualising this difference is the distinction between the instability and the 
failure of form. While both Laclau and Zizek argue that a materialist theory 
depends on the negativity that affects form, this can be understood in two 
different ways: on the one hand, as a result of this negativity that affects form, 
the identity of elements are subject to a constant instability or indeterminacy, a 
constant displacement through which form as something fully successful is 
forever 'out of reach', so to speak.26 On the other hand, we can understand this 
negativity as a more radical failure of form, as a failure of the success of form in 
providing an identity for particular elements. In the first, form is forever out of 
reach of the particular; in the second, form is stained or marked by 
particularity.27 This way of putting it would also be a useful way, I believe, of 
characterising the disagreement in relation to the subject that I've summarised 
above: on the one hand, the subject of poststructuralism is one that is subject to 
the instability of discourse, the endless 'play of signifiers' forever producing new 
subject-positions; on the other hand, the Lacanian subject is subject to the 'real' 
– a basic failure of discourse or the symbolic, around which the latter is 
structured. 
  
While, as far as I know, it has not been put in exactly these terms (the 
distinction between the instability and the failure of form), this nonetheless aims 
to capture a fairly standard distinction between poststructuralism and the 
psychoanalytic critique led by Zizek – in the sense that the latter introduces a 
more radical negativity at the heart of being understood as formally 
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 The 'form and essence of objects are penetrated by a basic instability and precariousness, and...this 
is their most essential possibility' (Laclau and Mouffe, 1990: 109). 
27
 This difference is, of course, often described by Zizek using Hegelian terminology, such as the 
concrete universal. He has also – in line with this – accused Laclau of being a secret Kantian. For 
example, in one of his more recent books, Zizek (2008: 294) writes that it is 'Laclau who is here (like 
Kant) all too naive in his critical stance, namely, in his assertion of the irreducible gap between 
empty universality and its distorted representation. From my Hegelian standpoint, this gap can be 
overcome. How? Not through the arrival of an adequate direct presentation of the universal, but so 
that distortion as such is asserted as the site of universality: universality appears as the distortion of 
the particular'. 
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constructed.28 However, what concerns me in this chapter, as I have said, is 
how to go about generating some useful concepts through which we can 
understand concrete ideological formations, and I am not convinced that 
psychoanalytic concepts are particularly useful here. A related issue is the 
problem of deriving the categories that Zizek is increasingly dependent on, such 
as class and capital, from this more radical conception of negativity: why should 
the psychoanalytic critique of poststructuralism lead to a rehabilitation of these 
Marxist categories?29 The best way forward I believe is to shift the starting-point 
in relation to the characterisation of the form that the different types of negativity 
affect. Poststructuralism and psychoanalysis both conceive of social form in 
terms of language or the symbolic so that the difference between Laclau and 
Zizek is often formulated, as I've suggested, as the difference between a less 
radical instability of discourse and its more radical failure.30 What I am 
suggesting instead is that we rethink this difference as the instability of the 
commodity-form versus a more radical failure of this form. It is at this point, 
then, that my characterisation of the difference between the poststructuralist 
and psychoanalytic conceptions of negativity as the difference between the 
instability and the failure of form gains its pertinence – it allows us to re-read the 
difference between the thinkers in relation to the commodity-producing structure 
of capitalism rather than in relation to the system of signs in discourse theory. 
 
In order to justify this shift of emphasis from the symbolic to capital, we need to 
take a slower journey from one to the other than is usually the case with Zizek, 
who tends to move more rapidly between them. First of all we need to look 
more closely at Laclau's concept of discourse: discourse is the 'primary terrain 
of the constitution of objectivity as such', it is not restricted to language or 
linguistic practices such as speech and writing, but is instead 'any complex of 
elements in which relations play the constitutive role' (Laclau, 2005: 68). The 
key point concerning Laclau's concept of discourse is this stress on the formal 
relations by which objects are constructed and the concomitant rejection of a 
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 See Daly (2009) for more on this. 
29
 Laclau (2005: 235) has described this feature of Zizek's thought as 'two incompatible ontologies: 
one linked to psychoanalysis and the Freudian discovery of the unconscious, the other to the 
Hegelian/Marxian philosophy of history'. 
30
 It should be pointed out that this is the case even in Zizek's writings to the extent that he often 
equates the social with the Lacanian symbolic, while, at the same time, putting forward an idea of 
capital as the real of our times – causing confusion that Laclau (2000a: 291-2) has rightly picked up 
on. 
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discursive/extra-discursive distinction. There is no 'beyond the play of 
differences, no ground which would a priori privilege some elements of the 
whole over the others' (ibid: 69). In response to the often-made criticism that 
this theory involves an idealistic reduction of social reality to language made by 
a number of authors (see, for example, Geras, 1987), Laclau has put forward 
the following argument many times: that to say that society is discursively 
constructed does not in any way involve reducing everything to language. 
Rather, what is involved is a practical ontology in which linguistic and non-
linguistic elements are articulated into relational ensembles, and it is through 
this process that those elements – from the most abstract concepts to brute 
material objects – gain their identity (a process that Laclau and Mouffe call the 
'social production of meaning', 2001: 107). 
 
However, the key question to raise in relation to this critique and counter-
critique of discourse theory is this: if we accept the idea of a practical ontology 
in which elements (linguistic and non-linguistic) come together in the production 
of a structured formation, what, then, is the nature of the continuing link with 
language that is implied by the use of the term 'discourse'? In a critical reader 
on Laclau, David Howarth (2004: 265) has described Laclau's use of the term 
'discourse' as relying on the 'trope of catachresis': 
 
That is to say, he 'creatively misapplies' the concept of discourse to encompass all 
dimensions of social reality and not just the usual practices of speaking, writing, 
and communicating. This displacement is, of course characteristic of a number of 
different approaches to social and political analysis. One has only to think of the 
way in which rational choice theorists model social and political behaviour on the 
behaviour of firms and private markets. 
 
However, while this point may help orientate discourse theory within the range 
of different approaches to social and political analysis, it does not really help in 
defending discourse theory against critics of the approach, as rational choice 
theory, to take Howarth's example, can be criticised precisely because it models 
behaviour on a set of untenable economistic assumptions. Indeed, Howarth 
himself follows the preceding passage by raising the 'key issue': 'how far can we 
extend Laclau's resultant analogy between language and society' (ibid: 266). 
Laclau's (2004: 323) response to this question is worth noting in full, he writes: 
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let me say that I have never established an 'analogy' between language and 
society, so I do not think it is really a pertinent question such as 'how far we can 
extend Laclau's resultant analogy between language and society'. What I have 
said, which is entirely different, is that social practices – language included – are 
structured by logics of equivalence and difference; that the discursive model is not 
a linguistic one which should be opposed to a certain 'social' constituted through a 
different paradigm. 
 
In this sense the answer to the question I pose above is not simply that the 
study of language provides certain useful tools and simplifying assumptions that 
can help in social and political analysis; rather, there is a much deeper 
ontological claim: that language and society share exactly the same formal 
structure. 
 
It is important then not to get sidetracked by the question of linguistic 
reductionism or determinism at the level of particular social practices; rather, it 
is social forms that are characterised as fundamentally linguistic. This is why 
one of the key developments in the emergence of discourse theory is the 
formalisation of linguistics by the Copenhagen school, a point made by both 
Laclau and Jacob Torfing. Laclau (2001), for example, argues that this linguistic 
formalism 'by breaking the link between linguistic categories and the substance 
that we call speech, made possible the extension of structural analysis to the 
ensemble of social life and opened the way to a generalised semiology'. 
Similarly, Torfing (1999: 89) writes that 'if linguistic analysis is no longer 
necessarily attached to a particular phonic or semantic substance and thus 
becomes an analysis of pure forms, there are no limits to the application of the 
abstract schemes of linguistic analysis'. We might put the point like this: 
'language' in discourse theory names not specific practices (speech, writing 
etc), but a social form that shifts from being applicable to a particular set of 
practices, a particular region in society, to one that encompasses all social 
practices. It names a kind of universal, mediating form through which any 
element can be understood.31 
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 This does not of course mean that Laclau thinks that material objects do not exist outside this set 
of formal relations. As Laclau and Mouffe (1990: 100-1) note in their reply to Geras: the 'fact that a 
football is only a football as long as it is integrated within a system of socially constructed rules does 
not mean that it thereby ceases to be a physical object. A stone exists independently of any system of 
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What, then, are the consequences of this understanding of a universal social 
form as linguistic? At this point I should perhaps repeat the note of caution 
expressed above: we have clearly entered into very complicated philosophical 
territory, raising questions about form, society and language that take us far 
beyond the scope of the discussion here. As I've said, I am concerned to merely 
establish a useful way of understanding the differences and similarities between 
Laclau and Zizek's respective ontologies. With this in mind, I want to, rather 
than answer the question posed as such, simply establish an important parallel 
between the two theorists in relation to language, on the one hand, and the 
economy, on the other. We need to now, then, turn to Zizek's focus on the 
latter. 
 
Zizek follows the Marxist tradition, and especially the Western Marxist strand of 
that tradition, in seeing the commodity-form as key to understanding 
contemporary societies. In his dialogue with Butler and Laclau he argues that 
 
one of the great and permanent results of the so-called 'Western Marxism' first 
formulated by the young Lukacs is that the class-and-commodity structure of 
capitalism is not just a phenomenon limited to the particular 'domain' of economy, 
but the structuring principle that overdetermines the social totality, from politics to 
art and religion (Zizek, 2000a: 96). 
 
In The Parallax View Zizek (2006: 56) describes this structure as 'a kind of 
socio-transcendental a priori, the matrix which generates the totality of social 
and political relations'. Zizek's focus on the commodity-form is, then, analogous 
to Laclau's focus on the sign, in the sense that the commodity-form for Zizek is 
not tied to a particular region, or particular set of practices, but one through 
which all social practices are subsumed and can be understood. One useful 
phrase for this, given by Zizek (2010: 198), is that the commodity-form 
becomes, in modern capitalist societies, a 'historically specific transcendental a 
priori'. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
social relations, but it is, for instance, either a projectile or an object of aesthetic contemplation only 
within a specific discursive configuration'. 
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In History and Class Consciousness Lukacs (1968: 85) writes of the 'qualitative 
difference between the commodity as one form among many regulating the 
metabolism of human society and the commodity as the universal structuring 
principle'. He goes on to describe what could be understood as a formalisation 
of economics as a crucial condition of this state of affairs – analogous to the 
formalisation of linguistics in relation to the development of discourse theory: 
 
in the first place, the mathematical analysis of work-processes denotes a break with 
the organic, irrational and qualitatively determined unity of the product. 
Rationalisation in the sense of being able to predict with ever greater precision all 
the results to be achieved is only to be acquired by the exact breakdown of every 
complex into its elements and by the study of the special laws governing 
productionEThe unity of a product as a commodity no longer coincides with its 
unity as a use-value: as society becomes more radically capitalistic the increasing 
technical autonomy of the special operations involved in production is expressed 
also, as an economic autonomy, as the growing relativisation of the commodity 
character of a product at the various stages of production (ibid: 88-9). 
 
This form then extends, just as in discourse theory, to all social practices: 
 
Reification requires that a society should learn to satisfy all its needs in terms of 
commodity exchange. The separation of the producer from his means of 
production, the dissolution and destruction of all 'natural' production units, etc., and 
all the social and economic conditions necessary for the emergence of modern 
capitalism tend to replace 'natural' relations which exhibit human relations more 
plainly by rationally reified relations. But this implies that the principle of rational 
mechanisation and calculability must embrace every aspect of lifeEOnly when the 
whole life of society is thus fragmented into the isolated acts of commodity 
exchange can the 'free' worker come into being; at the same time his fate becomes 
the typical fate of the whole society (ibid: 91). 
 
Lukacs continues: the 'atomisation of the individual is, then, only the reflex in 
consciousness of the fact that the "natural laws" of capitalist production have 
been extended to cover every manifestation of life in society' (ibid: 91-2). 
 
We can summarise the analogy like this then: for both Laclau and Zizek, a 
social form becomes detached from a particular region of society (language and 
the economy) and comes to denote the fundamental ontological structure of the 
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social world – a structure that includes elements both from the region itself (i.e. 
linguistic and economic practices) and from outside that region. Moreover, the 
development of both of these ontologies is linked to the rise of modern 
capitalism. For Zizek, this is obviously the case. However, it should also be 
noted that the same is true for Laclau: he and Mouffe note that the 'centrality we 
give to the category of "discourse" derives from our attempt to emphasize the 
purely historical and contingent character of the being of objects', but that this is 
not a 'fortuitous discovery which could have been made at any point in time; it 
is, rather, deeply rooted in the history of modern capitalism'.32 
 
There is nothing new in suggesting a link between language and a commodity-
economy as systems of difference and equivalence – indeed Laclau and 
Mouffe, themselves, draw this parallel in Hegemony (2001: 146). What is new, 
perhaps, is to emphasise this homology in relation to Laclau and Zizek's 
differing ontologies; however, this to me seems to be a productive way of 
reading Zizek. On the one hand, it suggests a defence of his focus on the 
economy (and the related concepts of capital, class etc) in a way that avoids the 
criticism of economic reductionism or determinism by utilising the way in which 
discourse theory itself avoids this charge in relation to language. For example, 
we could replace 'language' with 'economy' and 'discursive' with 'capitalist 
production' and the passage from Laclau (cited above) would make a good 
defence, I believe, of Zizek's focus on the economic: what Zizek could be said 
to claim is that (paraphrasing Laclau, 2004: 323) 'social practices – economic 
included – are structured by logics of equivalence and differenceEthe capitalist 
production model is not an economic one which should be opposed to a certain 
"social" constituted through a different paradigm'. 
 
On the other hand, this homology between Laclau and Zizek also leaves us in a 
good position to grasp the specificity of the difference between them. One way 
of putting this relates to Zizek's critique of Laclau's historicism. For Laclau, 
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 They go on to compare societies where the 'reproduction of material life is carried out by means of 
fundamentally repetitive practices' and where the 'discursive sequences which organize social life are 
predominantly stable' with the contemporary world in which 'technological change and the 
dislocating rhythm of capitalist transformation constantly alter the discursive sequences which 
construct the reality of objects' (Laclau and Mouffe, 1990: 118-9). It is only in the latter that the 
discovery of discourse – and the concomitant separation of linguistic form from content – becomes 
possible. 
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when meaning fails, when signifiers become loosened from their taken-for-
granted signifieds, we can talk about historicism – i.e. the shifting nature of 
ways of producing meaning. However, we cannot talk about historicity proper, 
as the system of signs through which social interaction is mediated is not a 
historically specific transcendental a priori, to use Zizek's phrase. In other 
words, in Laclau's theory when this system fails, when meaning breaks down, a 
series of hegemonic struggles attempt to fix that system. In contrast, what Zizek 
calls, the 'class-and-commodity structure of capitalism' is historically specific in 
this way, and Zizek's concept of 'class antagonism' aims to capture this 
dynamic. In representing the breakdown of the commodity-form as universal 
structuring principle, class antagonism provides the opportunity to change that 
system, not simply reproduce it in a different way.33 
 
We can see then that it is here that the more radical conception of negativity put 
forward in the psychoanalytic critique of poststructuralism becomes significant. 
Using my previous distinction we could argue that Zizek's concept of class 
antagonism attempts to grasp the failure of the commodity-form (as universal 
structuring principle), while Laclau (and poststructuralism more generally) can 
be said to merely describe the instability of that form. To put this another way, 
we can observe that in Laclau's work it is noticeable how the commodity-form 
doesn't fail. 
 
I'll finish this section with two examples of this last point. Zizek has provided a 
Marxist critique of Laclau on this issue in response to the latter's argument that 
the source of class antagonism 'cannot be internal to the capitalist relations of 
production, but has to be sought in something that the worker is outside those 
relations, something which is threatened by them: the fact that below a certain 
level of wages the worker cannot live a decent life, and so on' (Laclau, 2000b: 
202): 
 
I not only endorse Laclau's anti-objectivist stance; I even think that when he 
opposes 'objective' relations of production and 'subjective' struggle and resistance, 
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 Malik (1996: 247-8) has also argued, in relation to postmodern theories of 'contingency' and 
'indeterminacy', that 'it is precisely indeterminacy that is the foundation of ahistoric explanations. In 
order to be historically or socially specific one must understand the determinations of any social fact 
and its relationship with the totality in which it appears. Repudiating such certainty, and celebrating 
ambivalence, denies us the ability to grasp social phenomena in their specificity'. 
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he makes too much of a concession to objectivism. There are no 'objective' 
relations of production which can then involve or not involve the resistance of the 
individuals caught up in them: the very absence of struggle and resistance – the 
fact that both sides involved in relations accept them without resistance – is already 
the index of the victory of one side in the struggle (Zizek, 2000b: 319-20). 
 
A similar 'concession to objectivism' is also picked up by two non-Marxist 
authors: J. K. Gibson-Graham and Michele Barrett. In Hegemony Laclau and 
Mouffe (2001: 160-4) describe the historical conditions underpinning the new 
conditions of plurality in which social actors now find themselves in the 
contemporary world. This novel context is brought about by the dislocations 
wrought by post-war capitalism, which have, in commodifying ever greater 
areas of the social, led to a plurality of antagonisms in their wake. Here, as both 
Gibson-Graham and Barrett have pointed out, Laclau and Mouffe rely on a 
conception of capitalism as a seemingly autonomous logic of commodification. 
Barrett (1994: 257), for example, states that their thesis about post-World War II 
capitalist development is 'concerned with the expansion of capitalist relations 
into previously non-capitalist areas, but it rests on an extraordinary construction 
of capitalism as being about "commodification" but not necessarily about 
labour/capital contradictions'. For Barrett 'what is interesting about their 
constitution of "capitalism" is that it remains an elemental and undefined agent 
in the argument – yet an agent whose existence they have, in general terms, 
challenged'. Similarly, Gibson-Graham (1996: 6), in remarking on the same 
argument of Laclau and Mouffe's concerning the commodification of social 
relations, notes the 'sense that these processes are driven by a logic (in other 
words they are the phenomenal expressions of an underlying essence)'. The 
key point, then, is that for Laclau the commodity-form, and the process of 
commodification more generally, plays an important role in his social theory, but 







2.2 Reworking Laclau's Concepts #1: Dislocation and 
Antagonism 
 
I have spoken above of 'class antagonism' as the failure of the commodity-form 
as a universal structuring principle or transcendental a priori. However, in order 
to try to make this a more usable concept for an empirical inquiry (or, at least, a 
more empirically-minded inquiry), it is worth distinguishing between two aspects 
of the antagonism in a way that Laclau has, but Zizek has not. What I want to 
suggest is that class antagonism should be seen, following Laclau, as a broader 
term including two distinct dimensions: dislocation and class struggle. 
 
We saw above that Laclau initially introduced the concept of dislocation in 
response to Zizek's early criticism of Hegemony. This shift meant that social 
antagonism was now conceived as a potential response to a more fundamental 
negativity preceding it: since the publication of New Reflections Laclau has 
thought of identity as 'inherently dislocated because constituted around a lack in 
the Lacanian sense. In this sense, antagonism is one way to discursively 
master the limit of representation – namely the lack – even if these attempts to 
master the lack always ultimately fail' (Thomassen, 2005: 635). This more 
radical negativity results from the 'disruption of a structure by forces operating 
outside it', to use Laclau's concise definition (1990: 50). With Zizek's change of 
emphasis from language to the economy, we can use a similar definition to 
describe the dislocations of the class-commodity structure of modern capitalism. 
 
In order to expand on this definition it is important to say more about the 
concept of structure that is involved here. This concept is not particularly 
theorised in Zizek's writings; if he has clearly made a case for the key 
structuring role of the commodity, a corresponding notion of a class structure 
does not follow in his work. This can undoubtedly be linked to the fact that, as 
I've noted above, Zizek continues to equate the social with the Lacanian 
symbolic order, despite his Marxist theoretical commitments. Matters are further 
complicated by the fact that, on the one hand, Zizek emphasises the essential 
contingency and antagonism at the heart of any conception of structure or 
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objectivity in a manner reminiscent of a poststructuralist such as Laclau.34 On 
the other hand, one of Zizek's key positions in his theorisation of capitalism is a 
decisive rejection of the economy as nothing more than a sedimented practice. 
He has written, for example, that for him there definitely is an object 'the 
economy' that is not just a theoretical abstraction, an object 'whose inner logic 
can be deployed through the immanent analysis of its notional structure'. For 
Zizek, if one 'does not take this abstraction seriously, then [using Devenney's 
words] "other aspects of the social totality would not be seen" in their concrete 
role within social totality'. In this sense, '[c]apitalism is not just the outcome of 
multiple discursive strategies and struggles for hegemony – the "logic of the 
capital" is a singular matrix which designates its real' (Zizek, 2007: 211). 
 
One way of proceeding here is to understand Zizek as putting forward two 
dimensions of social practice: one at the level of the practices that fall under a 
particular, historical, transcendental a priori (this is the level at which discourse 
theory is practiced); the second at the more fundamental level of the 
transcendental a priori itself. The social structure that emerges can be 
understood as a result of both of these aspects. On the one hand, as I've 
already stressed, from the point of view of the situated 'discursive' subject, 
capital clearly exists as an object, 'out there', and serves to establish the 
fundamental coordinates of social life. Here, practical activity can emerge 
around the edges, so to speak, in the gaps and interstices opened up by 
dislocatory pressures – but it is activity that is clearly structured in the realist 
sense of that term. On the other hand, where Zizek's concept of class 
antagonism seems to lead us is towards the assertion of a more fundamental 
dimension of practice that for Zizek constitutes this formal object itself. 
 
Further weight for this interpretation can be found in the introduction to The 
Parallax View: there he distinguishes his project from Lukacs' thought: the 
'problem is not how to overcome the external opposition of thought and being 
by deploying their practico-dialectical mediation, but how, from within the flat 
order of positive being, the very gap between thought and being, the negativity 
of thought, emerges'. In this sense, while 'Lukacs et al. endeavour to 
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 In Tarrying With the Negative he writes that the Lacan he defends 'accepts the "deconstructionist" 
motif of radical contingency, but turns this motif against itself, using it to assert his commitment to 
Truth as contingent' (Zizek, 1993: 4). 
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demonstrate how thought is an active-constitutive moment of social being', 
Zizek aims at 'the “practical” aspect of the very passivity of thought: how is it 
possible, for a living-being, to break/suspend the cycle of the reproduction of 
life, to install a non-act, a withdrawal into reflexive distance from being, as the 
most radical intervention?' (Zizek, 2006: 6). As I understand Zizek's thought, the 
commodity-form as a universal structuring principle of contemporary societies 
names precisely just such a prior moment of practice by which the very 
possibility of a social subject becomes possible. It is only after this that the 
interaction between subjects and their objective conditions of existence that 
Lukacs describes becomes possible. 
 
Does this then lead back to a base-superstructure model, as Laclau (2005: 236) 
suggests, with a more fundamental economic level determining (in an albeit 
complex manner) non-economic superstructures? I would argue against this 
conclusion. While it is true that, for Zizek, there is 'something more fundamental 
than the struggle for hegemony' (as Laclau puts it, ibid) this is not itself 
understood as completely non-political in the sense that a determining 
economic base is. Rather, the point is the politicisation of this more fundamental 
level; that is, we don't have to choose between an apolitical economic 
determination, or a discursive theory of pure contingency.35 Indeed, as I have 
argued above, these positions have less between them than it would at first 
appear: the reason why Laclau emphasises contingency at the expense of a 
theorisation of determination is because the system of signs of discourse theory 
denotes a transcendental a priori that doesn't fail, which is not historically 
specific in this precise way. In this sense discourse theory can be understood 
as a theory of capital as an unstable, but nonetheless successful social form. 
This is why in Laclau's argument – as Barrett points out (above) – capital, as a 
social form or structuring principle, clearly does have very important 
determinant effects and therefore a key empirical presence. However, it is 
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 John Rosenthal (1988: 50-1), in his critique of Laclau and Mouffe, makes a similar point regarding 
the idea of the determination of the economic 'base': 'by analyzing class division out of the very 
concept of capital, what we find is that the space of the economy is itself shot through with political 
antagonism, that far from being the autonomous instance uniquely determining processes at other 
"superstructural" levels, the economic is determinant only insofar as the other instances can be 
understood as participating in its constitution, and this is precisely the reason that we are here 
dealing with overdetermined instances rather than isolable domains of activity'. 
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simply a taken-for-granted empirical fact, without an analysis of points of 
rupture, failure and consequent struggle.36 
 
Another way of making this point is in relation to the concept of the 'political', 
relied upon by Laclau. As Glyn Daly (2009) argues, drawing on the thought of 
Badiou: for Zizek, Laclau's political/politics distinction taken from Lefort (politics 
as a particular demographic region of the social versus the political as the 
ontologically constitutive moment that founds the social) is not so clear-cut: 
 
Badiou, for example, argues convincingly that what is called the political cannot be 
universalized or resolved philosophically in a once-and-for-all manner. The political, 
in this regard, is always bound by a politicsEThe distinction Lefort makes between 
politics and the political becomes consequently more blurred. There exists rather an 
ongoing interweaving of the two moments (of politics and the political), in 
characteristic fashion, within the terms of a broader configuration which we might 
call the historical mode of politics (ibid: 281). 
 
Further on, Daly argues in a similar manner that the 'political is never a simple 
purity but is always grounded or "economized" in some way (economized, that 
is, as a political constitution)' (ibid: 293), and adds in a footnote a useful 
qualification: 
 
To avoid misunderstanding, 'the political' certainly cannot be reduced to the 
'economic' – there is always the possibility of rupture/event and so on. Equally, 
however, we cannot speak of the political as axiomatically disengaged. Here the 
primacy of the political should be understood as the primacy of demarcating and 
structuring the space(s), or the mode, in which the logics of constitution and 
subversion become historically operational. It is neither the Political or the 
Economic but, in this broader sense, political-economy (ibid: 300).
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 Again, Rosenthal (1988: 51) makes a similar point: 'Laclau and Mouffe recognize this incidence 
of political struggle within the space of the economic as well, but they do so as if it were just "there 
to be recognized," existing in the empirical-concrete of politico-discursive practices'. In other words, 
the political already exists in the economic as a simple empirical fact; it does not threaten the 
economic as an objective, formal structure in a more complex, 'dialectical' fashion, as it does for 
Zizek. 
37
 The equivalent in discourse theory would be to see that there is a political moment at the heart of 
the process in which the sign comes to take the role of universal structuring principle or 
transcendental a priori – but as we have seen it is this political moment (or political-economic 
moment as Daly suggests) that is tellingly excluded. Discourse arises from a purely intellectual 
recognition of contingency, albeit one that has a key economic-technological process – the rise of 
capitalism – as its 'condition of possibility' (as I've noted above). 
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A 'mode' in which the 'logics of constitution and subversion become historically 
operational' is a good definition, I think, of the capitalist structure as Zizek 
understands it. 
 
I believe, then, that Zizek's shift towards the economy can be defended from the 
charge that he resuscitates an outdated base/superstructure model. 
Furthermore, this shift has an important impact on the concept of dislocation. 
For Laclau all social conflicts tend to be understood in the same way: as 
antagonisms that emerge in response to dislocations (as we will see in more 
detail below). This is because his conception of structure as discursive – as the 
totality of relations that emerge from the production of a (temporarily) stable 
system of signs – ensures that there is no fundamental distinction in the way in 
which struggles can affect that structure. Zizek's focus on the commodity-form, 
however, changes this, enabling a distinction to be made: struggles can be 
identified as dislocatory to the extent that they produce identities that fall outside 
the social structure and disrupt it from this position (recall Laclau's definition of 
dislocation: the 'disruption of a structure by forces operating outside it'). 
 
In order to develop this idea, we can build on the often-made point about a key, 
and novel, feature of the commodity-form as an organising principle in society: 
that of the formal equality and freedom of individuals as commodity-owners.38 
This principle is not only important in the functioning of a market-based 
economic system, but has, in many countries, become a key principle in 
organising social relations through the development of liberal-democratic 
institutions. At the same time, however, these same societies continue to 
display significant inequality and social divisions that tend to put this principle of 
formal equality under strain.39 One way of conceptualising this instability is 
through the concept of dislocation: a social conflict – say, over racism – can 
lead to the emergence of an unequal social identity – say, black people in 
Britain – that both stands outside the class-commodity structure to the extent 
that this identity is not a class, and disrupts that structure through the presence 
                                                 
38
 'The sphere of circulation or commodity exchange, within whose boundaries the sale and purchase 
of labour-power goes on, is in fact a very Eden of the innate rights of man. It is the exclusive realm 
of Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham' (Marx, 1976: 280). 
39
 See Wallerstein (1991) for an example of this type of argument. 
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of this group as an embodiment of inequality, and therefore the failure of formal 
equality in society. 
 
We can then distinguish this type of conflict from class struggle using Laclau's 
model. Antagonism is theorised, by Laclau, as a possible response to 
dislocation that, on the one hand, can have a stabilising function in that a 
relatively unified social identity or space is established, internal to the social 
structure, through the expulsion of an enemy that threatens it. However, as 
Torfing (1999: 131) notes: '[e]mphasis on the stabilizing function of social 
antagonism should not allow us to forget that social antagonism is also a source 
of dislocationESocial antagonism is undoubtedly a double-edged sword, as it 
constitutes and sustains social identity by positing a threat to that very identity'. 
  
Class struggle can be similarly understood as a possible response to 
dislocation; a response characterised by the introduction of certain equivalential 
effects into society. These effects can be said to have precisely the ambiguous 
consequences that Torfing identifies. On the one hand, it can serve to produce 
an identity, the working-class, that provides a relatively stable space within the 
class structure; a space in which the different demands and interests generated 
by the dislocatory effects of the economic crises and social conflicts generated 
by capitalism can be brought together and articulated. In other words there is a 
simplification of social space so that previously disarticulated fragments can be 
fused together and incorporated into a single social group. However, this 
process through which the negative effects of dislocations are positivised (to 
use Laclau and Mouffe's terminology) can only be achieved at the price of 
transferring this negativity to an enemy that threatens the identity: an exploiting 
capitalist class. The threat from this type of inequality is distinct, then, from that 
of dislocations: while both types of struggle can be said to cause the 
commodity-form to fail as the universal structuring principle in society, 
dislocatory struggles produce identities that lie outside or are excluded from the 
social structure, the former – class struggle – produces an identity that is an 
unequal antagonist within that structure. 
 
While this is only a brief sketch and I am not able to here expand on this 
argument, the advantage of drawing this distinction between class struggle and 
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dislocation – as two component parts of Zizek's concept of class antagonism – 
is that it enables an understanding of the difference between class and non-
class inequalities that avoids collapsing the two together as Laclau does.40 
Equally, this distinction means that we can avoid any suggestion that non-class 
inequalities are insignificant – they are as significant as dislocations are in 
Laclau's theory. The common link among the huge variety of conflicts and 
struggles in capitalist societies is not that they are all somehow embodiments of 
class struggle, but rather that any conflict can dislocate the basic capitalist 
framework.41 
 
In relation to understanding the new social movements for example (by which I 
mean the various struggles around non-class inequalities that emerged post-
war): rather than understanding them as a consequence of the success of the 
commodity-form in colonising new areas of social life, as Laclau and Mouffe do, 
we can offer the hypothesis that they in fact, initially at least, caused the failure 
of the commodity-form as a universal structuring principle. I say 'initially' 
because, as we will see in the following chapters, with the advent of 
multiculturalism we also find a narrative of incorporation, of integration of these 
struggles within the capitalist system. 
 
This last point is important, as so far I have only described class struggle as a 
way of articulating an unequal and antagonistic relation; clearly, it can also be 
used to describe a hegemonic response to social conflict. The latter can 
perhaps best be understood less as an opposing enemy camp on the other end 
of the class relation,42 and more as a hegemonic dissipation of that antagonism. 
One of my overarching concerns in the chapters that follow is to, within the 
context of equality and diversity in Britain, add evidence to our understanding of 
the shift in the way in which this antagonism is dealt with: from an attempt 
(particularly post-war) to integrate the working-class as subject, within the 
                                                 
40
 In a dialogue with Zizek, Laclau (2000b: 203) writes that 'class struggle is just one species of 
identity politics, and one which is becoming less and less important in the world in which we live'. 
41
 This is how I would interpret a point made by Zizek a number of times. In The Parallax View, for 
example, he writes that we should not think that 'class struggle is the ultimate referent and horizon of 
meaning of all other struggles'; rather, we should think of it as 'the structuring principle which allows 
us to account for the very “inconsistent” plurality of ways in which other antagonisms can be 
articulated into “chains of equivalence”' (Zizek, 2006: 361). 
42
 As Balibar (1991: 179) remarks: '[o]nly exceptionally does the class struggle take the form of civil 
war, whether on the level of representation or physical reality, and that is mainly when it is 
overdetermined by religious or ethnic conflict, or when it is combined with war between states'. 
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regulatory structures of the nation-state, to an attempt to integrate various 
disadvantaged minority groups in its place. 
 
 
2.3 Reworking Laclau's Concepts #2: Myth and Social 
Imaginary 
 
'Myth' and 'social imaginary' are two terms developed by Laclau to understand 
the way in which social orders are reproduced. Myths emerge in response to 
dislocations and provide a coherent framework or space through which various 
conflicting demands and systemic pressures can be reconciled: 
 
Myths construct new spaces of representation that attempt to suture the dislocated 
space in question. Their effectiveness is essentially hegemonic, as they involve the 
formation of 'a new objectivity by means of the rearticulation of the dislocated 
elements'. From their emergence until their dissolution, myths can function as a 
surface of inscription for a variety of social demands and dislocations (Howarth and 
Stavrakakis, including quote from Laclau, 2000: 15). 
 
Social imaginaries, on the other hand, name those myths that move from 
serving as a response to relatively local disturbances to a more general set of 
demands and tensions: 
 
when a myth has proved to be successful in neutralising social dislocations and 
incorporating a great number of social demands, then we can say that the myth has 
been transformed to an imaginary. A collective social imaginary is defined by 
Laclau as 'a horizon' or 'absolute limit which structures a field of intelligibility' (ibid: 
15-6). 
 
Again, I believe this conceptual distinction can be extremely useful in 
conducting more concrete research generally. However, it is particularly useful 
to the analysis of my empirical findings as we see a clear shift in the 
development of multiculturalism, and, more specifically, equality and diversity, 
from a local logic arising in response to particular conflicts, to one that 
increasingly expands into a more general ideological framework – one able to 
respond to a wide range of different demands from across society.  
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As above, though, it is necessary to specify the changes undergone by the 
concepts in utilising them within a broadly Zizekian approach. This 
transformation obviously relates back to my specification of the central 
difference between Zizek and Laclau's social ontologies. For Laclau, myths and 
social imaginaries provide more or less temporary stabilisations of 'meaning' – 
with 'meaning', as I've indicated, referring not to particular practices within the 
social formation, but rather to how the structuring principle of the social is 
understood. As I've argued, this theory can be read as a way of describing the 
unstable, but ultimately successful, role of the commodity-form as universal 
structuring principle in contemporary capitalist societies. With the introduction of 
class antagonism this changes: myths and social imaginaries can be 
understood as playing a central role in reproducing a successful capitalist 
system. In response to dislocations and class struggles, they provide 'new 
spaces of representation' in which social demands can be made and 
incorporated in a relatively harmonious manner. 
 
Again, we need to ask the question: does this reference to a capitalist system 
mean a return to a base/superstructure metaphor? Again, I would argue against 
this conclusion. Zizek is in agreement with Laclau that ideology cannot be 
reduced to a particular region within the social, and that hegemonic social 
imaginaries cannot therefore be reduced to a superstructural moment within a 
broader social topography (see, for example, Zizek, 1994: 14-5). 
 
However, for Zizek it is possible for the critique of ideology to link the particular 
orders of more temporary hegemonic social imaginaries with the underlying 
success of the commodity-form as structuring principle. For instance, take this 
example from Zizek (2007: 210) himself where he responds to the charge that 
his (Zizek's) claim that 'Western Buddhism as the ideal ideological form of 
today's global capitalism, relies on the naive-realist notion of ideology which is 
directly generated by the objective socio-economic process and, as such, not 
the result of contingent discursive struggles for hegemony': 
 
the present image of Western Buddhism is, of course, a discursive construct, the 
result of a series of contingent encountersEBut there is a limit to this undecided 
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game – not a limit in the sense of pre-existing reality that the predominant ideology 
should 'reflect', but a limit in the sense of the capitalist set of social relations which 
are in themselves not a pre-discursive fact but involve their own 'ideology', that of 
commodity fetishism. 
 
The limit to myths and social imaginaries, then, lies not in a specific area of the 
social that escapes and/or determines ideological phenomena, but rather is 
itself a prior ideological closure (what I have termed, after Zizek, a 'historically 
specific transcendental a priori' or 'universal structuring principle'). A closure 
that is not simply opposed to openness though in the Laclauian sense – 
stabilising a certain social field, establishing a specific configuration of elements 
etc – but rather one that in effect produces openness, or rather a regime in 
which the openness/closure dialectic can proceed. In this sense, then, this 
fundamental ideological closure establishes a prior successful terrain upon 
which various hegemonic projects can compete (Daly, 2009: 292). Once we 
understand that this ideological core fails we can see that a more concrete 
ideological configuration, such as multiculturalism, cannot be understood as 
superstructural in any standard sense of that term, but, at the same time, should 
not be considered as a mere 'result of contingent discursive struggles', distinct 





The arguments presented in this chapter have been necessarily abstract and 
involve some difficult ideas; I am also well aware that they are undeveloped at 
this stage as I do not have the space in this thesis to be able to pursue further 
the lines of argument presented. However, I do return to these ideas in the final 
chapter in order to show how they can help us produce some more concrete 
claims about the development of multiculturalism and equality and diversity in 
Britain. Here, I will try to demonstrate the applicability of the theory to empirical 
research – an obviously central factor in judging the strength of any theoretical 
argument. I will also, in this concluding chapter, make explicit some of the more 
obvious unanswered questions raised by the arguments made above. 
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Finally, in order to try to simplify the complexity of this chapter, I will substitute a 
more standard summarising paragraph with a point-by-point list of the 
successive arguments put forward: 
 
1) Zizek's concept of class antagonism can be understood as the failure of 
the commodity-form as a universal structuring principle or, to use Zizek's 
phrase, 'historically specific transcendental a priori'. 
2) It can be modelled on Laclau's concept of antagonism to the extent that 
the commodity and the sign function in Zizek and Laclau's thought as 
homologous formal structures that encompass all social practices. 
3) This homology enables us to utilise some of Laclau's concepts with the 
necessary adjustments made. 
4) The concept of dislocation can be used to understand the impact of non-
class struggles over inequality on the capitalist system through the 
external, disruptive impact of the identities produced. 
5) Class struggle can be understood as a response to dislocation, one that 
introduces an equivalence into the social through which a group, the 
working class, forms with interests in opposition to the capitalist social 
structure. 
6) Myths and social imaginaries can be understood as ideological 
mechanisms that respond to dislocations and class struggles by 




Chapter Three: The Origins of Multiculturalism in 
Britain 
 
Neither Laclau nor Zizek could be described as empirically-minded thinkers, 
and while, as I have argued, it is the former who has developed concepts more 
easily applicable to empirical enquiry, he has not himself engaged in any 
sustained attempt to test those concepts against real-world developments. 
However, it would be a mistake, I think, to dismiss either theorist as merely 
playing at intellectual games detached from a concrete political reality. 
Furthermore, for both thinkers the rise of identity politics and multiculturalism is 
one aspect of this reality that is particularly important to their respective 
theoretical projects. Laclau and Mouffe wrote Hegemony in 1985 against the 
backdrop of the collapse of traditional left-wing forces, seemingly powerless 
against the rise of neoliberalism and a renewed right wing hegemony. At the 
same time, untried and untested movements and theories emerging around the 
question of identity – the promotion of equality for groups such as ethnic 
minorities, women and gay people – were seemingly on the rise and capable of 
offering a fresh alternative to the focus on class politics at the heart of the 'old 
left'. The argument of Hegemony is clearly situated in relation to these 
developments: it seeks to provide the theoretical foundations for placing these 
new movements as firm equals alongside class, in a renewed left-wing project. 
 
The political developments animating Zizek's thought are perhaps less explicit, 
but it is nonetheless clear that at the heart of his theoretical project lies the 
observation that capitalism has achieved an unparalleled ideological success, 
and the contemporary left has clearly failed to pose a successful – or, for Zizek, 
even particularly credible – challenge. A central aspect of this failure for Zizek is 
the impasse he believes the Left's turn away from class towards a politics of 
identity and culture has led. Significantly, his explicit anti-capitalism developed 
over the course of the 1990s from a position initially much closer to the 'radical 
democracy' of Laclau; significant, I think, because between 1985 and the end of 
the following decade the link between identity politics and a radical left-wing 
agenda seemed much less certain. The freshness and potential the former had 
once held, or at least had seemed to hold, had clearly dissipated as many of the 
themes and ideas had been taken up and put into practice without any obvious 
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dent in a seemingly unstoppable capitalism. As Malik (2009: 58) has observed 
in relation to the radicalism of the GLC: at the time many of its policies were 
'derided as “loony left” by the Conservative press'; however, within a decade 
'they had been rebranded as “multiculturalism”, and had become as 
unexceptional as curry and chips on a Friday night'. 
 
What lay behind this, in many ways, extraordinary rise to prominence of 
multiculturalism also provides, then, an important historical background to the 
debate between Laclau and Zizek. It is therefore worth examining this history 
more closely in order to provide a context for both the case study findings to 
follow and the theoretical arguments explored in the previous chapter. However, 
given the limits of space and the complexity of this history, I will not attempt to 
provide a complete chronological account, but instead focus on three central 
themes: 1) the emergence of multicultural policies, on the part of local councils, 
in response to the civil disorder of the 1980s; 2) the decline of class as a social 




3.1 Riots and the Response 
 
The origins of multiculturalism in Britain can be traced back to the reaction of 
the state to a number of social disturbances that took place in the first half of the 
1980s. Kenan Malik (2009), who has provided a useful account of this history, 
describes – against the 'background of a nation increasingly polarized on the 
issue of race, a nation in which a new intensity of racism was matched by the 
fierceness of the response from a new generation of blacks and Asians' (ibid: 
41) – three local government responses to street disturbances (in London, 
Birmingham and Bradford). These disturbances involved young people from 
ethnic minority communities.43 In the case of London the Brixton riot of 1981, in 
Malik's words, 'came to symbolize the breakdown of race relations in Britain' 
(ibid: 56). While one in a large number of urban conflicts, it was only after the 
                                                 
43
 Although the ethnically mixed nature of those taking part including young white people is a 
widely noted fact: Gilroy (2002: 26), for example, states that only between 29 and 33 per cent of 
those arrested in the 1981 riots were 'non-white'. See also Phillips and Phillips (1998: 357-64) and 
Chris Harman (1981).  
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Brixton riot that a public inquiry, headed by Lord Scarman, was initiated into the 
cause of the disturbances and what could be done to prevent them recurring. 
While the Scarman report famously dismissed the suggestion of 'institutional 
racism', it is notable for pointing to, in the words of Sivanandan (1990: 90), a 
'new ethnic strategy', one received with 'enthusiasm (and relief) by Tory and 
Labour alike'. The strength of the language used by Scarman is worth noting: 
without government action, racial disadvantage could become an 'endemic, 
ineradicable disease threatening the very survival of our society' (quoted in 
Malik, 2009: 57). 
 
As Malik goes on to point out, however, the action promised by this report was 
not at odds with the Thatcher government more generally, despite her 'tough' 
reputation on the issues of race and immigration. As Malik puts it: 
 
Faced with major urban unrest, the Thatcher government responded in a typically 
pragmatic fashion, throwing resources not at more riot police but at inner-city 
communitiesEThere was a widespread recognition that unless black activists were 
given a political stake in the system, their frustration could threaten the stability of 
Britain's inner cities (ibid: 56-7). 
 
However it was the Labour party, rather than the Conservatives, that were able 
to initiate such actions due to the fact that the latter were regarded by many 
black activists as the 'party of racism', making cooperation difficult. Labour also 
had political control, at the level of local government, of many of those areas 
that had experienced unrest, at a time when many Labour activists were looking 
to new channels for progressive, political activity due to the problems their party 
faced on the national stage (ibid: 57-58). 
 
It was in this context that Ken Livingstone's Greater London Council (GLC) 
'pioneered a new strategy of making minority communities feel part of British 
society' (ibid: 58). This new strategy involved three elements: 1) the promotion 
of social and political equality for ethnic minorities through establishing equal 
opportunity policies, race relations units, and arranging consultations with 
representatives of minority communities; 2) the provision of resources – largely 
through financing ethnic minority organisations; 3) the recognition of difference: 
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At the heart of the GLC's anti-racist strategy was not simply the reallocation of 
resources but also a redefinition of racism. Racism now meant not the denial of 
equal rights but the denial of the right to be different. Black people, so the argument 
went, should not be forced to accept British values or to adopt a British identity. 
Rather, different peoples should have the right to express their own identities, 
explore their own histories, formulate their own values, pursue their own lifestyles. 
In the process, the very meaning of equality was transformed: from possessing the 
same rights as everyone else, to possessing different rights appropriate to different 
communities (ibid: 59). 
 
Malik highlights the same three elements in the council's response to unrest in 
Bradford: a promotion of equal opportunities, the establishment of race relations 
units and a 'new channel of communication between the council and the 
communities'; financial aid for minority organisations; a race relations policy that 
stated that every section of the city had 'an equal right to maintain its own 
identity, culture, language, religion and customs'. The latter element can be 
summed up in the words of the first aim of its 'race relations initiative': to 'bring 
about social justice' through establishing an '[e]quality of esteem between 
different cultures' (citing a Bradford Council document, ibid: 73). 
 
We can already see, then, in this brief description of council responses to the 
riots, the complex nature of multiculturalism. While undoubtedly best known as 
the celebration and accommodation of cultural differences, identities, values 
and so on, this idea is, in fact, interwoven with crucial economic, social and 
political dimensions. As I mentioned in chapter one, it is the historical evolution 
of the relationship between an emphasis on difference and one aspect of the 
social dimension – the specific type of redistributive equality policy pursued 
through the equality and diversity agenda – that concerns me for much of the 
rest of this thesis. 
 
There is a further aspect of these early multicultural initiatives that is of 
importance, relating to the nature of the differences that were promoted. It is a 
widely noted fact that minority identities emerged in a specific, institutionalised, 
contemporary form in Britain as a result of the kind of multicultural policies I 
have briefly described above. For example, the authors of an account of the 
development of post-war race relations in Britain write that one problem with the 
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GLC, and its policies, was 'its effect on the identity of the black communities. 
Under the rubric of the GLC, the communities which came from Caribbean, 
African and Asian roots, became “ethnic minorities”' (Phillips and Phillips, 1998: 
374). This rise of ethnicity is also recorded by Sivanandan (1990: 94), who 
notes the effect on identities of the competition for resources that were made 
available for non-white communities: 
 
The ensuing scramble for government favours and government grants (channelled 
through local authorities) on the basis of specific ethnic needs and problems 
served, on the one hand, to deepen ethnic differences and foster ethnic rivalry and, 
on the other, to widen the definition of ethnicity to include a variety of national and 
religious groups – Chinese, Cypriots, Greeks, Turks, Irish, Italians, Jews, Moslems, 





Malik cites Smith and Stephenson who have made a similar point in relation to 
the effect of multicultural policies pursued in Birmingham. The 'model of 
engagement' used by the council – in which Umbrella Groups were set up on an 
ethnic and religious basis in order to distribute funds and represent community 
interests (Malik, 2009: 65) – 'tended to result in competition between BME 
[black and ethnic minority] communities for resources. Rather than prioritizing 
needs and cross-community working, the different Umbrella Groups generally 
attempted to maximize their own interests' (Smith and Stephenson, quoted in 
ibid: 68). 
 
However, clearly it is not the case that these differences were invented or 
created by multicultural policies, but rather that they gained a certain form and 
importance that had not existed previously. There is clearly a complex interplay 
between ethnic differences and the submergence of these differences in a 
unified identity (a theme I return to in chapter eight). Malik (ibid: 52), for 
example, notes the influence, on radical anti-racist movements of the time, of 
the Black Power movement in the United States. Here, the idea of 'self-
organisation' meant that an anti-racist unity between black and white was not 
                                                 
44
 We might also add that other minority groups (based on characteristics such as gender or 
sexuality) similarly seem to take on an 'ethnic' form to the extent that they compete through the same 
model – see Malik (2009: 61) and Michaels (2006: 5). 
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thought possible through a simple merger with existing, white, organisations, 
but could only be the product of a more complex process involving specifically 
black (i.e. non-white) organisations. Malik cites the words of one such activist at 
the time, Tariq Mehmood: '[w]e had to put our own house in order' before 
uniting as equals with the 'white left'. 
 
However, for Malik this 'temporary organizational separation for political reasons 
gave way to the notion of permanent cultural distinctiveness as a fact of life'; 
what began as an anti-racist strategy became a 'celebration of cultural 
separation' (ibid: 54). This shift can be traced through the black political identity 
that existed prior to the impact of multicultural policies. Its central characteristic 
was its specifically political connotation as an anti-racist identity that consciously 
included, and sought to bridge, identities based on ethnic or cultural differences. 
It would also be fair, I think, to argue that it had a certain anti-systemic, 
antagonistic nature. Clearly events in the United States, again, influenced 
developments in Britain in relation to this point where a positive, politicised 
black identity arose accompanying the rise of Black Power and the more 
general radicalisation of anti-racist struggles.45 However, as Malik makes clear, 
it was given a 'peculiarly British' flavour by specifically incorporating both those 
of African and Asian origin. 'In Britain', writes Malik, 'young blacks and Asians 
were attempting to forge a more inclusive identity rooted in politics rather than 
ethnicity or skin colour, while at the same time trying to highlight the divisive 
character of racism' (ibid: 51-2). The whiteness to which blackness was 
opposed denoted, in the same way, not a particular ethnic difference but rather 
characterised the racist social structure more generally. 
 
One way of seeing this emergence of a black identity is not as a simple 
rejection of ethnic difference, but rather as a construction that emerged through 
the failure of the system or social structure to incorporate different ethnic 
interests. As Sivanandan (1990: 96) observes in relation to the period following 
the Scarman report and the emergence of multicultural efforts to engage with 
distinct ethnic groups: 
 
                                                 
45
 I am grateful to Alex Callinicos for this point. 
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By and large, the ethnics were content to fight each other in their quest for office. 
And it was only when there was a white blockage in the system, preventing them 
from going up further, that the ethnics turned 'black' and pulled out all their 
oppressed 'black' history to beat the whites with. Hence the demand for Black 
Sections in the Labour Party; the rise and fall of the Black Media Workers' 
Association (BMWA) (the fall coming after the white media made room for them in 
ethnic slots – since when they have gone back to being Afro-Caribbeans and 
Asians, respectively); and the emergence of a black trade union aristocracy, the 
Black Trade Union Solidarity Movement (BTUSM). 
 
This oscillation that Sivanandan describes highlights an important link between 
ideas of difference and attempts to stabilise the system, or central governing 
structure. These attempts have to combine the need to meet black demands 
from below with the promotion of horizontal ethnic identities that tend to split up 
and dissipate this more radical black identity. This brings Laclau's theory of 
equivalence and difference to mind and this connection is taken up in more 
detail in the concluding chapter. The key point to emphasise for now, however, 
is that the success of this strategy, and the corresponding rise of ethnicity and 
fall of a politicised black identity, depended on the ability of the state to become 
responsive to minority demands. Furthermore, this was something the state 
was, by and large, very successful at.46 
 
 
3.2 The Decline of Class in Society 
 
One of the indisputable trends in Britain over the last 30 years or so is that of a 
decline of class struggle and a working-class identity,47 alongside that of the rise 
of a politics of difference already discussed. While the historical coincidence of 
these two trends suggests a relationship between them of some kind, the 
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 The question of agency clearly raises itself here and at other points in this chapter: is the rise of 
multiculturalism that I describe here the result of a consciously pursued political strategy, or is it 
something which emerges more accidentally, as a result of 'multicultural drift' – as a text I will look 
at in the following chapter has put it (CFMEB, 2000: 14)? This is obviously a complex issue which I 
will put aside for now but return to in the final chapter. 
47
 The precise nature of the link between class struggle and an empirically identifiable working-class 
is not an issue that I can deal with in this thesis, partly because neither Zizek nor Laclau are 
particularly concerned with this question – see Callinicos (2006: 117-119) for a critique of Zizek, 
and others, on this issue. What I have to say here and in the following chapters about the working 
class does not rely on any particular approach to class analysis. 
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precise nature of this relationship is heavily disputed. Some of the theoretical 
questions that arise in the course of the debate on this question between Zizek 
and Laclau have been highlighted in the previous chapter, and in the following 
chapters I want to use some of the empirical material collected to contribute to 
this debate. Here I want to set the scene for these later chapters by focusing on 
the history of this decline of class. 
 
The first development to take account of is the emergence, post-war, of the new 
social movements. These were formed in response to non-class inequalities 
(among other non-class issues – militarisation and environmental destruction, 
for example). However, the novelty of these struggles does not lie in the mere 
existence of a non-class movement for justice – as Anne Phillips (1999: 20) 
points out 'it would be poor history to suggest that these [non-class] inequalities 
were only recently discovered'. It would seem rather that something changes in 
the significance that these inequalities have in relation to understanding social 
conflicts, and their relative importance in relation to class more specifically. To 
put it briefly, it is the centrality of class to inequality that appears to be 
challenged. As Phillips goes on to add, 'through an era dominated by the big 
“capitalism versus socialism” question, inequality had an inescapably class 
dimension', yet '[s]ubsequent developments have significantly modified this'. 
 
There is an important historical distinction to be made here though, that 
parallels the theoretical distinction made in the previous chapter: the distinction 
between the oppositional, dislocatory impact of the new social movements, on 
the one hand, and their incorporation through the rise of identity politics and, 
later, multiculturalism, on the other. If we return to Malik's description of the 
development of multiculturalism, it is noticeable that the oppositional anti-racist 
movements of the time he mentions clearly thought of race as having an 
'inescapably class dimension' (to use Phillips' phrase). He gives a number of 
examples of this: the Indian Workers Association (IWA), originally formed in 
1938 in relation to the issue of Indian independence, was re-formed in response 
to the problems faced by immigrants from the subcontinent in post-war Britain: 
 
The IWA organized both as a trade union, in factories, on the buses and in 
hospitals, and as an anti-racist campaigning organization within Asian communities. 
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It had close links to the labour movement in Britain and to the Communist Party of 
India, and its members invariably supported any action that local trade unions were 
taking, because, as the author and playwright Dilip Hiro put it, 'they believed that 
the economic lot of Indian workers was intimately intertwined with that of British 
workers' (Malik, 2009: 48). 
 
This group (along with the Universal Coloured Peoples' Association [UCPA]) did 
not believe in any straightforward assimilation and rejected the idea that race 
issues could be subsumed within those of class, yet, nonetheless their anti-
racism was ultimately directed towards the 'liberation of the class' (Sivanandan, 
1990: 79). A later group influenced by the IWA, the Asian Youth Movement 
(AYM), similarly combined both race and class, being influenced by both 
traditional, left-wing, class-based British organisations, as well as the Black 
Power movement in America and the idea of 'black self-organisation' (as 
mentioned above). Malik (2009: 52), again, cites the words of Tariq Mehmood – 
an activist with the AYM: '[m]ost of us were workers and sons of workersEFor 
us race and class were inseparable'. 
 
Of course, this is not to suggest that there existed one clearly defined 
movement in which the two issues were seamlessly united, and that a rejection 
of established working-class organisations was not a strong feature of the anti-
racist movements of the time. It is also important to be cautious about drawing 
too general a conclusion on the basis of limited evidence. Nonetheless, I think a 
good case can be made for the idea that the issue of racial inequality was not 
as separated from that of class as it often appears to be today. It is also worth 
considering whether this shift is linked to the rise of multiculturalism as an 
official ideology – in other words, if the question of the relationship between 
race and class is also a political, as well as a theoretical and historical, one. 
 
This argument – that the shift from a more 'organic' connection between race 
and class to a more fragmented separation between the two issues is not just a 
historical fact, but also the outcome of a political process – is strongly made by 
Sivanandan in his collection of articles already cited, Communities of 
Resistance (1990). For example, in a revised version of a talk given in 1983 at a 
GLC consultation event, he argues that: 
 
 59 
What ethnicity [the differences that become recognised in multiculturalism, as 
described above] has done is to mask the problem of racism and weaken the 
struggle against it. But then, that is precisely what it was meant to do. It was the 
riposte of the system – in the 1960s and 1970s – to the struggles of black people, 
both Afro-Caribbean and Asian, both in the workplace and in the community, as a 
people for a class, extra-parliamentary and extra-trade union. It was the riposte of a 
system that was afraid that the black working-class struggles would begin to 
politicise the working class as a whole. It was, in particular, the riposte of the class-
collaborationist Labour governments of Wilson and Callaghan which sought in 
ethnic pluralism to undermine the underlying class aspect of black struggle and 
black politics (Sivanandan, 1990: 63-4). 
 
He continues in a similar vein in relation to a description of the changing 
dynamic between the anti-racist movement and the state's response to it during 
the 1970s and 1980s: 
 
on the ideological level a new battle was being mounted by the state against black 
struggles whereby they could be broken down into their ethnic and, through that, 
their class components. Ethnicity was a tool to blunt the edge of black struggles, to 
return 'black' to its constituent parts of Afro-Caribbean, Asian, African, Irish – and 
also, at the same time, to allow the nascent black bourgeoisie, petit-bourgeoisie 
really, to move up in the system. Ethnicity delinked black struggle – separating the 
West Indian from the Asian, the working-class black from the middle-class black 
(ibid: 67). 
 
He goes on to describe the various government-funded 'ethnic policies and 
programmes' as 'Government moneys for pluralist ploys – the development of a 
parallel power structure for black people, separate development, Bantustans – a 
strategy to keep race issues from contaminating class issues' (ibid: 68). 
 
What Sivanandan suggests, then, is that the already-noted fragmentation of a 
political blackness into particular ethnic/cultural identities was accompanied by 
a similarly depoliticising effect in relation to the class dimension of the black 
struggle, and that this was a deliberate aim behind the policies. Malik (2009: 57) 
also picks up on this point in relation to the response of the Conservative 
government to the urban unrest of the 1980s. He cites a Sunday Times profile 
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of Sir George Young,48 written in October 1982, that describes the 
government's aim as: 'the creation in Britain of a small but prosperous black 
middle class'. Both authors add evidence, then, to the claim that the separation 
and depoliticisation of class, in relation to anti-racist struggles, was a 
consciously pursued and necessary effect of state-sponsored multicultural 
policies. 
 
While, again, we need to be cautious here about the wider claims we can make 
from limited historical evidence, this discussion should nonetheless help provide 
a context for the decline of class as a particular type of political subjectivity and 
its separation from the issue of anti-racism – a decline that is clearly registered 
within the case studies and one that I will look at in more detail in the following 
chapters. However, my argument so far has relied largely on the observations 
of a writer (Sivanandan) who is primarily concerned with the effects of 
multiculturalism on a politicised black identity – albeit with, according to him, an 
'inescapably class dimension'. As I noted, the existence of this identity can be 
seen as a reaction to the exclusionary, institutionalised whiteness of British 
society at the time, and this, importantly, included working-class institutions.49 
What about the decline of these institutions, however, and the identity that they 
supported? In the final part of this section I will briefly highlight some of the 
historical factors behind the decline of the working class that are not connected 
to the rise of multiculturalism, and that help give a context for the decline of 
class as a broader phenomenon. 
 
Clearly economic changes are key here: the expansion of global markets, 
economic restructuring, changes in production processes, the decline of 
manufacturing, the rise of unemployment as a permanent structural feature of 
neoliberal societies – these are all obviously central to the decline of the 
working class due to the negative impact they have had on the workplaces and 
areas most strongly associated with working-class identity and organisation. I 
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 The first minister for race relations who was appointed after the Brixton riot. 
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 On this point Roger Hewitt (2005: 27) argues that there was a high level of 'spontaneously 
organised trade union support for [Enoch] Powell', and that there is a 'clear connection between the 
very visible support from unionised labour for Powell's message and the long history of racially 
exclusionary practices in the trade union movement together with Labour's uneasy compromises 
with them'. Similarly, Malik (2009: 49) writes that, in the past, for 'black and Asian workers, taking 
industrial action often meant facing down not just the employer but the casually bigoted attitudes of 
union officials too'. 
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will not go into these changes in any detail as they are well known and not the 
main focus of my attention here.50 It is important to keep these significant 
changes in mind, however, as they form an important background to the 
ideological and textual effects of the decline of the working class that I focus on 
in the chapters to follow. 
 
Mike Savage (2000: 152) also draws our attention to the cultural aspect of this 
decline. He concludes his book on class and social change in Britain by arguing 
that 'much contemporary social and cultural change can be seen as the fallout 
from the eradication of the defining role of the working class in British culture'. 
While this process is clearly closely tied to the kind of economic changes noted 
above, he argues that those changes do not of themselves explain the decline 
of the working class as an established identity as, for one thing, these changes 
have not led to a disappearance of jobs that might be described as 'working 
class' in terms of pay, status, lack of control over the conditions and terms of 
employment and so on. He also distances himself from any claim about a 
'fading of the golden, collective, working-class “community”', or the idea of 
'embourgoisement': the idea that the working class has disappeared into an 
expanded middle class. Rather what he claims is more interesting: it is that the 
'idea of the working class served as a moral identifier for much of the twentieth 
century, and thereby helped consolidate a particular notion of the working class 
which had sustained importance in British society', and that the 'link between 
dominant notions of individuality and citizenship, which in Britain were closely 
associated with the working class, has in recent years been sundered, with 
profound social and cultural implications'. In other words, crucial to 
understanding the changes in class relations of recent times is the loss of the 
place the working class held in, to use Laclau's term, the dominant social 
imaginary. While the kind of 'raw material' (i.e. the pay and conditions at work 
just mentioned, but also the stark socio-economic inequalities that have opened 
up more generally in recent years51) out of which a working class is formed may 
still exist, it is, for Savage, the fashioning of this material into an identifiable 
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 See Fox-Piven (1995: 109-10) for a summary. 
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 According to Danny Dorling, inequality in the UK is currently at its worst since the second world-
war, and is a situation that has worsened significantly since 1979 and the impact of the rise of 
neoliberalism (Guardian, 2012). 
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group with a 'stake' in society, and the notions of individuality and citizenship 
that necessarily follow, that is important and that has dissolved over time. 
 
This question of the relationship between the working class and the need to 
build a cohesive, national culture leads us naturally to the question of the 
political changes that have taken place. Again, these are well known. The 
pursuit of an aggressive right-wing agenda by Margaret Thatcher and the 
Conservative party confronted head-on trade union power and curtailed many of 
the rights and powers that had up until then served to cement the place of the 
working class as a political force in society. This was part of a more general 
neoliberal offensive outlined by David Harvey in A Brief History of Neoliberalism 
where he describes neoliberalism as the 'restoration of class power' (Harvey, 
2005: 31). Harvey describes the central elements of Thatcher's strategy to 
reduce trade union power: the use of macro-economic policies to keep inflation 
down causing high unemployment and consequently reducing the power of 
organised labour;52 the confrontational stance towards powerful unions (most 
notably the actions leading to the miners' strike of 1984); finally, the dismantling 
of industries with powerful union traditions through the promotion of foreign 
competition and investment in the UK. Harvey sums up these efforts like this: 
'[b]y the time Thatcher left office, strike activity had fallen to one-tenth of its 
former levels. She had eradicated inflation, curbed union power, tamed the 
labour force, and built middle-class consent for her policies in the process' (ibid: 
59). All of these changes impacted not only on the trade unions but also the 
Labour party, which historically owed its existence and impetus to the protection 
and promotion of working-class interests (ibid: 55). Having lost four elections in 
a row this historical link between Labour and the working class was, if not 
completely severed, significantly weakened when Labour reclaimed power in 
1997 (ibid: 62-3). 
 
In relation to the more specific ideological aspects of this political project we can 
note the (again, well known) emphasis on 'individual freedom' in opposition to 
notions of social equality and justice that were clearly linked to a recognisable 
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 Harvey (2005: 59) quotes Alan Budd, an economic adviser to Thatcher, who suggested that 'the 
1980s policies of attacking inflation by squeezing the economy and public spending were a cover to 
bash the workers'. 
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working-class movement. Echoing Savage's argument concerning the loss of 
identity, Harvey describes the 
 
cultivation of a middle class that relished the joys of home ownership, private 
property, individualism, and the liberation of entrepreneurial opportunities. With 
working-class solidarities waning under pressure and job structures radically 
changing through deindustrialization, middle-class values spread more widely to 
encompass many of those who had once had a firm working-class identity (ibid: 61-
2). 
 
We should also – particularly given the fact that the empirical material of my 
case studies is largely textual – pay close attention to the linguistic aspects of 
this ideological project. David Cannadine (2000: 175-8), for example, has 
described how Margaret Thatcher made a concerted and deliberate effort to 
keep class, as a collective social category 'based on mutually hostile relations to 
the means of production', off the public agenda and replace it with the language 
of individuals, markets and consumers. This was something she was, as 
Cannadine points out, 'very successful' at and it was 'not coincidence that it was 
also in these years that they [class and class conflict] disappeared as the 
languages and concepts of historical inquiry' (ibid: 175). He notes the care she 
took in the terms she used in speaking of 'the working people' and 'the working 
population', but never 'the working class' as a single collective category. 
Interestingly, this aspect of Thatcherism was left unchanged by the arrival of 
New Labour (Cruddas, 2006). As we will see, an important feature of the New 
Labour discourse on equality and diversity is the interaction between this 
continuing absence of the working class, on the one hand, and, on the other, 
the return of ideas of equality, equal opportunities, social justice, and so on; 
ideas that are brought back to government as a consequence of Labour's 
traditional social-democratic heritage. 
 
What this brief overview suggests is that there were a number of significant, 
deep-rooted and far reaching changes behind the decline of class and, more 
specifically, the existence of a working class in Britain as an institutionalised 
social presence and political force.53 These changes provide a context to 
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 See Jones (2011) for a recent, though journalistic rather than academic, account of this decline of 
the working class in Britain. 
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Sivanandan's observations regarding the particular effects of multiculturalism on 
a politicised black identity, and clearly, as I've said, these broader changes 
have no immediately obvious connection with multiculturalism as a local 
response to a particular set of urban conflicts and broader equality issues 
regarding minority groups. In other words, the fragmenting effect of 
multiculturalism observed by Sivanandan cannot be said to have caused the 
decline of the working class more broadly speaking. However, neither, I believe, 
should we think that multiculturalism arises as a simple effect of an already-
changed terrain. We can perhaps describe the link in terms of the dislocated 
context in which multiculturalism began to operate. In other words, the decline – 
or perhaps, more accurately, active dismantling – of the working class, and the 
broader changes to the post-war social consensus behind this decline, 
profoundly disrupted social relations. This enabled a reorganisation of these 
relations brought under the more general term neoliberalism, together with the 
role played by multiculturalism. More specifically the latter has helped develop 
an idea of social equality and social justice that no longer has the working class 
as its central concern – or even, as I will try to show, as a concern at all. 
 
 
3.3 The Dynamic Nature of Multiculturalism and the 
Incorporation of Critique 
 
The third development I want to look at is the ability of multiculturalism itself to 
change and evolve over time as a hegemonic operation, in other words, its 
dynamic nature as an evolving ideology. It is this that can help explain how it is 
able to develop a new idea of social equality and justice adapted to the changed 
neoliberal terrain that I've just mentioned. There are two main features of this to 
consider: firstly, the ability of multiculturalism to expand and incorporate new 
interests and demands pitched at a framework that arose initially in response to 
a more specific context; secondly, its ability to respond to criticisms, 
weaknesses and points of failure. The first will be largely traced through the 
case studies themselves as the range of different organisations considered, 
from the world of business to trade unions to race and gender equality NGOs, 
illustrates this point well. Here, I will focus on the second feature and the role 
played by two criticisms more specifically: 1) the critique of the concept of 
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identity at work in multiculturalism; 2) the anti-racist critique that accuses 
multiculturalism of replacing concern about racism with the nurturing of cultural 
differences. 
 
Perhaps the most common criticism levelled at multiculturalism concerns the 
concept of identity it works with.54 The argument is that by promoting certain 
minority identities, other differences, cutting across those identities, tend to be 
neglected and/or absorbed into a one-dimensional picture in which 'society is 
made up of a series of distinct, uniform cultures which dance around one 
another' (Malik's words, citing Amartya Sen, 2009: 70); or, as Floya Anthias and 
Nira Yuval-Davis (1992: 158) put it, multiculturalism: 'constructs society as 
composed of a hegemonic homogeneous majority, and small unmeltable 
minorities with their own essentially different communities and cultures which 
have to be understood, accepted, and basically left alone'. However, as I will 
show in the following chapters, a key feature of the case studies is the way in 
which this criticism seems to have been incorporated into the operation of 
equality and diversity: the assumed complexity of identity, the way in which 
other identities and struggles cut across any particular group is a very common 
feature of the texts.55 
 
The incorporation of this critique can be seen in the development of a theory of 
intersectionality. Judith Squires (2005: 8) has drawn attention to this aspect of 
multicultural discourse: she notes the emergence, first of all, of a critique of 
identity that argues that the 'work of recognition theorists proceeds from an 
assumption of a readily identifiable, homogeneous, singular essence, which 
leaves little space for explanation of intra-group differences'. The theory of 
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 See Modood (2007, chapter five) for a discussion of the theoretical issues that arise from this 
criticism. 
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 Of course, this may be simple rhetoric that masks the reality of the policies pursued and their 
effect on people's ideas about human identity. As Malik argues of multiculturalism more generally: 
'[f]or all the talk about culture as fluid and changing, multiculturalism invariably leads people to 
think of human cultures in fixed terms' (2005). It should be noted in this regard that it is clearly a 
limitation of my focus on equality and diversity texts – in order to explore the political and 
ideological dynamic of multiculturalism – that I cannot pursue in more depth the links and potential 
gaps between language and policy, between rhetoric and the way in which multicultural ideas are 
taken up in concrete settings and their effects on practical politics. I do however return to this issue 
in the concluding chapter and offer some thoughts on this question. In this chapter, despite the 
validity of this point, my focus is on the possibility of multiculturalism being able to adapt and 
change in relation to a critique in order to function over time as a hegemonic ideological formation, 
and this, I think, can be considered somewhat separately from the issue of the potential existence, 
and precise nature, of a gap between the texts and the concrete policies pursued. 
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intersectionality arises, then, as an attempt to correct this by 'exploring the 
effect of in-group essentialism, in which a sub-set of a group seeks to fix the 
characteristics of a specific identity, marginalizing those group members who 
differ in other aspects of their identity' (ibid). 
 
While, as Squires points out, it is easier to talk about 'intersectionality' in theory 
than in practice, it should be reiterated that from the beginning the question of 
ethnic minority groups was only ever one aspect of multiculturalism – though it 
is undoubtedly the aspect that it is most associated with and the one that I have 
largely focused on in this chapter. Feminist demands, which clearly cut across 
ethnic identities, have also played an important role in its development. Southall 
Black Sisters (SBS), for example, is a well-known group, formed in 1979, that 
has campaigned for women's rights and against racism and discrimination. It 
has also, as Malik (2009: 173) notes, been outspoken in its criticism of religious 
fundamentalism and against the assumption that local community leaders of 
ethnic or religious groups necessarily represent everyone in that community. In 
line with this aim, SBS helped found Women Against Fundamentalism in the 
period following the declaration of the fatwa against Salman Rushdie in 1989. 
More generally, as a group, it has clearly played an important role in the 
development of equality and diversity in Britain.56 
 
While this critique of identity has largely come from within the multicultural field, 
broadly speaking, the anti-racist critique of multiculturalism is interesting in the 
sense that its impulse arises from a more radical, oppositional position. The 
anti-racist critique is clearly discernible in both Malik and Sivanandan's 
criticisms of multiculturalism, and has already been elaborated to a certain 
extent above. Anthias and Yuval-Davis similarly describe how this critique 
'organized around the unifying notion of “Blackness”, and saw in multi-
culturalism a divisive mechanism, a distraction from the focus on the differential 
power relations, discrimination and disadvantages of Black people'. Both the 
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 It is also worth noting the importance to the functioning of multicultural ideology of the 
equivalence drawn between race/ethnicity and other social characteristics in terms of the inequality 
faced by different oppressed groups. Randall Hansen (2000: 227) for example, records what he 
describes as a 'smart strategic move' by Roy Jenkins to help get potentially controversial race 
equality legislation, contained in the 1976 Race Relations Act, through parliament by linking the 
measures proposed with a similar set of measures already passed for women – measures the 
Conservative party had backed. The Conservatives therefore 'found it difficult to oppose analogous 
measures for ethnic minorities'. 
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rise of Black Power in the USA (which I have already mentioned above) and the 
successful anti-colonial movements in former British territories are cited as key 
influences, and gives an indication of the anti-systemic impulse of anti-racism, 
as a movement in Britain (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992: 159). Conversely, a 
connection can be drawn between the British adoption of multiculturalism and 
Britain's colonial legacy: as Anthias and Yuval-Davis argue, the multicultural 
model, as a response to the failure of assimilation, was one 
 
which particularly suited the first generation of British 'Race Relations Experts', who 
got their training in the colonial and missionary machine of the British empire; there 
they ruled through a stratum of local leaders and chieftains without too much 
intervention in the 'internal affairs' of those they ruled, unless they were in conflict 
with their interests in the area (ibid: 158-9). 
 
When it came to 'race relations' closer to home the 'Community Relations' 
boards and councils (the institutional forerunners to the CRE [Commission for 
Racial Equality]) similarly sought to incorporate minority groups 'indirectly', with 
the latter represented by leaders of the 'various religious and cultural 
organizations' of the newly-arrived immigrants (ibid: 159).57 
 
Whether or not such a clear connection can be made with Britain's colonial past, 
it is not hard to see how early versions of multiculturalism were ripe for criticism 
for its lack of any real challenge to the inequality and oppression faced by 
minority groups. The field of educational policy was a major battleground here 
with the anti-racist critique arguing that what was needed was to teach pupils 
less about cultural diversity and more about the deep-rooted structures of 
discrimination and disadvantage that black people faced. Anthias and Yuval-
Davis continue: '[r]ather than just teaching pupils about their own culture and 
other pupils' cultures, anti-racist policies were concerned with employing more 
Black teachers and taking out racist ideological elements from majority curricula' 
(ibid: 160). Roger Hewitt (2005: 147-8) cites criticisms from a number of authors 
in the early 1980s who argued along similar lines, such as Chris Mullard and 
Maureen Stone. The latter, for example, argued that 
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 Malik (1996: 170-3) has drawn a connection, more generally, between the colonial experience and 
the rise of the idea of cultural pluralism in Western societies. 
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By focussing on self-esteem, it [multicultural education] manages to ignore the vast 
body of evidence showing that working-class and black families have much less 
access to power, to resources of every kind, than middle-class children. 'Self-
concept' becomes a way of evading the real, and uncomfortable, issue of class and 




This critique was taken up during the 1980s by certain radical educational 
authorities, and despite the criticisms that it faced and its eventual demise in 
this particular, radicalised, form (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992: 160), it clearly 
had an impact on the evolution of multicultural education. 
 
In wider society, Anthias and Yuval-Davis describe similar changes taking place 
in the development of the 'Race Relations Industry', which 'expanded 
considerably' due to the increased funding it received from the government 
during this same period (the 1980s). From this emerged the kind of anti-racist, 
and importantly redistributive, initiatives that I focus on in the following chapters: 
'contract compliance',59 positive action, ethnic monitoring and 'outreach 
community work'. Anthias and Yuval-Davis also note the rise of black people 
during this time to positions of power in Race Relations organisations, but also 
the public sector and politics more generally. The most important factor for the 
authors behind these developments – and for my discussion here – is what they 
describe as an 'entryist' strategy, by a 'new generation of Black militant 
intelligentsia', to seek to occupy prominent professional and political positions 
within the social structure, while bringing with them a radical critique of racism. 
The authors observe that as 'many of them had earlier been active in grass-
roots movements, they brought with them the organizing principle of Blackness 
and incorporated it into the multi-culturalist model of the Race Relations 
organizations as they found them' (ibid: 161-2). Clear evidence, then, of the 
ability of multiculturalism to absorb a critique that initially arose in opposition to 
it, but which then came to influence its later development. 
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 It is worth noting, in relation to my discussion in the previous section, the close connection 
between the issues of race and class here. As Hewitt notes: it is 'interesting that both Mullard and 
Stone specifically mention the predicament of white working-class and black groups as closely 
related. This kind of association became later not only lost but, worse still, any concern with the 
issue of class was taken to be a symptom of racism' (ibid: 148).  
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 Now more commonly known as 'procurement' – it makes equality policies on the part of 
businesses a condition of winning government contracts. 
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In summary, Hewitt (2005: 148) has argued that the anti-racist critique 'came to 
impact on the prevailing model of multiculturalism in the UK during the 1980s, 
giving it a much greater emphasis on anti-racism and issues of racial equality'. 
Modood (2007: 41) has similarly argued that 'anti-colour racism' (his term for the 
earlier anti-racism that was critical of multiculturalism) 'has been a key critical 
element in the evolution of multiculturalism. The fact of racism and of power 
inequalities tended to be ignored by early conceptions of multiculturalism and 
came to be rightly rectified in later formulations'. In this sense we might add a 
more nuanced historical (and, as I will come to describe, geographical) 
dimension to our understanding of how multiculturalism developed in response 
to inequalities. While I noted above three aspects of the multicultural policies 
that Malik describes (the recognition of difference, the provision of resources, 
the promotion of social and political equality for minority groups), it can be 
argued that those elements emerge in a historically uneven way. While equality 
is clearly present in the early history of multiculturalism,60 it is nonetheless a 
conception of equality that is much less substantive than the increasingly 
radicalised, more redistributive version that marks the later development of 
multiculturalism in Britain. Perhaps the most striking illustration of this point lies 
in the changing status of 'institutional racism'. This issue is an important aspect 
of Sivanandan's (1990: 85) critique of multiculturalism, as the latter's neglect of 
it allows him to criticise the equality policies that emerged alongside the 'divisive 
culturalism' for which multiculturalism is – certainly among its critics – better 
known. Twenty years on and the concept is firmly entrenched within the equality 
and diversity field as a taken-for-granted reality.61 
 
As indicated above, it is also worth mentioning briefly the specificity of the 
British case in relation to other countries. Hewitt (2005: 132) suggests that 
multiculturalism has two points of origin: the race equality policies that emerged 
in the United States in the 1960s (with the extension of these policies to other 
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 Roy Jenkins famously defined integration in 1966 'not as a flattening process of assimilation, but 
as equal opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance' 
(quoted in Pitcher, 2007: 42 – my emphasis). 
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 It first emerged in a prominent, public way with the Macpherson report (1999) and the enquiry 
into the murder of Stephen Lawrence and the subsequent police mishandling of the investigation. 
There is obviously an evolutionary process in the 'drift' of race equality policy and legislation in 
relation to this question however, with the introduction of 'positive action' and the recognition of 
'indirect discrimination' in the 1976 Race Relations Act being one obvious milestone in this regard 
(see Solomos, 1989: 6-8 and Bleich, 2003: 101-7 for a discussion of this act). I discuss the legislative 
developments in relation to equality and diversity in detail in chapter six. 
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types of inequality such as gender and disability), and the management of 
relations between settled, immigrant and indigenous populations.62 While the 
former has played a key role in the development of multiculturalism in the 
United States from the beginning, it was only something that 'came to be 
reflected in the UK version' (ibid – my emphasis). Furthermore, in Canada and 
Australia it played little part, reflecting the peculiarities of the issues faced by 
those countries in the post-war period. 
 
Both the anti-racist critique of multiculturalism and the critique of multicultural 
identities have been followed by more recent concerns about socio-economic 
inequality and social cohesion: the central charge in both cases is that 
multiculturalism is either directly generating or, at the very least, not helping 
either problem, and in both cases we see clear shifts in the equality and 
diversity framework in response. As more recent developments, these are 
clearly registered within the case studies to follow so I have not included them 
here. However, it is worth adding that they show the continuing ability of 
multiculturalism – not just in its earlier phase but as a more fully developed form 
– to incorporate different criticisms directed at it and to respond flexibly to these 





In this chapter I have focused on three developments that help set the context 
for the case studies to come: the response to civil disturbances on the part of 
local councils; the decline of class registered as the loss of both an 
institutionalised working-class identity as well as a political black identity that 
appeared to have an inherent 'class dimension'; finally, the dynamic nature of 
multicultural ideology in responding to criticism. As I've said, the aim here has 
not been to provide a comprehensive history, but to pick out those historical 
features that provide the best context for the case study findings. These themes 
then – of conflict and integration, class, and ideological change – are all central 
to the developments that I trace in the following chapters. 
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Chapter Four: The Framework 
 
In this chapter I will present the discourse of equality and diversity as a basic 
model or ideological framework that can be identified across the case studies. 
The concept of a framework is used as a synonym for Laclau's term, myth: a set 
of concepts, produced in response to social discord, that provides a model of 
social harmony that aims to meet the various conflicting demands giving rise to 
that discord; this model then serves to guide the concrete policies enacted on 
the ground. What Laclau captures with the addition of the concept of social 
imaginary is the expansion and universalisation of the myth – a phenomenon I 
trace, in relation to equality and diversity, in the following chapters. 
 
In order to do this, I will use two of the case studies drawn from civil society – 
Runnymede and Fawcett – as the texts produced by both organisations 
represent relatively 'pure' forms of the equality and diversity discourse. By this I 
mean that the aims of both organisations (race and gender equality 
respectively) are met through a straightforward promotion of the framework 
itself. This contrasts with the other organisations that I will look at whose goals 
include, in different ways, interests outside the framework and who relate to it, 
therefore, in a somewhat more instrumental fashion. Both organisations also 
have a history that precedes the emergence of equality and diversity in its 
contemporary form; this helps us to grasp the specificity of the discourse by 
teasing out the change in meaning that the two central terms (equality and 
diversity) undergo through their later, multicultural, combination. 
 
I will start with the multicultural idea, put forward in the Runnymede discourse, 
of a society made up of a number of diverse communities – relatively coherent 
social groups that display a unique cultural identity that deserves 'recognition' of 
some kind within a broader nation-state. However, in order to understand the 
specificity of equality and diversity we need to understand how this idea of 
difference becomes linked to the issue of inequality. In the second section, then, 
I trace the historical evolution of the idea of difference through the Fawcett texts 
in order to bring out its changing relationship with the concept of equality. In the 
final section I focus on class: the widely noted blind-spot of the framework. A 
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look at both case studies allows us to make some initial observations that show 
that it is not the absence of class, as such, from the framework, but the specific 
form in which it appears that is significant. 
 
Before I take a closer look at the texts it is worth saying something about the 
two case study organisations themselves. According to an interview with Heidi 
Mirza (a prominent academic in the equality and diversity field), Runnymede63 
was initially set up after two law students (Anthony Lester and Jim Rose) visited 
the United States in 1968, at the height of the unrest that was taking place at 
that time over the issue of race. Having been 'very taken with [the] powerful 
black uprising' they witnessed, they brought the ideas accompanying that 
movement back to Britain (Mirza, n.d.). It is worth noting, however, that it was 
the more moderate end of those ideas that they brought back: as an 
organisation Runnymede has always been close to government, campaigning 
for change through lobbying and advising, rather than opposing, the 
government of the day. 
 
Runnymede describes itself as a 'leading independent think tank on ethnicity 
and cultural diversity', with the aim of promoting, what it calls, a 'successful 
multi-ethnic Britain' through challenging racial discrimination and campaigning 
for equality (see, for example, Berkeley, 2004: 16). Much of the literature they 
produce is in the form of fairly short reports and briefings, the subjects of which 
are varied; they include, for example: reports of conferences organised on 
specific government agendas, investigations into particular areas of inequality 
such as education or financial exclusion, or studies of a particular community 
(e.g. the Bolivian community in London – Sveinsson, 2007). However, as an 
organisation, they have also been involved in producing book length reports, 
some of which have become well-known texts within the field: Colour and 
Citizenship (Rose, 1969), for example, was an early riposte to the rise of Enoch 
Powell and his anti-immigration politics (Middlesex University, n.d.); The Future 
of Multi-Ethnic Britain (henceforth shortened to 'the Parekh Report', CFMEB, 
2000) was, in turn, intended as a follow-up to this earlier book.64 The Parekh 
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 The name comes from the town in Surrey where the Magna Carta was signed. 
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 An attempt to update and extend it, according to Mclaughlin and Neal (2004: 158). 
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Report is a particularly significant text:65 its key vision, Britain as a 'community 
of communities', captures the central idea that, as I say, multiculturalism is best 
known for. I therefore draw heavily on this report along with other Runnymede 
texts in the first section of this chapter. 
 
Like Runnymede, Fawcett is a well-known organisation within the equality and 
diversity field. The organisation describes itself as the 'UK's leading campaign 
for equality between women and men' (Fawcett, n.d.). Its vision is of a 'society 
in which women and men are equal partners at home, at work and in public life' 
(see, for example, Brittain et al, 2005: inside front cover). Founded originally in 
1866 as the London Society for Women's Suffrage, the initial goal, as the name 
suggests, was to achieve the vote for women. However the group later became 
the London and National Society for Women's Service, signalling a move to 
broader issues of equality between men and women. The group was given its 
present name in 1953 honouring a prominent campaigner for women's rights, 
the late Dame Millicent Fawcett (Fawcett, 1976: 1). In accounts of their history it 
is observed that, in relation to the campaign for women's suffrage, the group 
clearly differentiated itself from the more militant and radical wing of that 
movement; it is fair to say that they, like Runnymede, continue to represent 
quite a moderate line in relation to the issues around which they campaign. The 
texts produced by Fawcett cover a variety of issues to do with gender equality, 
covering areas such as: the 'gender gap' in pay between men and women, the 
under-representation of women in politics and business, the treatment of 
women in the justice system, and the particular inequalities suffered by ethnic 
minority women. The sample of Fawcett texts taken include a number from 
each decade since the 1960s, allowing some useful observations regarding the 
changing nature of equality discourse. I focus specifically on these historical 
shifts in dealing with the relationship between equality and diversity in the 
second section of this chapter. 
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 Malik (2009: 63) claims that it has 'come to be seen as defining the essence of multiculturalism', 
and Modood (2007: 17) describes it as the 'best public policy statement on multiculturalism in 
Britain'. 
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4.1 A 'Community of Communities' 
 
If there was a single phrase or slogan that could sum up multiculturalism as a 
political movement it might well be this idea, first put forward in the Parekh 
Report, of envisioning the development of Britain as a 'community of 
communities' (CFMEB, 2000: 3). What exactly is meant by this phrase though? 
What is a 'community', and what does it mean for Britain, which is itself a 
community, to contain a number of different communities? 
 
Starting with the question of definition, the Parekh Report, quoting the Oxford 
English Dictionary, defines a community very broadly as 'a body of people 
having a religion, a profession, etc, in common...a fellowship of interests...a 
body of nations unified by common interests'. Examples of 'everyday usage' are 
then given: 'the local community', 'the disabled community', 'a mining 
community', 'the scientific community', 'the gay and lesbian community', 'the two 
communities in Northern Ireland'. The report then goes on to 'envisage Britain 
as a community whose three principal constituent parts are England, Scotland 
and Wales, and to envisage each of the constituent parts as a community, as 
also each separate region, city, town or borough. Any one individual belongs to 
several different communities' (ibid: 47). 
 
This definition is simple enough, but also says very little in relation to the actual 
meaning of the phrase in question. Any complex, large-scale society, at any 
point in its history, clearly contains different interest groups in this sense and is 
therefore a 'community of communities'. Another Runnymede report is 
somewhat more specific: 
 
The Report of the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain developed two 
main ideas – of citizenship based on human rights, mutual respect and of reciprocal 
responsibilities; and of a 'community of communities' in which a range of 
communities – especially but not only those based on race, ethnicity, culture or 
religion – are able to retain their individual identity but with a sense of 'common 
belonging' to a single country or nation' (Faulkner, 2004: 2 – my emphasis). 
 
It is worth noting that the different types of community mentioned here explicitly 
includes 'race'. Does this idea, that communities 'based on race' should be 
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encouraged to 'retain' their identity, confirm the suspicions of critics such as 
Michaels (2006: 21-49) and Malik (1996: 169-177, 2008) that there is a process 
of racialisation at work within multicultural ideology? What about the other 
characteristics named, such as culture and religion, are they merely proxy terms 
for race? 
 
The key concept here is undoubtedly 'ethnicity', as it bridges the gap between 
'race' on the one hand, and terms such as 'culture' and 'religion' on the other; in 
other words, it has a 'family resemblance' with 'race', but it aims to signify 
something less objective and biological than the latter.66 Again, there is a 
definition of the term in the Parekh Report: 'an ethnic group is one whose 
members have common origins, a shared sense of history, a shared culture and 
a sense of collective identity. All human beings belong to an ethnic group in this 
sense' (CFMEB, 2000: xxiii). Here we get to the heart of multicultural ideology 
with its central notion of a 'shared culture' in opposition to a more objective, 
biological understanding of social differences. In this sense, use of the term 
'race' is 'unhelpfulEto the extent that it reflects and perpetuates the belief that 
the human species consists of separate races'. On the other hand, the term 
continues to be of 'essential importance, since it refers to the reality of racism' 
(ibid: xxiv). In terms of the logic of the discourse, then, race is a necessary term 
only in relation to the question of inequality and oppression – and this is to be 
distinguished from the idea of cultural or ethnic difference, which simply refers 
to the ebb and flow of human differences as they appear in all their variety in 
historically-evolving societies. It is this important discursive distinction that gives 
us the phrase common in Runnymede texts: 'race equality and cultural 
diversity'. 
 
In a related sense, it is worth noting that in its depiction of diverse ethnic 
minority communities, the Parekh Report is careful to emphasise that they 
should not be considered homogenous in any sense, or separate entities in 
relation to other communities. In chapter two, for example, it is argued that while 
in the past 'British national identity has always been more diverse than it is 
normally imagined to be', in more recent times it has become particularly 
'complex' due to a number of factors which have 'shaken the unified conception 
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of Britishness hitherto taken for granted and have injected a sense of fluidity 
and uncertainty into what was formerly experienced by many as a settled 
culture' (ibid: 23). Furthermore, one of these factors responsible for recent 
change, post-war migration,67 has 'raised many questions' about 'British identity 
and British institutions', and has led to the central question: '[h]ow are the new 
communities to be viewed in relation to the nation?'. The answer is worth 
quoting at length: 
 
One customary approach, which co-exists with the dominant version of the national 
story outlined above, is to see them as bounded, homogeneous groupings, each 
fixedly attached to its ethnicity and traditions. The 'majority', by the same token, is 
imagined to be fixed, unified, settledEThere are two things wrong with this mental 
picture of a large homogeneous majority and various equally homogeneous 
minorities. First, Britain is not and never has been the unified, conflict-free land of 
popular imagination. There is no single white majority. Second, the 'minority' 
communities do not live in separate, self-sufficient enclaves, and they do display 
substantial internal differences. They too must be reimagined (ibid: 26). 
 
This certainly seems a long way, then, from the charge of critics such as 
Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992: 158), as cited in the previous chapter, that 
multiculturalism 'constructs society as composed of a hegemonic homogeneous 
majority, and small unmeltable minorities with their own essentially different 
communities and cultures'.  
 
If the diverse communities central to the multicultural imaginary are not 
conceived as either homogenous or separate, how are they conceived in the 
literature? What captures their specificity as multicultural differences? To help 
point us towards an answer it is perhaps worth comparing the Parekh Report to 
an earlier Runnymede text, Employment of Minorities in Britain (Stewart, 1975). 
What is noticeable in the latter text is that the existence of cultural diversity is 
clearly recognised, in the sense of an acknowledgement of minority groups 
bringing over to Britain different cultures and cultural practices. For instance, in 
the first chapter, 'Who are the Immigrants?' (which covers similar ground to the 
section of the Parekh Report I have just summarised), the author writes, after 
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describing the long history of immigration into Britain, that '[a]ll these minorities 
have made their contribution to social and working life in Britain, in some cases 
bringing and retaining their individual cultures and forming tight-knit groups, in 
others merging with the British population' (ibid: 1-2). Here, the reality is 
understood as one where both the retention of a different culture within British 
society and its assimilation are possible, and the outcome depends on the 
particular group in question. 
 
Further on, in a sub-section on 'Asians', there is a focus on the many different 
groups that make-up this group in Britain (i.e. those from the Punjab, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, East Africa and so on). Stewart then writes: '[t]hese groups have 
strongly differentiated backgrounds in terms of experience and culture, which 
are represented in differences in work background, name systems and religion'. 
She also mentions that in 'all cases there is a strong sense of community and 
family, with a great respect for older people' (ibid: 8). Compare this with the 
Parekh Report, where under the sub-heading '“Asian” communities' it states 
that: 'Asians are not a single group. The conventional terminology blurs critical 
distinctions between Bangladeshis, Gujaratis, Pakistanis and Punjabis; between 
South Asians, East African Asians and Chinese; and between Hindus, Muslims 
and Sikhs. South Asians vary significantly not only in terms of nationality and 
religion but also in terms of language, caste and classETraditions of origin are 
strongest in familial, personal, domestic and religious contexts, where there is a 
strong sense of extended kinship' (CFMEB, 2000: 30). These two descriptions 
of those with Asian origins are then very similar. One point of possible 
divergence however lies in the sentence that follows in the Parekh Report: '[i]n 
consequence, a stereotype has arisen of Asians being distinctively 
conservative, but in fact there is much internal diversity in Asian 
communitiesETraditions and beliefs are varied and dynamic, constantly 
reinterpreted according to circumstances' (ibid: 30-1 – my emphasis). This 
certainly contrasts with the earlier Runnymede text in which minority 
communities tend to either blend into the existing population or else form 'tight-
knit' groups; in the Parekh Report these communities are both relatively distinct 
from the majority population and also themselves contain difference. In other 
words, the differences in the later text do not refer to homogeneous cultural 
blocks, but rather serve to distinguish internally heterogeneous communities. 
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There are two further points to make here. Firstly, it is worth turning briefly to 
the theory of multiculturalism and an important distinction made by Will 
Kymlicka that is picked up by Kenan Malik (2008): 
 
Kymlicka draws a distinction between the 'existence of a culture' and 'its 'character' 
at any given moment'. The character of culture can change but such changes are 
only acceptable if the existence of that culture is not threatened. But how can a 
culture exist if that existence is not embodied in its character? By 'character' 
Kymlicka seems to mean the actuality of a culture: what people do, how they live 
their lives, the rules and regulations and institutions that frame their existence. So, 
in making the distinction between character and existence, Kymlicka seems to be 
suggesting that Jewish, Navajo or French culture is not defined by what Jewish, 
Navajo or French people are actually doing. For if Jewish culture is simply that 
which Jewish people do or French culture is simply that which French people do, 
then cultures could never decay or perish [a warning that Kymlicka issues] – they 
would always exist in the activities of people. 
 
In other words there is a key distinction in the theory of multiculturalism between 
the character or content of a particular culture or set of cultural practices, and 
the existence or form of that culture that can remain – or has a reality – over-
and-above the changing nature of those practices. In the Runnymede texts I've 
looked at, the focus in the 1970s is perhaps best seen as a focus on the 
character of different cultures brought over through immigration, which may or 
may not retain that character in relation to the host country. In the Parekh 
Report, however, we find a stress on the internal diversity of different cultural 
communities, suggesting a shift to a focus on the importance of the existence of 
a culture able to 'contain' diverse and changing social practices.68 
 
Secondly, we can turn to the more concrete policies pursued in the name of 
multiculturalism. We saw in the previous chapter that the policies that occurred 
in the 1980s were considerably more complex than the phrase 'recognition of 
difference' generally brings to mind. I noted three aspects of the policies, with 
the provision of material goods, and social and political equality, existing 
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alongside cultural recognition. What we saw was not simply the demand for 
recognition of specific cultural practices by minority communities, then, but the 
use of cultural differences to establish a relationship between a disadvantaged 
community and the state. 
 
A more recent Runnymede report gives a useful illustration of what is involved 
here in its look at what it portrays as a relatively late newcomer to the 
'community of communities': Hindus. The report is called 'Connecting British 
Hindus: An enquiry into the identity and public engagement of Hindus in Britain', 
and in the foreword Ruth Kelly (the then Labour Secretary of State for 
Communities and Local Government) describes the report as the 'first to be 
commissioned with a specific focus on capturing an insight into the aspirations 
and contributions of Hindu communities in Britain'. She continues by elaborating 
on what the state will gain from it: '[t]he research will allow Government and its 
agencies to access evidence based research which specifically identifies 
service needs from the Hindu communities' perspective. I hope this will assist 
service providers in understanding the needs of Hindu communities in Britain 
and to feed this knowledge into tailoring public services appropriately' (Berkeley, 
2006: inside front cover). The author of the report, Rob Berkeley (the current 
director of Runnymede), elaborates on what the community in question will gain 
from this articulation of social needs: the 'processes for building a sense of 
community around contested formations of identity is a political and social 
project that could enable people from Hindu backgrounds to work more 
effectively together for their needs'. We also get a further indication of the 
constructed nature of the sense of community in question, when he writes that 
the 'process of developing a sense of fellow feeling, mutuality and belonging will 
take a commitment of time and effort, but also some capacity building to be able 
to engage with others outside of immediate community links' (ibid: 11). 
 
There are also some useful passages on the ongoing management of this 
relationship between state and community. In other words, the responsibility for 
change does not lie simply with the state in terms of creating a space for the 
communities within British society, it also lies with the communities themselves. 
In this sense, faith communities are 'required to have the capacity toEengage 
with agendas presented to them by government' as well as be able to 'define 
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the needs of their communities' (ibid: 7), and this requires '[b]uilding the 
capacity to address intergenerational changes and to use the existing expertise 
within the Hindu community to reinterpret Hindu values, beliefs and practices in 
times of social, technological, and political change' (ibid: 11). Interestingly, the 
kind of social and political changes that Hindu leaders are required to keep 
pace with include the equality and diversity agenda itself: it is argued that a 'key 
task for any Hindu leadership is to find ways of respecting traditions but 
challenging discrimination based on family background, religious tradition or 
jaati (caste) within a community' (ibid: 12). 
 
What these points suggest, then, is that specifically multicultural differences – 
the diverse communities that make up the Parekh Report's vision – go much 
deeper than is often understood by the phrase 'cultural diversity'. What we find 
in the discourse is the use of culture to mark out a socially disadvantaged group 
identity, and the use of this identity to establish a relationship with, and make 
demands on, the state. 
 
What about the community that contains these diverse communities though? 
What happens to this identity within the discourse? At first sight there is a 
symmetrical discursive operation in which Britain is argued to be, both in the 
past and present, 'diverse' in the same way as minority communities are 
diverse. This is clear from the passage cited above: Britain has never been the 
'unified, conflict-free land of popular imagination' and minorities also 'display 
substantial internal differences'. Similarly, the report concludes, at the end of the 
chapter on minority communities, that 'Britishness is less unified, more diverse 
and pluralistic, than is normally imaginedEHowever, migrant communities also 
turn out to be less unitary, more diverse and varied, than is normally imagined' 
(CFMEB, 2000: 36). On closer inspection, though, it is clear that there is a 
crucial distinction between the diversity of Britain, on the one hand, and that of 
minority communities on the other. A clue lies in the subtle difference in wording 
in the preceding quote: while minority communities are understood as less 
'unitary' (i.e. not homogenous), these differences are nonetheless internal to a 
relatively coherent group formation (as I have argued above). By contrast, 
Britain is less 'unified' – it is the ability to contain this difference within a single 
national community that is placed in doubt by its diversity. 
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In this sense, what is emphasised in the report's rethinking of the national story 
is not simply the differences internal to Britain (as is the case with its description 
of minority communities), but the struggle and conflict that has permanently 
scarred the project to unify those differences – to bring them together into a 
coherent whole. For example, 'the primacy of parliament in Britain was achieved 
at the expense of civil war, a king's head, the persecution of Catholics and the 
crushing of revolt in Ireland' (ibid: 2000: 19); the 'Act of Union (1801), which 
attempted to broker Ireland into the bargain, was continually contested' (ibid: 
20); 'there have always been many, often contested, ways of being British' and 
Britishness has always been 'strongly challenged' by the Irish, Scottish and 
Welsh and by a 'range of local and regional loyalties' (ibid: 22). The 
'achievements now said to characterise Englishness were staunchly resisted by 
some English people while being vigorously championed by others...[and] were 
achieved only through protracted struggle'; great national achievements such as 
the NHS and the welfare state more generally were each 'at one time the cause 
of bitter struggle' (ibid: 22). Even in 'today's less politicised climate' there are not 
only different, but 'dramatically opposed, versions of national identity', and a 
'universal sense of “Englishness” is impossible when our class system provides 
so many different “Englands”' (ibid: 22-3). This can be compared with a passage 
on Irish identity: there are 'various ways of being Irish in Scotland and England, 
connected withEdifferences of class, gender and time of migration' (ibid: 32), 
but these differences do not appear to be 'dramatically opposed', and 
differences of class do not appear to make a universal sense of Irishness 
'impossible'.69 
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 It should be noted that the report does use the term 'division', rather than just 'difference', at least 
twice in the discussion of minority groups: in the section on Asian communities it mentions 'deep 
divisions between parents and their children about the dangers of assimilation' within those 
communities, and, similarly, the 'many significant divisions and differences among British Jewry'. 
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Britain from neutrally containing its differences in the same way as these ethnic minority 
communities. 
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At the heart of this asymmetry in the significance of diversity for minority and 
majority communities lies one particular blockage to a unified British identity that 
is clearly predominant: racism. In the concluding section of the two chapters I 
have been looking at, the report adds a cautionary note to the optimistic claim 
that – having argued that both Britishness and migrant communities are diverse 
– the 'prospect of all communities finding a better, more just and humane way of 
living together has improved in the recent past': 
 
as we show in many chapters of this report, Britain continues to be disfigured by 
racism; by phobias about cultural difference; by sustained social, economic, 
educational and cultural disadvantage; by institutional discrimination; and by a 
systematic failure of social justice or respect for difference. These have been 
fuelled by a fixed conception of national identity and culture (ibid: 36). 
 
While by 'social, economic, educational and cultural disadvantage' they 
undoubtedly mean not just race but other inequalities such as class and gender, 
it is racism that poses a fundamental threat to society in a unique way. We saw 
in the previous chapter that the Scarman report argued that racial disadvantage 
could become an 'endemic, ineradicable disease threatening the very survival 
of our society' (quoted in Malik, 2009: 57). There are further examples of this 
type of argument in more recent Runnymede texts. For example, in the 
introduction to the report on British Hindus the author summarises the six-point 
framework for the research, taken from the Parekh Report, the last of which is 
that racism is 'deeply divisive, intolerant of differences, a source of much human 
suffering, and inimical to the common sense of belonging lying at the basis of 
every stable civilisation. It can have no place in a decent society' (Berkeley, 
2006: 8). Similarly, in another Runnymede publication, Audrey Osler writes that 
in Britain 'as in other multicultural societies across Europe, racism remains a 
powerful force which not only undermines the human rights of individuals but 
also serves to undermine democracy itself' (Osler, 2003: v), and that racism, 
which 'acts as a barrier to inclusion and participation, is therefore not only 
undemocratic, but also the enemy of democracy, threatening the stability and 
social cohesion of our society' (ibid: vii). In contrast, the other inequalities, such 
as gender inequality and economic disadvantage, do not threaten the very 
foundations of society in this way. 
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There is a final point to make here: it is not just racism in general but specifically 
white racism that holds this particular place in the discourse. In discussing 
whether there is a 'future' for Britishness, and pointing to the potential for a 
'suitably qualified' identity for ethnic minorities (e.g. Black British, Indian British 
etc), the following argument is made in the Parekh Report, in what proved to be 
a highly controversial passage:70 
 
However, there is one major and so far insuperable barrier. Britishness, as much as 
Englishness, has systematic, largely unspoken, racial connotations. Whiteness 
nowhere features as an explicit condition of being British, but it is widely understood 
that Englishness, and therefore by extension Britishness, is racially codedERace is 
deeply entwined with political culture and with the idea of nation, and underpinned 
by a distinctively British kind of reticence – to take race and racism seriously, or 
even to talk about them at all, is bad form, something not done in polite company 
(CFMEB, 2000: 38). 
 
In a section on the history of racism the report argues that racism is a universal 
phenomenon: it 'has existed and continues to exist in all societies. Chinese and 
Indian attitudes to outsiders, and African attitudes to Asians, and so on' (ibid: 
63). There is therefore no reason to think that racism in Britain is considered by 
Runnymede to be a solely white phenomenon, more generally; however, in 
terms of the deep, structural, 'systematic' racism that underpins the discourse, 
and which presents an antagonistic threat to a unified Britain, it clearly is. 
 
 
4.2 The Changing Meanings of 'Equality' and 'Diversity' 
 
It is clear, then, from the Runnymede discourse that the idea of difference in 
multicultural discourse is a complex one; there is also a similarly complex 
relationship between difference and inequality – particularly racism, which has a 
uniquely threatening character. In order to understand the specific nature of an 
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example, argues that '[m]issing the nuance between "racial connotations" and "racism", journalists 
consistently misrepresented and misquoted the report as rendering "British" inherently racist (as 
opposed to historically racist)'. 
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equality and diversity framework we need to investigate this relationship more 
closely. The Fawcett Society texts allow us a useful historical picture of the 
changing meanings of these two terms (equality and diversity), and how they 
interact within the same organisational discourse. 
 
Starting with the Fawcett discourse in the 1960s we can note that the concept of 
diversity appears twice in two texts, both of which are reports of conferences 
held by the Fawcett Society in 1967 and 1969. In the summing-up of the 1967 
conference, the speaker (Miss Hilton) is reported as saying that: 
 
perhaps all through the Conference we had fallen into the error of generalising 
about what women are and what women think and want. We were in fact as 
various, perhaps even more so, than men....it was surely the aim of education to 
enable people to be their best selves. Among the 'best selves' of men and women 
there would be an enormous diversity of points of view, likes, dislikes and ability 
and the kind of patterns they wanted to make of life. 
 
In the old days it was essential that feminist organisations should assume that all 
women wanted or should want a particular brand of freedom. This was necessary 
to achieve such freedom, and now it has been achieved (Fawcett, 1967: 19). 
 
Further on, she notes that at 'one time a number of objective thinkers had got 
together during the war years and tried to thrash out what was the feminine 
point of view if such existed...they failed to establish the existence of a feminine 
point of view as such, the diversity was so great' (ibid: 21). 
 
At the 1969 conference a speaker on 'Women and Management' is reported to 
have argued the case for women managers in terms of what women, as a 
gender, can bring to the task: 
 
The main qualities called for [in management] were patience, flexibility, sympathy 
and empathy with people, all feminine qualities. Provided women were not content 
just to copy men, they should be excellent managers. Certainly, professional 
qualifications were important, but they had to be combined with the feminine 
qualities which were badly needed in the business world today. 
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Differences between men and women should not be played down; richness of 
diversity was the condition of a creative societyEWomen, with their concern for the 
individual, with their intuitive feeling for unity and harmony had something unique to 
offer to the business world (Fawcett, 1969b: 21). 
 
We can see here two different uses of the term 'diversity' that are worth 
specifying: 1) in the first quote, from the first speaker, the term is used in the 
sense of individual differences, i.e. differences internal to a social group of 
some kind – in this case, women; 2) the second speaker uses the term to refer 
to group differences – women, as a group, are thought to possess certain 
'feminine qualities'. While the term 'diversity' is not itself used, we can also note 
a third type of difference that will help in understanding the later equality and 
diversity discourse: in the second quote from the first speaker, a politicised 
social difference is necessary as a temporary strategy – in other words, in order 
to achieve a political goal such as freedom for women, certain generalisations 
about what women want, as a distinct group, are necessary. 
 
The concept of equality is much more central to the discourse in this earlier 
period (as is to be expected for a gender equality organisation). In texts from 
the 1960s the term clearly refers to something (like freedom in the passage 
above) that has, in its formal sense, already been achieved, and which has to 
now be 'put into practice'. At the 1969 Fawcett conference, Dr. Louis Blom-
Cooper is reported as saying that: 
 
The stage had been reached where the law, as such, would soon have done all it 
could to equalise men and women. It was necessary to consolidate these gains and 
during the next ten years attention should be devoted to putting these declared 
rights into practice. Women would get effective equality if they used their new-found 
powers wisely (ibid: 9). 
 
In the Annual Report of 1968-69, Miss Halpin, in the Chairman's remarks, 
similarly states that '[t]oday our "rights" had more or less been won but the 
younger generation did not realise how much was involved in maintaining the 
position and keeping the doors of opportunity open' (Fawcett, 1969a: 2). 
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In the 1970s the focus shifts onto 'inequalities' – in other words, the more 
substantive inequality that requires remedy in the texts of the previous decade. 
For example, in the Annual Report at the end of that decade, the Society has as 
its 'principal object' the 'removal of all inequalities and discrimination based on 
sex, whether in law, practice or custom, and the promotion of equal opportunity 
in all spheres of work or other endeavour', and it 'seeks to promote education 
and the dissemination of knowledge on the past and present position of women 
and on the inequalities which have been and are imposed on them by law or 
custom in this country or elsewhere' (Fawcett, 1979: 1). A pamphlet written in 
1972 states that: '[w]ith a view to comprehensive legislation to end the 
inequalities which remain, we urge that the Law Commissions in England and 
Scotland should jointly set up a status of women study, to identify remaining 
inequalities and propose legislation to abolish them effectively' (Fawcett, 1972: 
2). At the same time, this work against inequalities, and for a 'true equality' 
(Fawcett, 1976: 1) is accompanied by a critique of a notion of difference in the 
sense of group distinctions (as opposed to individual differences among 
women). In the same pamphlet, for example, the aims of Fawcett include: 
 
phasing out single-sex professional and business associations, societies and clubs. 
We are against women's divisions, associate memberships, wives' groups – as well 
as the relegation of women to those ancillary functions in joint organisations such 
as fundraising and coffee-making. There may be a place for distinct women's 
organisations for some years yet, but the aim should be integration and equal 
participation (ibid: 2). 
 
It is worth highlighting, in the final sentence, that this critique of difference does 
not preclude the continuing relevance of a potentially necessary, though 
temporary, political difference, which may be required for 'some years yet'. 
 
In contrast to the more optimistic tone of the 1970s71 the texts from the 1980s 
clearly register disappointment as those hopes begin to fade. What is noticeable 
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 In the 1972 pamphlet this optimism is linked with, among other things, the emerging women's 
liberation movement: '[w]e believe that the women's movement has now entered a new phase, and 
we see the evidence for this in three encouraging developments. The Equal Pay Act has been passed. 
Pledges to introduce legislation to prohibit sex discrimination in certain areas (employment, for 
example) have appeared in the programmes of political parties. And there has recently been a 
ferment of discussion about the roles of men and women in society…we acknowledge gratefully the 
stimulus that has come from the women's liberation movement. Its grass-roots questioning of basic 
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in terms of the concept of equality is less a change in its meaning – it is still 
linked to the rectification of various inequalities in society – and more the 
emergence of various concrete policy measures to achieve the desired 
redistributive effects. In particular, the argument for policies that treat women 
differently in order to increase their standing as a group – such as affirmative or 
positive action – begins to be made quite forcefully. The report of the 
proceedings of a 'Women's Action Day' held in London in 1980 records a 
number of speakers calling for this type of intervention. For example, one 
speaker is reported as arguing that '[p]ositive discrimination had to begin in 
schools, and cover the whole spectrum of employment. Management and 
unions should agree on positive action, then identify the areas where women 
are offered dead-end, low-paid jobs while men are offered jobs with prospects' 
(Fawcett, 1980: 6).72 This finding fits with the general historical trajectory of the 
development of multiculturalism I outlined in the previous chapter, where this 
decade (the 1980s) saw the beginning of organised, institutionally backed 
programs (within certain local authorities) to make minority groups more equal 
with the majority. However, as I've mentioned, it wasn't until later that the idea 
of diversity becomes linked with these policies and to 'equality' in the specific 
combination that we find in contemporary equality and diversity texts. 
 
We can see this last point reflected in the Fawcett discourse where 'diversity' 
only appears in this form in the 2000s. More specifically, I can't find the term 
used in this sense until the Annual Report of 2003-04 where it is stated that 
'Fawcett recognises that women's lives and experiences are diverse. We 
campaign for changes in legislation, practice and culture that bring about real 
improvements for all women. Through our strong evidence-backed campaigns 
we stimulate debate and bring women's voices to the heart of policy making' 
(Fawcett, 2004: 1). It is worth noting, however, that in the Annual Report from 
three years earlier, while not the exact term, the concept of difference is used in 
a similar fashion: 'we go from strength to strength in our ability to make sure that 
women's voices are heard, making sure policy makers remember that women's 
                                                                                                                                               
attitudes, its dynamism and its new perceptions have done a lot to prepare the ground for this new 
phase' (Fawcett, 1972: 1). 
72
 Interestingly, at this early stage no distinction is made between positive discrimination and 
affirmative action, on the one hand, and positive action, on the other. In contrast, this is a distinction 
that, as we will see, plays an important role in later texts. 
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needs are different' (Fawcett, 2001: 1). Once we get to the Annual Report for 
2008-09, we see that the concept of 'diversity' is not only central to the Fawcett 
discourse, but the general promotion of equality and diversity appears to be the 
basic aim of the organisation, with gender equality more an emphasis within this 
broad agenda rather than the sole aim. That is certainly the impression given by 
the way they summarise their objectives in this document: '[t]he Society works 
to promote equality and diversity, in particular equality between women and 
men, and to eliminate gender discrimination for the benefit of the public' 
(Fawcett, 2009: 2). 
 
In these later texts diversity appears as key to the pursuit of equality. This is 
illustrated well in a 2005 report called 'Black & Minority Ethnic Women in the 
UK': 
 
This publication is the first that Fawcett has produced focusing exclusively on the 
position of Black and Minority Ethnic women in the UK. As an organisation, we 
recognise that we have fallen too readily into the trap of talking about women as if 
they were a homogenous group. 
 
To achieve equality between women and men, Fawcett seeks to understand the 
particular experience of Black and Minority Ethnic women, diversity among Black 
and Minority Ethnic women as well as the commonality of experience among 
women of all ethnicities. This publication represents an important step on the road 
to addressing this agenda within our work (Brittain et al, 2005: inside front cover – 
my emphasis). 
 
The emphasised phrase indicates the new role that diversity begins to play in 
relation to equality: it becomes a way of achieving equality, not merely 
something to be recognised alongside it. 
 
What does it mean, though, for diversity to be a way of achieving equality, and 
what kind of diversity are we talking about? I've located three meanings of 
difference in the earlier Fawcett discourse: individual differences, group 
differences, and political distinctions. At a first glance, the contemporary turn 
towards diversity could be viewed as a straightforward replacement of the third 
meaning by the second. I quoted Malik on the early history of multiculturalism in 
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the previous chapter: 'temporary organizational separation for political reasons 
gave way to the notion of permanent cultural distinctiveness as a fact of life' 
(Malik, 2009: 54). In this case, 'difference' goes from denoting a political 
distinction (in response to inequality) to a group difference characterised by 
culture. 
 
However, in looking at the contemporary texts it would seem that diversity 
contains elements of both these meanings, rather than one simply replacing the 
other. It is clear, for example, that the difference that women constitute in the 
later Fawcett texts is not the same as the 'feminine qualities' of the passage 
from the 1960s that I cited. The critique of 'stereotypes' is a constant theme in 
the literature generally. A Fawcett 'think piece' on the subject of stereotypes 
argues that 
 
empirical evidence challenges the authority of these familiar stereotypes; showing 
that women and men are in fact more similar than they are different, and that there 
is more variation among women and among men, than between women and men. 
In short, gender stereotypes create a 'false dichotomy' between female and male 
characteristics (Rake and Lewis, 2009: 3). 
 
Here we can see that diversity in the sense of individual differences is used to 
challenge the idea of natural differences between the sexes (i.e. there is more 
variation within the group 'women' than between 'women' and 'men').73 
 
However, this simple proposition (which few would deny) obviously cannot be 
isolated from the political context of inequality in which the discourse operates. 
In a Fawcett report on the effects of the recent recession on women, written two 
months later, Katherine Rake (2009: 3) writes that: 
 
The collapse of the UK's financial institutions has had huge repercussions. One 
consequence has been the fact that during the collapse of our banking system the 
faces of leading figures were put on the front pages of every newspaper. For the 
first time, the public has seen for themselves who holds power in our major 
businesses, and they were the faces of white menEIt is important that the 
argument about why this is a problem is made without descending into simplistic 
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 In a similar way, we saw above how the Parekh Report appeals to the internal diversity of 
minority communities in order to challenge the idea of them as 'bounded, homogeneous groupings'. 
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caricatures of women and men's behaviour (i.e. that men are testosterone-fuelled 
risk takers while women are risk averse and compassionate). We would argue that 
the problem lies, rather, in the fact that these institutions have drawn their senior 
figures from one narrow demographic. 
 
If the problem is not enough people from a particular 'demographic', what 
characterises that demographic in a way that would then benefit institutions? It 
cannot be crude generalisations about women's naturally 'risk averse' 
inclinations, yet there nonetheless must be some kind of difference that a 
particular demographic would contribute. Rake puts the solution like this: 
'women and men continue to have different life experiences and their needs 
and interests are often different as a consequence. Better governance comes 
when a rich variety of life experience is reflected among decision makers' (ibid). 
However, this merely leads to the question of the cause of these 'different life 
experiences'? Once again, if they are purely a result of inequality, the 
achievement of gender equality would eliminate these different life experiences 
and there wouldn't be a 'rich variety' at the top. Yet the phrase 'life experiences' 
clearly suggests something to do with the social conditions that women find 
themselves in, rather than any innate differences between the sexes. 
 
Having considered this shift in the meaning of difference as it comes to be 
articulated with equality, I will finish this section by considering how equality 
itself changes as a result of this pairing. In other words, what does it mean for 
equality to be a way of achieving diversity? One way of thinking about the 
development of equality initiatives, such as positive action, in the 1980s, is that 
it shifts equality from entailing a structural or relational and therefore qualitative 
change, to one involving the quantitative comparison of groups within a 
structure or set of relations. However, as I will go on to argue in more detail in 
the following chapter, there is an important distinction (both historically and 
analytically) between equality initiatives, such as affirmative or positive action, 
and the later institutionalisation of these initiatives under the broader term 
'diversity'. As Peter Wood points out, in the United States affirmative action was 
to be a temporary measure that would bring about racial equality as an 
'achieved fact'. Quantitative comparisons between, say, the top positions held 
by whites and non-whites respectively was therefore a means to an end that still 
involved a qualitative shift in social relations – in moving from a racially unequal 
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to a racially equal society. With the advent of diversity things are not so clear: 
diversity 'dispensed with the old notion of equality and in so doing, dispensed 
with the idea that group preferences would be only a temporary expedient' 
(Wood, 2003: 238). Consequently, the quantitative comparison between groups 
becomes a permanent exercise in closing 'inequality gaps', rather than a 
temporary measure towards ending inequality. 
 
Take, for example, this text from 2005: the 1970s  
 
was a time of great optimismEthere was a hope among many in the women's 
movement that if only they pushed hard enough they would see equality for their 
daughters' generation. 
 
In this review, we look at how much has really changed 30 years later. We find that 
while there are many successes to celebrate, there is still a great deal further to go 
to close the inequality gaps between women and men (Fawcett, 2005: 2). 
 
Compare this to the contribution of a speaker, in a debate on equal pay, at the 
TUC women workers conference of 1969: 
 
Year after year we have come forward to this rostrum, urging and pleading for 
social justice, but it is very, very far away I am afraid, unless the women themselves 
take the action that is needed to show that we really mean to have equality, not in 
the distant future, but now (TUC, 1969: 52). 
 
The point should be emphasised: this idea of equality as an immediate 
qualitative change in social relations is entirely absent from later texts. There is, 
instead, a kind of asymptotic approach towards equality in that while continued 
progress is generally acknowledged, there is no obvious sign of when equality 
might be achieved, no end-point that can be reached that will mean 
redistributive equality policies are no longer necessary. 
 
This shift in the meaning of equality as it becomes combined with diversity – 
from a qualitative change in the nature of social relations to a permanent 
reduction of inequalities between groups within a set of social relations – also 
points towards a final meaning of difference that we find in the texts. This 
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meaning of difference describes a position within a social structure, and is 
therefore not simply an expression of a group characteristic of some kind 
(gender, ethnicity etc), but it is at the same time clearly more permanent and 
institutionalised than a temporary political difference. This is a difference that 
emerges from the recognition of an unequal group in society by the state, and 
the resulting space provided for it within the institutionalised workings of the 
system. This is a meaning that clearly came across in my analysis of the 
diverse communities in the Runnymede discourse. We also saw, in the 
discussion of the rise of ethnicity in the previous chapter, that what helped form 
the new ethnic differences was not the existence of ethnic difference alone, but 
rather the place that was found within the system for those differences as equal 
groups in society. Conversely, the emergence of an anti-systemic black identity, 
in which those differences were submerged, can be linked to the failure to 
incorporate ethnic groups in this way (i.e. as equals). 
 
 
4.3 The Blind Spot 
 
We have a better picture now of equality and diversity discourse as an 
ideological framework. As an ideological response to a fundamental inequality 
that threatens society, it establishes the principle of equality between social 
groups (measured according to various indicators of material well being,74 but 
also less tangible political and 'symbolic' factors such as power-relations, 
recognition and status). Diversity is a crucially flexible term: in order to pursue 
social justice, groups have to be distinguished on both the 'horizontal' level 
(from each other) and the 'vertical' level (their unequal social position). 
However, this is a type of social justice that depends on diversity having two 
further possible meanings: 1) the social groups in question are non-class 
groups that are different on the basis of a range of characteristics (ethnicity, 
religion, gender, sexuality, disability, and so on); 2) this is social justice within a 
particular social system, giving rise to institutionalised differences within the 
social structure. This leads to, on the one hand, differential treatment of majority 
and minority in order to promote social equality, but also, at the same time, an 
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 E.g. unemployment and poverty rates, wealth, housing, job opportunities, educational 
achievement, health outcomes, and so on. 
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attempt to include all groups within the system: to 'address the white 
communities on an equal basis with others' (Mclaughlin and Neal, 2004: 159).75  
 
I want to finish this chapter by looking at the key exclusion at the heart of this 
framework: class inequality. From my argument so far this seems simple 
enough: the social groups made equal in the model are characterised by their 
link to various non-class characteristics (gender, race, sexuality etc); this means 
that high levels of socio-economic inequality, which cuts across these groups, 
is, at best, compatible with this model, at worst, actively reproduced by it. 
However, this relationship between the framework and class is not quite as 
straight-forward as it might at first appear. For this reason I will not do more 
here than give an initial first sketch of the place of class within the discourse; 
the following chapters (particularly chapter seven) will significantly expand on 
this. I will start with the issue of class, as it emerges in the Fawcett discourse in 
a somewhat oblique fashion: in this organisation's defence of equality and 
diversity in response to the latter's right-wing critics. 
 
As a 'means of achieving social justice in a hierarchical society',76 the equality 
and diversity framework invariably gives rise to the critique from the right that 
the majority group – the group on the wrong end of the differential treatment 
institutionalised through this framework – is, in fact, becoming a disadvantaged 
group itself. This criticism is registered within the Fawcett discourse in their 
Annual Report for 2000-01: the report has the sub-title 'Banishing the Myths', 
which clearly indicates the need to respond to this challenge. The Chair of the 
organisation, Jenny Watson, argues that: 
 
Looking back, this year seemed to be the year of the media myth – that women 
have it all. Girls do better at school, women have shattered the glass ceiling, and in 
these post-feminist days, boys and men, whose identity is so uncertain, need 
attention. 
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 According to Mclaughlin and Neal, the original remit of the commission behind the Parekh Report 
(under a different chair, Sir John Burgh) was to 'look at the future of multi-ethnic Britain as a whole. 
It should be seen to address the white communities on an equal basis with others'. Similarly, the 
report itself states that the 'development of Britain as a community of communities is not about 
"multi-ethnic Britain" alone; it is for the benefit of all people, not just so-called minorities' (CFMEB, 
2000: 9). 
76
 This is a phrase used in a Runnymede text to describe the historical acceptance of reservations in 
public bodies for disadvantaged groups (such as Untouchables) in India (Khan, 2006: 6). 
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Of course we need to be concerned with boys who have problems in school, with 
the decline of traditional industry which has disproportionately affected men. But if 
women have really cracked it, why are those girls who do so well at school still 
being paid just 82% of their male colleagues – even less if they work part-time? 
Why are girls still not studying IT or engineering in anything like the same numbers 
as boys?...For every woman who makes it to the top – such as the handful we 
identified in our FTSE female report – there are thousands of others who face 
difficulty in balancing their work and home life and experience discrimination in the 
workplace (Fawcett, 2001: 1). 
 
It is clear from this passage, though, that 'problems in school' and the 'decline of 
traditional industry' are not just issues that disproportionately affect men, but are 
also issues that disproportionately affect different social classes. In this sense 
the right-wing critique tends to mirror the strategy of identity politics in binding 
together socio-economic interests with the articulation of a non-class identity. 
The difference is, of course, that this identity is a majority identity – the aim 
being to challenge the idea of disadvantaged minorities that legitimate equality 
and diversity policies. 
 
There are two main responses to this challenge that exist within the equality 
and diversity discourse: one is the straight-forward response, as we see above, 
to restate the fundamental inequality between majority and minority, shifting the 
ground, if necessary, away from those areas where there might be statistical 
indicators that do not reflect this. The second is more interesting and involves 
not simply rejecting the claims of unfairness, as articulated by the right-wing 
critique, but also attempting to break the link drawn by the latter between socio-
economic issues and a majority identity. In other words, this response involves 
drawing a class division, within the majority, between the legitimate grievances 
of those suffering from the effects of the socio-economic structure, and those 
who are simply using those grievances to further an attack on equality and 
diversity. Crucially, this return of class within the discourse repeats the 
asymmetry between majority and minority, through the contrast between the 




A good illustration of this can be found in a collection of articles in a recent 
Runnymede publication entitled: 'Who Cares about the White Working Class?'. 
In her foreword, Kate Gavron – the vice-chair of the organisation – sets out the 
context for the collection like this: 
 
At first sight the subject of this book may surprise readers, coming from an 
organization which for forty years has worked to promote a successful multi-ethnic 
Britain by addressing issues of racial equality and discrimination against minority 
communities. Seeking to examine the grievances of a part of the white majority is 
not an obvious development. But a recent emphasis in the media and by other 
commentators on the segregation of, and competition between, ethnic groups has 
suggested that white working class communities may be losing out in the conflict 
over the allocation of scarce resources. This has prompted us to ask our 
contributors to describe what is really happening (Gavron, 2009: 2). 
 
The answer is that '[i]n fact, the most disadvantaged working-class people of 
whatever ethnic background, roughly the poorest fifth of the population, are 
increasingly separated from the more prosperous majority by inequalities of 
income, housing and education'. Gavron concludes: 
 
What we learn here is that life chances for today's children are overwhelmingly 
linked to parental income, occupations and educational qualifications – in other 
words, class. The poor white working class share many more problems with the 
poor from minority ethnic communities than some of them recognize. All the most 
disadvantaged groups must be helped to improve their joint lot. Competition 
between them, real or imagined, is just a distraction (ibid). 
 
Once again, we need to pay close attention to the discourse here. To begin 
with, the first quote makes it clear that the aim is to 'examine the grievances of a 
part of the white majority', and from the title of the publication and throughout it 
is clear that it is the white working class that is the central subject of the 
collection. Class is clearly registered as a modification of the fundamental, 
structuring majority/minority relation (a 'part of the white majority'), rather than a 
group that cuts across the ethnically defined 'communities' we have already 
looked at. In other words, the working class seems to take on an ethnic form in 
a similar fashion to other disadvantaged groups defined by non-ethnic 
characteristics, such as gender and sexuality (I mentioned this feature of 
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multiculturalism in the previous chapter). From the second quote it is clear that 
this group takes its place alongside ethnic minorities as one of the many 
'disadvantaged groups' with which multiculturalism deals. 
 
It is this reduction of a class to a disadvantaged minority that leads Walter Benn 
Michaels (2009), in his review of the publication, to argue that what we get from 
Runnymede 
 
is less an alternative to neoliberal multiculturalism than an extension and ingenious 
refinement of it. Those writing in this collection understand the 're-emergence of 
class' not as a function of the increasing injustice of classEbut as a function of the 
increasing injustice of 'classism'. What outrages them, in other words, is not the fact 
of class difference but the 'scorn' and 'contempt' with which the lower class is 
treated. 
 
Terry Eagleton (1996: 57-9), among others, has similarly criticised the attempt 
to fit class into the multicultural schema of disadvantaged groups. The central 
point is that the equivalence between class and non-class inequalities fails 
because class is not an 'ism'. In other words, it is not about prejudice and ill-
treatment of individuals according to their identity (skin colour, gender, cultural 
practice, sexuality etc), but rather involves an exploitative social relation that 
requires a fundamentally different type of politics to remedy. 
 
While this criticism undoubtedly brings out an important distinction between 
class and non-class inequalities, it is important to add two points that can be 
missed in discussion of this question. Firstly, as we have already seen 
multiculturalism, from the very beginning, involves much more than 
the injustices Michaels identifies (prejudice, discrimination, lack of cultural 
recognition, stereotyping etc). There is a stronger, though undoubtedly limited, 
attempt to equalise the material conditions of disadvantaged groups with 
comparative majority groups – including the redistribution of a broad range of 
material resources – alongside the political project to provide institutional 
mechanisms for consulting and integrating those minority groups into the 
functioning of state power. We should be careful then not to underestimate the 
nature of the equality sought in the 'politics of difference'. Secondly, it is clear 
from my case studies that this model of social justice is quite compatible with a 
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critique of the injustice of socio-economic inequality as a general over-riding 
structure that affects all disadvantaged groups. What needs to be analysed, I 
think, is less an exclusion or lack of emphasis on socio-economic inequality, 
and more the separation within the discourse of the two types of inequality and 
the effect this has on each: identity-based inequality, on the one hand, to 
remedy which requires focusing on the inequality of a distinct, non-class group; 
on the other hand, socio-economic inequality, to remedy which means to reduce 
the overall disparities that cut across identity-based groups, and whose 
amelioration is not therefore linked to the 'recognition' of a distinct social group. 
 
What we find, then, is that the working class as a group tends to fall between 
these two meanings of equality: it is a distinct, disadvantaged group, but not 
one of the 'identity' groups that are recognised within the equality and diversity 
framework. I noted in the previous chapter that Sivanandan's analysis of the 
ideological impact of multiculturalism was not a straightforward case of a focus 
on race replacing a focus on class. Rather, it was the separation of the two 
issues that was crucial. He argues, in a similar vein, that as a result of the 
theoretical challenge to Marxism and championing of non-class groups as 
agents of change in the same period, the working class 'was stripped of its 
richest political seams – black, feminist, gay, green etc. – and left, in the name 
of anti-economism, a prey to economism' (Sivanandan, 1990: 77). While clearly 
the kind of New Left thinking he is targeting is very different from the neoliberal 
multicultural discourse I am looking at, he does, I think, capture quite well what 
happens to an agent that was previously at the heart of the politics of inequality. 
 
We can illustrate this point further by returning to the Runnymede collection on 
class. We have already noted that its main subject is the white working class: a 
kind of ethnicised class grouping whose disadvantage is clearly, as pointed out 
by Michaels, understood in 'culturalist' terms. For example, in his introduction to 
the collection, Kjartan Páll Sveinsson concludes that the 'white working classes 
are discriminated against on a range of different fronts, including their accent, 
their style, the food they eat, the clothes they wear, the social spaces they 
frequent, the postcode of their homes, possibly even their names. But they are 
not discriminated against because they are white' (Sveinsson, 2009: 6). Here 
the white working class is clearly depicted as a distinct identity that suffers from 
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the kind of direct discrimination that minority groups suffer from. However, as I 
noted, equality for the other non-class minority groups (such as women or the 
disabled) includes the redistribution of material resources in relation to a 
comparatively advantaged group. For the white working class, however, this 
aspect of equality falls under the more general socio-economic inequality that is 
distinct, in the discourse, from the remedying of group inequality; the former 
type of inequality does not include recognition of the kind of socio-political, 
culturally distinct, subjects that define the minority groups of multiculturalism. In 
this sense, then, the working class appears as either a specific group that 
suffers from prejudice (i.e. 'classism'), or tends to disappear in a more general 
attempt to rectify socio-economic inequality that cuts across all disadvantaged 
groups. 
 
This contemporary distinction between identity-based and socio-economic 
inequality can be usefully contrasted to an earlier social-democratic discourse 
on equality in which no such distinction appears to exist. Here, the working 
class appears as a recognised, disadvantaged group in a way that it does not in 
contemporary equality and diversity texts. One consequence is that, in contrast 
to contemporary texts (where, as we've seen, class tends to be linked with white 
men whilst women and ethnic minorities are taken as groups that 
unproblematically form across class differences), we see the simple fact of the 
class-divided nature of disadvantaged minorities. 
 
In some of the earlier Fawcett texts, for example, we see that privileged class 
interests within the women's movement, both in the past and present, are 
contrasted with the distinct interests of working-class women. In a talk given to 
the 1967 conference, a speaker (Professor McGregor) is reported as saying 
that it was the problems of 'upper and middle class' women in Victorian society 
that were the 'effective origin of the women's movement' and that 'involved the 
development of opportunities for education and professional training of women. 
Such women thus began to have the freedom to choose between work and the 
legal bondage of marriage.' In contrast: 
 
new freedoms for the women of the working class, who always formed an important 
segment of the labour market, lay in the control and regulation of conditions of 
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work. The necessity for such controls was not understood by, and was thus 
generally opposed by, the largely middle and upper class women's movement 




Probably also the upper and middle class nature of the women's movement had 
been an obstacle [in the latter's progress]. It was essential to extend it to the 
interests of industrial women...Professor McGregor ended by stressing what he 
described as the inescapable fact that women have two roles; in the case of the 
working class woman the problem is the creation of an industrial structure which will 
give opportunities for responsibility and promotion (ibid: 9). 
 
In a paper given to the Fawcett Society in 1978, David Donnison makes a 
similar observation of '2nd wave feminism' whose 'leaders have been 
predominantly middle-class'. He contrasts this with 
 
leaders of other movements for reform in which working-class people have played 
so large a part – the movements, for example, which have reorganised this 
country's secondary education, launched at last a better pension scheme, and 
rehoused one-third of our population in non-profit housing allocated with greater 
regard for needs than for the ability to pay (Donnison, 1978: 3). 
 
What is noticeable in these quotes is that there is nothing particularly radical 
about the observation of the class-divided nature of women as a group. By that I 
mean that in these examples the social democratic discourse is focused, like 
multiculturalism, on integration: both seek to incorporate disadvantaged groups 
within a wider social structure by improving the social conditions of those 
groups. The difference is simply the replacement of the working-class by 
various minority groups as the central agents in this process. 
 
It isn't that the existence of non-class inequalities are not recognised in the 
older texts, but the lack of a separation between socio-economic and identity-
based inequality means that, unlike in contemporary equality and diversity texts, 
there is no automatic connection between gender equality and social equality; it 
depends on whether or not the former aids the overall improvement in the social 
position of the working class and, what is an indivisible aspect of this, a 
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reduction in socio-economic inequality. In her opening address to the Fawcett 
conference of 1969, for example, Shirley Williams (a Labour MP at the time) 
points out that '[s]ocial justice for women was one of the questions frequently 
neglected by women's organisations. Equality within professions, equality of 
admission, equal pay, all these were recognised and fought for, but it was 
frequently forgotten that the bulk of women are to be found on the shop floor' 





Having already summarised the first two sections of this chapter above, we can 
now briefly add the final element to this chapter's description of the basic 
conceptual structure of equality and diversity discourse: the distinction I have 
outlined between identity-based inequality and socio-economic inequality. It is 
this distinction that I believe is important in understanding the reason why class, 
despite its formal inclusion, seems to nonetheless be excluded – or, rather, 
depoliticised. I should perhaps repeat a disclaimer already made however: none 
of the analysis of this chapter is intended to, at this stage, link to broader 
empirical or theoretical debates. In this sense, to note this distinction in the 
meaning of equality in the discourse, and suggest its potential importance in 
explaining the move away from class, is not to say why it might be important. To 
begin to broach these broader questions about how the framework functions, I'll 
now turn to consider the latter as a historically dynamic entity: something that 
has been pushed and pulled in a variety of directions, by a number of different 




Chapter Five: Diversity Management 
 
The business take-up of the equality and diversity framework has undoubtedly 
been a major factor in its rise to prominence over the preceding decades. Not 
only is the workplace a key area of society in which equality and diversity 
policies operate, but in a world in which business has such an influential 
position it is hard to imagine any ideas, let alone equality and diversity, 
becoming mainstream without significant corporate support. The case study 
organisations I want to look at in this chapter reflect this: the Confederation of 
British Industry (CBI) and Schneider-Ross both put forward a business 
perspective in relation to equality and diversity in the context of differing 
organisational goals. A look at their respective discourses will therefore give us 
a useful insight into some of the ways in which the framework, described in the 
previous chapter, has been modified through its articulation with the business 
interests represented by these organisations. There are three points within this 
particular variant of equality and diversity discourse that I want to focus on: 1) 
the 'business case' for equality and diversity – i.e. the claim that equality and 
diversity can be thought of as beneficial to organisations for economic reasons, 
rather than as a legal necessity or ethical responsibility; 2) the shift in emphasis 
towards the 'diverse individual', away from group-based equality initiatives; 3) 
the focus on organisational culture as a key target of equality and diversity 
policies. 
 
Once again, it's worth saying something about the two organisations 
themselves before I look more closely at the texts they've produced. The CBI 
was established in 1965 as a representative of Britain's employers. It is large 
and well-known, describing itself as the 'voice of British businesses' and the 
'UK's top business lobbying organisation' (CBI, 2012). According to their figures 
they represent around 240,000 businesses that together employ a third of the 
private sector workforce (CBI, 2007a: 1). Its mission, according to its website, is 
to 'promote the conditions in which businesses of all sizes and sectors in the UK 
can compete and prosper for the benefit of all' (CBI, 2012). Equality and 
diversity, though not insignificant, is a fairly minor issue among the many areas 
their work covers. Illustrative of this is the relatively small number of texts (in 
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relation to their size) that the CBI has produced in comparison with my other 
case study organisations.77 
 
The majority of these texts are specific policy responses – that is, statements of 
the CBI position in relation to specific government reports or consultation 
documents. These aim to represent members' interests and opinions on specific 
topics, and are written by the CBI for government officials and other interested 
parties. The policy positions are generally supportive of equality and diversity, 
with a pragmatic line taken stressing cooperation between the different interests 
involved in the field. As is to be expected, they stress the need for policies that 
suit business interests, such as cutting down on costly bureaucratic 'burdens' 
and a focus on outcomes rather than processes; they are keen, in other words, 
to avoid a 'tick box' approach.78 The most useful CBI (2008) text that I have 
found is a report called 'Talent not Tokenism: the business benefits of workforce 
diversity'. Produced in collaboration with the TUC and the EHRC, it is 
particularly useful in laying out the different arguments involved in the claim that 
equality and diversity is good for business, along with illustrative case studies of 
different businesses applying these arguments to policies on the ground. 
 
The CBI texts I have chosen to look at date from the year 2000 onwards. While 
they have produced texts from before this time on the subject of equality and 
equal opportunities in the workplace, the other organisation I will look at in this 
chapter is more useful in relation to the earlier development of a specifically 
business-focused discourse. The organisation in question, Schneider-Ross, is a 
small but influential equality and diversity consultancy firm. They state that their 
mission is to 'provide the global expertise to our clients who want to become 
truly inclusive organisations, creating value from diversity'. They have worked 
with 'many of the world's leading companies to help them develop and 
implement their global diversity and inclusion strategies, including some big 
names such as Barclays, HSBC, Vodafone and BP (Schneider-Ross, 2012). 
Their work with these organisations involves carrying out audits on the current 
state of equality and diversity policies within that organisation, making 
                                                 
77
 I should also add that, compared with Schneider-Ross, the CBI texts contained less material of 
interest in relation to my overall argument. I have therefore focused more on the Schneider-Ross 
discourse in this chapter. 
78
 See, for example, their response to a select committee inquiry on equality (CBI, 2007b). 
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recommendations, running training sessions for staff, and so on. The company 
was set up more recently than the CBI, in 1989, but a book written by Rachael 
Ross and Robin Schneider (the co-founders of the company) in 1992 was, 
according to them, the first business text on diversity in the UK: From Equality 
to Diversity: A Business Case for Equal Opportunities (Ross and Schneider, 
1992). This is the main reason for the point made above on the insight that this 
case study gives us into the early development of 'diversity management'79 – it 
will feature as a key text throughout this chapter. 
 
Alongside this, Schneider-Ross have produced a number of reports and articles 
between 1998 and 2007 on various aspects of equality and diversity. There is 
an investigation of why women, ethnic minorities and people with disabilities are 
under-represented in the senior civil service, for example (Schneider, 1999). 
There is also a report on the public duty to promote race equality written for the 
CRE (Commission for Racial Equality), together with a follow-up to this which 
looks at the impact of all three public sector duties, including those relating to 
gender and disability (Schneider-Ross, 2003, 2007a).80 The Business of 
Diversity is also worth mentioning: published in 2002, it looks at the specific 
ways in which both public and private sector organisations are utilising equality 
and diversity for their particular organisational goals. It gives some useful 
insights into how diversity management techniques function in concrete 
settings, and the reasons behind the increasing use of these policies by the 
leaders of the organisations featured (Rutherford and Ollerearnshaw, 2002). It 
is this kind of in-depth look at the way in which equality and diversity interacts 
with organisational dynamics that gives the Schneider-Ross discourse its 
specificity in relation to the other institutions I am looking at. 
 
                                                 
79
 'Managing diversity' or 'diversity management' is a label that according to Sonia Liff (1999: 67) 
was popularised in Britain by Kandola and Fullerton in their book first published in 1994: Managing 
the Mosaic: Diversity in Action. The term designated a new business-focused approach to the 
question of discrimination and inequality in the workplace – replacing that of 'equal opportunities'. I 
use the term in this thesis to describe the take-up of the equality and diversity framework, described 
in the previous chapter, by business or managerial interests with the different emphases and 
modifications to the framework that result. The three areas looked at in this chapter are all 
distinguishing characteristics of diversity management according to Kirton and Greene's (2005: 124-
5) overview of this new approach. 
80
 The race equality duty is the name commonly given to that part of the race relations amendment 
act of 2000 that gives public authorities a new statutory duty to promote race equality; the gender 
and disability duties, which were created in later legislation, do the same for these different grounds 
of inequality. There is more on this legislative device in the following chapter. 
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5.1 The Business Case 
 
As I say, From Equality to Diversity was published in 1992. The preface outlines 
the basic aim of the book and the particular historical conjuncture to which it is a 
response: 
 
In the two years that it took to write this book, there has been one particularly long-
running debate between ourselves and the publishers: what should the title be? 
The reason for the difficulty was straightforward and leads us directly to the heart of 
this book: its topic to most people is known as 'Equal Opportunities' and yet, as far 
as we are concerned, that term is itself misleading and can cause needless 
hostility. 
 
We argued that the time is right for a comprehensive re-evaluation of this whole 
field and that one of the concepts we have to stand on its head is that of Equal 
Opportunities itself. Its emphasis upon equality (ensuring parity of treatment 
between groups), and association with the legal process, is a recipe for 
confrontation, resistance to change and lack of progress. 
 
In our view there is a simple solution to this impasse. It is time for employers to 
claim this subject as their own. They should not be looking to change because they 
are being forced into it by the law, the Government, Local Authorities or 
campaigning groups. They should choose to embrace change in order to realise 
particular business benefits; the stimulus for change must be internal not external. 
The aim of this book, therefore, is to make the business case for change and to 
give employers a framework for achieving change (Ross and Schneider, 1992: ix). 
 
According to John Solomos (1989: 12-3), the second half of the 1980s was a 
period when the multicultural initiatives of the earlier part of the decade began 
to run into difficulties.81 Solomos also notes the conflict felt at the time between 
the prevailing market ideology of the period and the 'pursuit of equity' through 
'judicial channels'. Writing in 1989, he observes that the 'concern with promoting 
a greater role for the market fits uneasily with the pursuit of equity for racial 
                                                 
81
 More specifically, Solomos (1989: 12) mentions 'negative media publicity' including its focus on 
the 'loony left', 'resistance to change by the local white population', and the 'attack' on anti-racism by 
'sections of the political right'. Hewitt (2005: 32-3) adds to this 'serious own-goals' by those pursuing 
anti-racist policies at the time such as the 'clumsy style of anti-racist policy implementation adopted 
by a number of left-dominated boroughs', and the divorce of anti-racism from a 'wider set of political 
concerns' – especially that of class. 
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minorities through administrative and judicial channels'. This is clearly 
registered in the passage above where Ross and Schneider note the 'impasse' 
the pursuit of equal opportunities has led to and the problematic 'emphasis 
upon equality' implied by the term itself. 
 
The timing of the book (From Equality to Diversity) is significant, then, as it 
arises at a perceived moment of failure in the advance of the equality and 
diversity framework. The solution to this deadlock is, as Ross and Schneider 
suggest, 'simple': employers should present their own case for pursuing equal 
opportunities rather than having it imposed upon them via political and legal 
means. Ten years later The Business of Diversity makes clear how influential 
this solution became: the report notes the emergence, during the 1990s, of 
'strongly business-focused campaigns', giving examples of trend-setting 
organisations such as Business in the Community (who initiated Opportunity 
Now and Race for Opportunity82) and the two Employers' Forums on disability 
and age discrimination (Rutherford and Ollerearnshaw, 2002: 3). 
 
Of course, what is highlighted here is a trend rather than a more precise event 
or set of events. The Opportunity Now campaign, established in 1991, 
continued a process that actually began during the previous decade: 
 
There was a shift in the Eighties away from the legalism of the equality legislation 
towards a recognition that it made business sense to look after women employees. 
So initially, it was the need to retain women, once recruited, that provided the 
kernel to the business case. It was recognised that costs of losing trained women 
and then having to replace them, could be hurting the bottom line. It was clear that 
in order to appeal to the business community, equal opportunities had to be linked 
to the bottom line (ibid: 8). 
 
It is also clear from the same report that it was towards the end of the 90s that 
deeper organisational shifts started to occur across both the public and private 
sector. In a survey of 140 organisations the largest percentage of respondents 
(33%) established equality and diversity as a business priority within the last 
three to five years (i.e. from 1997), and another 15% within the previous two 
                                                 
82
 Two campaigns for improving the position of disadvantaged groups in business – women and 
ethnic minorities respectively. 
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years (i.e. from 2000) (ibid: 18). As we will see, this period (the later part of the 
90s) is clearly a significant time of expansion of equality and diversity. 
 
It is worth giving one of the more interesting examples of this process of 
business 'ownership' of equal opportunities: while Ford (the car company) 
 
had various equal opportunity policies in place, including some excellent monitoring 
systems, for many years, there was no comprehensive policy tied in to the business 
case until eighteen months ago. Since 1995 there had been a big push for diversity 
in the US led by CEO Jacques Nasser. In the UK, however, Ford was facing a 
turbulent time as trade unions charged their management with racism. Incidents 
had occurred which workers felt were not being addressed properly culminating in a 
series of wildcat strikes, a legal action by Asian worker Sukhjit Parmar and the 
threat of further strikes. This crisis led Nasser to fly into Britain, amidst huge 
publicity, in October 1999 to answer criticisms of institutionalised racism in Ford of 
Britain. A formal investigation by the CRE (Commission for Racial Equality) hung 
over Ford and it was agreed that it would be postponed if certain action was taken. 
Surinder Sharma was headhunted from Littlewoods to mastermind the strategy. He 
says 'although we started from this external pressure, we have a very positive 
approach and want to make sure that we really are the best in the business'. 
 
In only eighteen months Ford has already begun implementation of a really 
comprehensive diversity strategy across Europe, and is a good example of how 
much can be achieved in a short period of time, even in the wake of difficult 
circumstances. It has begun to integrate diversity with a strong business focus into 
every aspect of the organisation (ibid: 19). 
 
Here we see a good example of a more general dynamic that I am highlighting: 
the 'external pressure' faced by a business, as a result of the conflicts 
generated by inequality that threaten the smooth running of operations, leads to 
an attempt to 'integrate diversity with a strong business focus into every aspect 
of the organisation'. 
 
So what are the actual arguments involved in this idea that equality and 
diversity can be good for business and not merely a matter of legal compliance? 
In the literature we can pick out three central claims: 1) diversity policies 
improve the workplace; 2) diversity policies widen the recruitment net to attract 
the best talent available; 3) a diverse workforce helps mirror an increasingly 
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diverse customer base.83 As I've said above, the CBI text, 'Talent not 
Tokenism', gives a detailed account of the way businesses can benefit in all 
three areas. 
 
For example, in the introduction to this report it is argued that '[i]ncreasing 
employee satisfaction, which helps attract new staff and retain those already 
there, reduces recruitment costs, and can increase productivity' (CBI, 2008: 7). 
Further on, a similar argument is made: '[t]reating people fairly in recruitment, 
training and development, and promotion has helped these businesses 
[featured in the report] build a reputation for being good places to work' with 
similar resulting benefits (ibid: 10). This is pretty straightforward: avoiding 
conflicts and staff resentment will ultimately pay-off in the ways mentioned. 
However, this seems to be about equality and fairness in how people are 
treated, rather than diversity in the more specific sense of how different types of 
people can, as a result of their differences, improve the business. 
 
Something similar might be said of the recruitment argument. For example, if 
we return briefly to the Schneider-Ross discourse, we see that the 'war for 
talent' is prominent: this is 'an argument that began in the late Eighties based on 
demographics, which showed that there would be proportionally fewer young 
job seekers, including graduates, over the next twenty-five years and that 
therefore employers needed to recruit from a wider pool than they had been 
doing' (Rutherford and Ollerearnshaw, 2002: 8). This 'war for talent' takes place 
at the same time as the UK population is ageing, and where women, ethnic 
minorities and disabled people are increasing in terms of numbers of job-
seekers – what the authors describe as 'changing labour market demographics' 
(ibid: 3).84 Similarly, the CBI (2005: 1) state at the beginning of their evidence to 
the Labour government's Equalities Review (this review will be discussed in the 
following chapter): 'CBI members know that in an increasingly tight labour 
market, widening the pool of skills available beyond traditional sources is of 
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 See Squires (2005: 9) for a similar account of the different arguments involved in the business 
case. 
84
 This argument concerning demographics was particularly influential in the United States where a 
report published in 1987 entitled 'Workforce 2000', by the Hudson Institute, sought to show how, by 
the year 2000, white men would be a minority of new entrants to the workforce. The influence of 
this report is seen by a number of authors as helping to initiate the new diversity management 
approach – see, for example, Kirton and Greene, citing Kandola and Fullerton (2005: 123-4) and 
Wood (2003: 204-210). 
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growing importance to business success'. However, as with workplace 
improvement, the argument here seeks to simply avoid discrimination against a 
particular section of the population in order to broaden the potential workforce. 
In other words, only drawing from one particular demographic will inevitably 
mean missing out on skills and potential held by people in other social groups. 
 
In contrast, diversity is also said to be of benefit through the specific contribution 
human differences can make to the business. For example, in a case study of 
Serco (an international service company), it is explained that the company is 
'clear that promoting diversity in its approach to customers and in its workforce 
isn't just about winning contracts [from public bodies]': 
 
Delivering a broad range of services around the world means we must be an 
innovative and diverse business. Employees that have broader experiences and 
thinking styles help us improve the services we deliver and develop new types of 
business that benefits our customers, their customers and of course our people 
(CBI quoting Christopher Hyman, Chief Executive of Serco, 2008: 34-5). 
 
In other words, diversity policies do not simply extend the chances of finding 
people who are good thinkers according to some universal standard (through 
looking for talent amongst minority groups that aren't being properly considered 
during the recruitment process). Rather, these policies help find different 
'thinking styles' that will then benefit the company. 
 
This idea that differences can contribute something to businesses is often 
central to the marketing and customer-service argument: diverse workforces 
help to mirror or reflect a diverse customer base. For example, one of the 
'tangible benefits' of diversity includes '[u]nderstanding better how the 
company's diverse customers think and what drives their spending habits' (ibid: 
7). On the following page, similar issues are raised for managers and 
executives reading the report: 
 
Perhaps your customer base is limited to people who all look like one another and 
like your staff – this could mean there are untapped markets for your business that 
a more diverse workforce could help you reach. Or maybe your customers look 
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very different from your staff and you're worried you don't know enough about how 
they think (ibid: 8). 
 
Here the second sentence appears to establish a direct link between how 
customers look in terms of physical characteristics and how they think. It is easy 
to see on the basis of passages like this how the criticism has emerged of 
diversity management – echoing criticisms of multiculturalism more broadly – 
that it leads to an 'unnaturally reified view of ethnicity and exaggerates the 
importance of cultural differencesEperpetuating a view of the permanence and 
immutability of cultures, while reducing ethnicity to simplified constructs that can 
be easily summarised in management training sessions' (Wrench, 2005: 77). 
The question raised here is whether it is possible for an organisation to balance 
a concern for the individual with a recognition of group-based characteristics, or 
whether this, in reality, constitutes an impossible balancing act. I will look at the 
way in which this issue is dealt with by the discourse in the following section. 
 
A final aspect of the business case that is worth mentioning relates to the global 
context in which business operates. As I mentioned in my introduction to this 
chapter, Schneider-Ross has a specific international focus and this is apparent 
in their discourse – in particular, the links drawn between global economic 
processes and diversity. In one article, for example, it is claimed that: 
 
Spurred on by the advance of technology and the spread of markets far beyond 
national or traditional boundaries, globalisation is both the new reality and the 
backdrop against which diversity is developing apace.  
 
Businesses with any serious ambitions towards the world stage must now wrestle 
with the conundrum of how best they might sensitise their product or service to 
local markets that may differ widely from one another. To do so, they require people 
who can speak the local language and who are tuned in to the local culture 
(Schneider, 2001b: 27). 
 
The article goes on to link this increasing global focus of companies with the 




The impact of globalisation is all the greater for the way that customer need is 
increasingly driving many markets. Companies and governments are starting to 
acknowledge that consumers and peoples around the world are not a 
homogeneous mass. Indeed, we at Schneider-Ross are invited more and more 
frequently by clients in the UK to help them to segment their complex domestic 
markets, let alone global ones, and to improve their understanding of the differing 
needs of women, ethnic minorities and people with disabilities who might use their 
products and services (ibid). 
 
In another article of that year it is argued that all this constitutes a significant 
economic shift: 'through the new delivery mechanisms such as the internet, we 
are inexorably moving into an era of “mass customisation” – where individuals 
can expect and demand services that are very precisely tailored to their unique 
individual needs and preferences' (Schneider, 2001a: 3). 
 
A further interesting aspect of the global dimension to the business case is the 
contrast that exists between, on the one hand, the increasing awareness of, and 
response to, cultural differences around the world on the part of global 
companies, and, on the other, the attempt to establish a single cohesive culture 
within those same organisations. This interaction between the global and the 
local, between the universal processes driving the expansion of multinational 
companies around the world and the particular cultures encountered, is perhaps 
best illustrated in a report on equality and diversity for businesses working in the 
Asia-Pacific region (i.e. India and China). Under the heading 'Aligning Global 
Approaches With Local Culture And Norms' the report observes that some 
multinationals are 'struggling to make global talent management practices work 
effectively in cultures and economies very different from other geographies 
where they operate'. It is then argued that '[g]reater local flexibility is needed to 
develop employment packages that respond to market conditions. At the same 
time, core processes such as performance management are being tested for 
cultural biases that unfairly hold back the progression of local talent' (Schneider-
Ross, 2007b: 20). In other words, in order to 'align' the global and the local 
there needs to be both 'flexibility', in response to diverse local conditions, as 
well as the maintenance of the neutrality (i.e. universality) of 'core processes'.  
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This idea of constructing an 'inclusive culture' that can incorporate diversity will 
be further explored in the final section of this chapter. For now I will simply 
highlight the fact that these links between globalisation and the business case 
bring to mind the claims of critics, such as Slavoj Zizek (1997), that there is an 
important connection between the development of global capitalism and the rise 
of multiculturalism. Indeed the arguments for a business case more generally 
are embedded in a wider neoliberal discourse of an expanding global economy, 
increasingly knowledge-based and service-led economies (for Western nations 
such as Britain at least), the increasing sovereignty of the market more 
generally, and in particular a stress on the individual as the key to a dynamic, 




5.2 From Equal Groups to Diverse Individuals 
 
The influence of the United States is probably felt more in the diversity 
management variant of equality and diversity than anywhere else. The idea of 
diversity (in its specific multicultural combination with equality) also has a very 
precise origin in this country: in 1978 a court case, Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke, gave rise to the first official appeal to diversity as a way of 
defending affirmative action. A white student, Allan Bakke, challenged the 
legality of a 'Special Admissions' program run by the University of California on 
the basis that this program unfairly admitted less qualified minority candidates 
ahead of him, thereby denying him a place. The case went all the way to the 
Supreme Court and was ultimately decided in Bakke's favour; however in his 
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 Another aspect of the business case that should be mentioned is, interestingly, a return to the 
ethical and social justice dimension of equality and diversity policies, but this time as an internal 
motive of the organisation, rather than an externally imposed challenge to the organisation from 
equality movements. This is a point made a number of times in the Schneider-Ross discourse – for 
example: '[w]e have indicated a number of tangible business benefits that organisations are realising 
as a result of their work on diversity. At the same time, however, there is something of a move 
towards a more "in principle" support – without having to prove the return on investment in purely 
commercial terms'. While this has always been a 'key driver for the public sector, social justice now 
features as a main driver for the private sector too. It could be argued that the rationale for the 
promotion of equality and diversity in organisations has come full circle, as many private sector 
leaders now actively espouse the moral imperative of doing so' (Rutherford and Ollerearnshaw, 
2002: 14-5). There is a move, then (visible in other 'corporate responsibility' initiatives such as fair 
trade and community involvement schemes), towards a kind of enlightened self-interest on the part 
of companies in which an enhanced 'ethical' reputation will ultimately benefit the organisation. 
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ruling Justice Powell, one of the members of the court, famously introduced the 
idea of diversity as a way of defending the university program, arguing that 
diversity was a legitimate public good that may in certain circumstances 
outweigh the principle of non-discrimination. As Peter Wood (2003: 99) 
observes, this ruling was to be hugely influential.86 
 
What was the aim behind this famous ruling? Wood describes Justice Powell's 
decision as an attempt at a 'painless solution to the nation's racial divisions' that 
only made things worse (ibid: 145). Walter Benn Michaels (2006: 4), another 
American critic of diversity, though this time from the left, describes the decision 
as a 'kind of end run around the historical problem of racism'. In other words, 
the aim was to turn the pursuit of racial equality into the promotion of diversity 
no different, in principle, to the promotion of other less contentious types of 
difference – for example, geographical differences (i.e. the different areas of the 
country that students are from) have been considered to be of importance in 
ensuring a diverse student body, as both Wood and Michaels note. The hope 
was to avoid a more controversial confrontation with the history of racism in 
America. However, as Michaels points out, while diversity may have been 
initially introduced as a way of avoiding the question of inequality, 'the 
commitment to diversity became deeply associated with the struggle against 
racism. Indeed, the goal of overcoming racism, which had sometimes been 
identified as the goal of creating a “color-blind” society, was now reconceived as 
the goal of creating a diverse, that is, a color-conscious, society' (ibid: 4-5). 
 
The specifically corporate take-up of diversity in the United States did not 
develop until a number of years after the Bakke case. The short piece often 
cited as a key early statement of a proposed new approach to the issue of equal 
opportunities is called 'From Affirmative Action to Affirming Diversity'; it was 
written in 1990 by an American management guru, R. Roosevelt Thomas. As 
the title of the article makes clear, diversity, as with the Powell verdict, marks an 
attempt to move away from the idea of affirmative action. The key problem for 
Thomas (and a point made in the previous chapter) is the temporary nature of 
affirmative action and similar policies aiming to correct social inequalities; what 
                                                 
86
 See Wood (2003: chapter five) for a detailed analysis of the Bakke case and its legacy in the 
United States. 
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is needed, therefore, is a more permanent solution. This point is made clear by 
Thomas (1990: 108), when, having extolled the virtues of affirmative action 
policies, he argues that nonetheless: 
 
affirmative action is an artificial, transitional intervention intended to give managers 
a chance to correct an imbalance, an injustice, a mistake. Once the numbers 
mistake has been corrected, I don't think affirmative action alone can cope with the 
remaining long term task of creating a work setting geared to the upward mobility of 
all kinds of people, including white males. It is difficult for affirmative action to 
influence upward mobility even in the short run, primarily because it is perceived to 
conflict with the meritocracy we favor. For this reason, affirmative action is a red 
flag to every individual who feels unfairly passed over and a stigma for those who 
appear to be its beneficiaries. 
 
As is clear from this passage the key conflict, or, at least, 'perceived' conflict,87 
is that between the necessary action required to create 'upward mobility' for 
disadvantaged groups (affirmative action) and the 'meritocracy we favor'; 
because of the temporary nature of the former, this conflict cannot be solved. In 
other words, affirmative action temporarily suspends meritocracy in order to 
correct a historic injustice and therefore cannot be reconciled with it. As Thomas 
argues: 
 
what affirmative action means in practice is an unnatural focus on one group, and 
what it means too often to too many employees is that someone is playing fast and 
loose with standards in order to favor that group. Unless we are to compromise our 
standards, a thing no competitive company can even contemplate, upward mobility 
for minorities and women should always be a question of pure competence and 
character unmuddled by accidents of birth. 
 
And that is precisely why we have to learn to manage diversity – to move beyond 
affirmative action, not to repudiate it (ibid: 108). 
 
                                                 
87
 That the term 'perceived' is used is significant, I think, in that it shows that Thomas doesn't think 
that affirmative action actually is unfair in any way, only that people think that it is. This adds 
weight, then, to the interpretation of the rise of diversity as a pragmatic response to problems 
encountered with how equality policies are presented to the public, and not a rejection of these 
policies or the principles behind them. 
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Diversity arises, then, as an attempt to solve this conflict between equality 
policies and meritocracy by combining the differential treatment necessary for 
affirmative action with a return to meritocratic principles. 
 
To take a closer look at this solution, we can turn to the Schneider-Ross 
discourse and From Equality to Diversity, published two years after the article 
by Thomas just cited. In comparison with Thomas, 'affirmative action' is not 
generally named as the problem – this is to be expected as affirmative action 
has never been legal in Britain and, it's probably fair to say, the weaker 'positive 
action' measures that have been allowed have not been quite such a source of 
acrimony and national debate as in the United States. Nonetheless, equal 
opportunities is clearly registered as a source of conflict within the text and 
therefore something requiring a solution: 
 
Equal opportunities has, in the main, been seen as something which has been 
imposed on employers. For some, it has been about doing something for 'them' at 
the expense of 'us'. 
 
The law enshrined the moral case for equal opportunity. Employers had a 
responsibility to help create a fair and equal society. If they failed to do so, then 
they could end up in court. Somehow or other, there seemed to be a whiff of 




One of the consequences of the emphasis placed on external influences [i.e. the 
political/legal challenge to business just mentioned] was that organisational change 
in this area simply mirrored the structure of the legislative changes. The law defined 
discrimination by defining its causes – for instance, prejudice against women or 
minorities – and so did employers. The law established two 'single issue' 
Commissions [on race and gender] and so employers looked at discrimination 
against these groups. Discrimination was not something to tackle 'holistically' in the 
round, it was about achieving parity between groups. The very term 'equal 
opportunities' seemed to lend its weight to this interpretation. 
 
The danger associated with tackling the issue piecemeal, one group at a time, is 
that one group, often women, receives a great deal of attention and little thought is 
given, for instance, to people with disabilities, ethnic minorities or older people. 
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Moreover, equal opportunities seems to be no longer about fundamental principles 
(such as appointing the best person for the job) but is instead seen as 'special 
pleading' for minority groups (ibid: 51). 
 
In the second paragraph of the second quote we see, as with Thomas, a clash 
between the 'fundamental principles', in which job appointments are made on 
the basis of merit, and equality policies that seek to establish favourable 
treatment of minorities. The same thing that the CBI report (2008) is keen to 
avoid, tokenism, 'follows directly from this approach. Recruiting and developing 
members of a minority group becomes an end in itself' (1992: 51). 
 
One part of the solution – again, just as Thomas argues against an 'unnatural 
focus on one group' – is to shift attention towards the individual: 
 
In reality, what is important is focusing on the individual rather than the group. From 
a selection point of view, the important thing about a female recruit is not that she is 
a woman, but whether she has the skills to do the job. Putting people into 'boxes', 
seeing them as representatives of a particular group rather than as one particular 
individual, is profoundly counter-productive (ibid: 52). 
 
What is needed instead is for 
 
objective selection systems to be in place and applied. This will be to the benefit of 
everyone in the organisation: it is as much to the advantage of the white male that 
selection decisions are made on the basis of skill [i.e. merit], as it is to any member 
of any so-called minority groupEIn essence, if organisations can ensure that they 
are able to treat individuals fairly and they are able to respond flexibly to individual 
needs, then they do not need to worry about groups. Equal opportunities should 
look after itself (ibid: 52). 
 
In other words, what is needed is a focus on individual merit as the sole criterion 
for organisations to recruit and promote – avoiding the conflicts and difficulties 
associated with the attempt to bypass that principle in order to correct group 
inequalities. 
 
This is not a surprising finding within the discourse. As Squires (2005: 13) puts 
it, citing Iris Marion Young: it is a 'widely held principle of justice that positions 
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and rewards should be distributed according to individual merit, measured as 
the greatest skill for performing the tasks that positions require'. It also 
undoubtedly chimes with the neoliberal right in a way that an appeal to stronger 
versions of equality of opportunity do not; it is therefore a key strategic move in 
the attempt to gain the adherence of business leaders to the equality and 
diversity framework. As John Wrench (2005: 82) has noted, this shift in 
emphasis has been welcomed by many employers as it 'fits well with the trend 
to economic liberalism and the move in industrial relations away from trade 
unions and collective bargaining'.88 
 
However, as Wrench also points out, this, to use his phrase, '“individualising” 
tendency' of diversity management threatens to alienate those supporters of a 
more traditional, politicised approach to equality. For example, the TUC – an 
organisation with a long history of collective struggles – strongly criticised 
diversity management through a motion discussed and subsequently carried at 
the TUC Black Workers' conference of 1997: 
 
Conference notes with concern the increasing trend amongst personnel and human 
resource management practitioners to seek to replace existing equal opportunities 
policies and procedures with those titled managing diversity or mainstreaming. 
 
Both of these stress the perspective of the individual within the employing 
organisation, rather than focusing on the promotion of equal opportunities 
strategies, or on challenging discriminatory practices and outcomes (TUC, 1997: 3). 
 
The conference goes on to call on the TUC Race Relations Committee to 
'support initiatives that expose the inadequacies of "managing diversity" and 
"mainstreaming”', and 'work with all unions and other organisations who are 
actively encouraging effective policies and proposals to improve racial equality' 
(ibid).89 Other voices in the equality and diversity field, such as former chair of 
                                                 
88
 See also Doug Miller (1996: 205) and Squires (2005: 12). The latter writes that the diversity 
management approach 'melds more readily with the norms of individualism and meritocracy that 
characterise neo-liberal polities'. She also adds that in the US where 'hard' affirmative action 
measures have been rendered both 'unpopular and illegal', diversity programmes have been 
developed 'which do not rely on numerical targets and quotas'. Interestingly, as we will see below, 
the Schneider-Ross discourse tries to maintain a distinction between the concept of 'targets', on the 
one hand, and 'quotas' on the other.  
89
 Although it should also be remembered that the TUC are the co-producers of Talent not Tokenism, 
which clearly sets out a diversity management approach (CBI, 2008). As we will see in chapter 
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the CRE, Herman Ouseley, have also voiced concerns along similar lines: 
'[d]iversity approaches that encourage managers to ignore the realities of 
inequality and discrimination, which create such conditions for people from 
particular groups, will mean that the status quo is maintained' (quoted in Liff, 
1997: 11). There is a strong strand of opinion, then, within the equality and 
diversity field that sees diversity management as little more than a 'soft option' 
(Wrench, 2005: 75-6).90 
 
However, despite these concerns, it should be stressed that the solution to the 
conflict between group-based equality policies and the principle of individual 
merit is not a straight-forward promotion of the latter and rejection of the former. 
It is better understood, I think, as a reconstitution of group-belonging as a 
feature of individuality. This enables the continuation of group-based equality 
policies through presenting them as a way of fulfilling individual potential rather 
than making groups equal. This is where, then, we see 'diversity' enter the 
argument: 
 
When the focus is on individuals rather than groups, then there is a corresponding 
shift away from equality towards diversity. 
 
Every individual is, by definition, unique. The organisations that will succeed in the 
future are those that can harness this human diversity to advantage. The focus is 
not on equalising the differences between groups, but on responding to individual 
needs and aspirations. 
 
Once again, we find the term 'equal opportunities' unhelpful. 'Equal' seems to 
suggest that everyone should receive exactly the same treatment. This can be 
interpreted as meaning: 'they' have to fit in with the way 'we' do things. In other 
                                                                                                                                               
seven, the TUC, due to its nature as an organisation, tends to have a wider range of perspectives on 
equality issues than the other organisations I am looking at. Talent not Tokenism is also published 11 
years later than the conference motion I have cited, which helps demonstrate the success diversity 
management has had in gaining widespread support across the equality and diversity field over the 
years. 
90
 Interestingly, this danger is also alluded to in the Schneider-Ross discourse itself. In a report co-
produced with Runnymede it is observed that '[t]here are…indications that some companies may be 
using the diversity agenda (everyone is different, we are each unique) not as a way of setting an 
overall, and inclusive, context for change but as a way of avoiding getting into “single issues” such 
as race' (Sanglin-Grant and Schneider, 2000: 24). This criticism is also made in a number of 
academic studies. For example, Miller has argued that diversity management's 'remoulding of equal 
rights to capture and contain it within a market model has all but expunged the political meaning of 
positive action' (quoted in Wrench, 2005: 78). 
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words, women and minorities are free to join us, we will make all decisions based 
on merit, but we insist on them conforming to our 'norms' (Ross and Schneider, 
1992: 52). 
 
Here, we see both elements of the conflict brought together: 'all decisions 
based on merit' as a principle is combined with an idea of difference that can 
ground group-based initiatives. 
 
This solution, while clearly influential, is nonetheless not without its problems. 
We find in the diversity management discourse the same tricky balancing act 
we found in the previous chapter between the individual and their group 
belonging: the diverse individual brings social group characteristics to the 
organisation that the organisation should try to harness to stay competitive; 
however, by contributing a group characteristic there is always the danger that 
the individual will become reduced to nothing more than a 'carrier' of that 
characteristic – will be stereotyped, in other words, as representing that group 
rather than simply being themselves. We saw in the previous chapter how the 
Fawcett discourse clearly recognised this danger in relation to the diversity-
based argument that more women at the top of capitalist institutions would help 
to avoid problems with the banking system. The answer lay in the idea of 
women's 'different life experiences', as opposed to the reliance on a 
stereotypical view of women as naturally averse to the kind of risk-taking 
behaviour practiced by male bankers. We see a similar recognition of the issue 
in the CBI discourse. For example, the introduction to 'Talent not Tokenism' 
states that 
 
Everyone brings to the workplace the different characteristics that make them who 
they are. Each person has a different experience and viewpoint. While it's important 
not to stereotype by assuming that all people who share a characteristic will think or 
behave in the same way, many companies now understand how they benefit from 
having in their workforce people with a range of characteristics, viewpoints and 
experiences who feel valued for all of these (CBI, 2008: 10 – my emphasis). 
 
Here the danger to avoid is explicitly stated. Is it possible, though, to avoid 
stereotyping while nonetheless including people on the basis of the fact that 
 119 
they contribute a difference of some kind? This is a central question with which 
equality and diversity discourse has to grapple. 
 
A further tension surrounds the key concept of merit. As I say, there is a 
continued importance attached to group-based measures within both the CBI 
and Schneider-Ross discourses, alongside the focus on individual merit – these 
measures are generally grouped under the term 'positive action'. It is important, 
however, for both organisations to distinguish positive action from positive 
discrimination or affirmative action – the latter being differentiated on the basis 
that it ignores merit. In other words (again, in theory at least), positive action 
refers to actions taken to help individuals from disadvantaged or under-
represented groups compete on equal terms with others. This may involve 
simply directing the advertising of jobs towards these groups and encouraging 
their members to apply for those jobs, or it may take the form of more 
substantial help, such as special training opportunities, support networks, 
mentoring, or changing existing working practices to enable people with 
different circumstances to compete on equal terms.91 As it is put in Talent not 
Tokenism, '[t]hese “balancing measures” reflect the possibility that in some 
cases, to achieve a fair outcome, a difference in approach and methods to 
encourage may be required' (CBI, 2008: 6). In contrast, positive discrimination 
is understood as taking into account a group characteristic at the point of 
decision (to hire, promote etc), thereby choosing between candidates on the 
basis of a principle other than merit. As it is made clear, this is not merely a 
pragmatic distinction but one grounded in British and European discrimination 
law (ibid). 
 
While this is clearly an important distinction that is drawn and relied upon in 
order to reconcile group-based measures with a focus on merit – in practice 
what comes through in the texts is the difficulty of upholding this distinction. In a 
response to the select committee inquiry on equality – more specifically, on the 
proposal by the committee to extend positive action measures – the CBI 
(2007b) states that, while 'there may be benefits to extending the scope of 
positive action within the limits of EU law', 
                                                 
91




CBI members have said before that the line between positive action, which is 
lawful, and positive discrimination, which is not, is a very fine one. Employers who 
might want to take positive action to increase the diversity of their workforce are 
often confused about how to go about doing this without falling foul of the law. 
 
This 'fine' line is also very apparent in the Schneider-Ross discourse. Here it 
often takes the form of a corresponding distinction between targets (positive 
action) and quotas (affirmative action or positive discrimination). 
  
Again, according to Ross and Schneider (1992: 16), the distinction between the 
two has its basis in UK law with targets being legal, unlike quotas. As they 
explain, a target is an 'aspiration, it represents a realistic appraisal of what is 
possible in the future. A quota, on the other hand, reserves a certain number of 
jobs regardless of the merit of the applicants. The distinction might be fine but it, 
and the principle of merit upon which it relies, is very important'. On the 
following page they similarly declare that: as the following chapters of the book 
will show, 'this is a particular tightrope that organisations have to walk. In our 
view, too exclusive a focus on equality targets can become a problem. These 
targets should be a measure of progress, not an end in themselves' (ibid: 17).92 
 
Despite the reluctance of companies surveyed on this question, The Business 
of Diversity argues that when it comes down to it 'it is hard to implement 
diversity and equality policy without some kind of goals or targets in mind and 
many of our respondents do set goals' (Rutherford and Ollerearnshaw, 2002: 
29). In contrast, the results of a survey taken two years earlier show that while 
'many of the respondent companies monitor the ethnicity of their employees, 
most do not go on to set targets for the representation of ethnic minority 
employees' – only 10% according to the results (Sanglin-Grant and Schneider, 
                                                 
92
 Again, Miller (1996: 204) points to the same issue: he writes that amongst employers 'target 
setting is still viewed as too “radical” in the sense that there is a risk of confusion between targets 
and “quotas”'. It is also worth noting that the public sector are 'more comfortable with the whole 
concept of targets and goals' (Rutherford and Ollerearnshaw, 2002: 29). This no doubt reflects the 
fact that, despite market-based reforms, the public sector still has a tradition and ethos of pursuing 
social goals, such as equality, and therefore more of a willingness to set aside the merit principle in 
order to achieve these aims. 
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2000: 15).93 The report records that '[i]nterestingly, this question provoked many 
of the strongest comments in the company responses', quoting one as declaring 
that their company: 
 
consciously avoids operating a quota system ['targets' and 'quotas' are here 
conflated by the respondent] in regard to ethnic minorities, because it is our belief 
that individuals should be allowed to progress on the basis of merit, irrespective of 
race, gender, sex, religion, age or physical disability. To introduce quotas could 
potentially create a positive discrimination mindset with the danger of arousing 
prejudice where none currently exists (ibid). 
 
The authors of the report then add this comment: '[t]argets (or “aspirations” as 
they are sometimes called) are not only consistent with a merit-based approach 
but also necessary for it. They are a way of challenging the otherwise natural 
tendency for organisations to “clone” by choosing the “comfortable” candidate' 
(ibid). In other words, left to their own devices organisations will naturally tend to 
bypass merit and instead simply recruit according to familiarity. The solution 
then – precisely because this is a 'natural' tendency of organisations and not an 
artificial failure – is not to temporarily suspend the importance of merit through 
the use of affirmative action-style quotas, but rather try to more permanently 
redefine merit on the basis of a constant vigilance against these tendencies. 
 
I want to finish this part of the chapter with one more example on this point. A 
section by Ross and Schneider (1992: 16-7) on 'Setting equality targets' begins 
by emphasising the need for targets to be 'realistic', and the corresponding 
importance, therefore, of being able to accurately monitor the make-up of the 
current workforce (and also – although they don't mention this here – the 
labour-pool from which that business draws). Presumably an unrealistic target 
will begin to put pressure on the merit principle at the point of selection, 
whereas a realistic target merely works against the natural tendency for 
organisations to be non-meritocratic. The authors then go on to discuss the 
situation of two equal candidates and if positive discrimination is then 
                                                 
93
 The reason for the difference in the results is not the main issue here – the aim is rather to show 
the tensions that emerge around this question. However, it is worth considering whether the 
difference in the results may have something to do with the fact that the second report, in which a 
minority of respondents set targets or goals, is, unlike the first, focused purely on the question of 
racial equality and not the other types of equality (such as gender or disability) – race being 
undoubtedly a more controversial area in which to undertake this kind of action. 
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acceptable. They mention a 'slight shift' on this issue by the CRE, who in their 
1985 review of the Race Relations Act proposed that in a situation of equal 
merit between candidates, the one from the 'under-represented group should be 
appointed'. Ross and Schneider comment that this policy is 'always somewhat 
problematic: are there ever really equal candidates? It makes a target much 
more like a quota. Moreover, by advocating the use of ethnic origin as the 
determining factor this again undermines one of the basic principles of the Act'. 
In other words, the group identity (here, ethnicity), despite only being applicable 
in a situation of hypothetical equality between candidates, would start to infringe 
on the individual and the 'merit principle'. 
 
Interestingly, the CRE, in the later withdrawal of their proposal in 1991, are cited 
as making a similar point, and here the issue links with the question of (and 
potential dangers that may arise from) monitoring: according to the CRE the 
proposal 'does have the drawback that it would stop the use of ethnic 
monitoring data being neutral in its impact on individuals' (CRE quoted in ibid: 
17). In other words, the monitoring of ethnic identity would cease to be simply a 
way of setting 'realistic targets', and would therefore stop being consistent with 
the merit principle (if we accept the redefinition of merit that involves a critique 
of the 'natural' tendencies of organisations that I've described above). The 
monitoring would instead encroach upon the individual by linking their 
declaration of group identity on the monitoring form to their treatment, as an 
individual, within the organisation. 
 
In a further development in relation to this issue, the most recent Equality Act 
(2010) made the use of positive discrimination in this situation (where the 
candidates are of equal merit) legal (the so-called 'tie-breaker' clause). It is also 
worth noting that the potential 'drawback' mentioned by the CRE is, for a critic of 
multiculturalism such as Kenan Malik (2007), a danger inherent to the practice 
of ethnic monitoring as such, not merely in relation to this hypothetical situation. 
He argues in one article that the 
 
problem with ethnic classification is not just that the data may not be useful. It is 
that the process of classification often creates the very problems it is supposed to 
solve. Identities are not natural categories. They are created through social 
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interaction. But as multicultural categories receive official sanction, so they become 
in a certain sense fixed and appear almost natural. Once the distribution of political 
power, financial resources and social opportunities become linked to one's 
membership of a particular group, so these group identities acquire a reality denied 
to other identities. 
 
In other words, for Malik, any attempt to monitor the ethnicity of individuals will 
ensure that the individual becomes bound to a fixed and naturalised group 
identity. It is interesting, then, to see the same danger recognised, and the issue 
wrestled with, within equality and diversity discourse itself. 
 
 
5.3 Cultural Change and Integration 
 
The theme of organisational cultures, and how to change them, is an important 
issue in the diversity management discourse. This is no surprise as clearly the 
issue is going to be of interest to representatives of business owners and to 
management consultants whose livelihoods depend, in different ways, on the 
smooth running of organisations. The theme is particularly strong in the 
Schneider-Ross discourse: as equality and diversity consultants, there is an 
emphasis on the strategies for change that will help organisations to 
successfully incorporate equality and diversity policies. From Equality to 
Diversity, for example, argues that a focus on diversity is not just about 
changing procedures and objective systems; rather, a more 'organic' 
transformation is required: 
 
We should not deny that individuals are different and therefore have different 
strengths and different needs. In itself, therefore, simply ensuring that there are 
objective decision-making processes in place is insufficient. If an organisation is 
really concerned with diversity rather than just equality, then it needs to look at its 
total culture – not just its systems...Unless the overall culture is responsive to 
different needs, then progress will be very limited. Recruits might be selected from 
non-traditional sources, but they will not stay if they do not feel they can succeed 
(Ross and Schneider, 1992: 53). 
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On the following page the authors conclude with a similar sentiment: '[i]f an 
organisation is committed to equal opportunities, then it is not enough to review 
the current systems and check that they are "fair". It means taking a hard look 
at the organisation and ensuring that it supports cultural diversity rather than a 
mono-culture' (ibid: 54). 
 
This aspect of the discourse can also be understood in relation to the shift I've 
already noted from more temporary, group-based equality measures (such as 
affirmative action in the United States) to the more permanent idea of promoting 
or 'managing' diversity. In other words, once we are no longer talking about an 
'artificial, transitional intervention' correcting an 'imbalance, an injustice, a 
mistake', but rather the 'long term task of creating a work setting geared to the 
upward mobility of all kinds of people' (Thomas, 1990: 108), the issue of how to 
embed the equality and diversity framework within an organisation becomes 
crucial. This, in turn, leads us to a concern with a positive change in how the 
organisation operates as a whole, not merely with correcting a temporary 
moment of failure (i.e. discrimination). One Schneider-Ross article argues that 
the diversity approach 'acknowledges that representation is part of the issue' 
but 'places a cultural transformation at its heart. It is about creating a working 
culture that looks for, respects, values and therefore harnesses difference'. 
Change is 'not about helping “them” join “us”, but about critically looking at “us” 
and rooting out all the aspects of our culture that inappropriately exclude and 
stop us from being inclusive – whether in the way we relate to employees, 
potential employees, customers, business partners or other stakeholders' 
(Schneider, 2001b: 26). Nine years earlier Ross and Schneider (1992: 55) 
predicted that '[i]n time' equal opportunities will 'not be a topic of controversy 
and debate. It will not be viewed as something in favour of minorities and 
against whites. It will however, be normal to be different and equal opportunities 
principles will be integrated into the values of organisations'. It is worth noting 
here that where a few pages earlier Ross and Schneider had found the term 
'equal opportunities' 'unhelpful', here the term is used to refer simply to that 
which is 'integrated' into an organisation. Diversity (it being 'normal to be 
different') is presented as simply the 'integration' of the old equal opportunity 
policies into existing institutions. 
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What exactly is implied by the term 'integration'? The Business of Diversity has 
a chapter dedicated to the concept, although in 
 
one sense the whole of this report is about integration. What we mean by 
integration is the incorporation of the values of equality and diversity into the heart 
of an organisation, so that it has become part of its culture. It is much more than a 
few add-on policies "owned" by HR. For instance, BT refers to integration as being 
a process in which diversity and equality are included at every stage of the 
business – in BT Values, BT style, BT documents, recruiting, selecting, 
performance and rewards (Rutherford and Ollerearnshaw, 2002: 25). 
 
The report explains that integration is about 'widening the scope of diversity 
work and entails having an understanding that all parts of the decision-making 
processes in a business have the potential for discrimination – not just the 
employment processes' (ibid: 26). However, we can also understand integration 
as not only an extension of where discrimination may be found, but also how 
discrimination may be hidden in apparently non-discriminatory processes: '[t]otal 
integration or mainstreaming,94 not only puts systems in place and monitors the 
obvious and tangible outcomes of policy, but investigates neutral looking 
policies and practices themselves for bias towards one group of people' (ibid: 
26). 
 
Integration is similar, then, to the idea behind targets already looked at above. It 
links up with the idea of culture, because one way of understanding how these 
hidden discriminatory practices remain hidden is through an organisation's 
taken-for-granted culture. This is the central theme of a report carried out on 
behalf of the Cabinet Office into the 'under-representation of women, ethnic 
minorities and people with disabilities in the senior civil service'. Here it is stated 
that 'the main barrier [to equality and diversity] is perceived to be a deeply 
embedded culture, which has the impact of excluding those who are different. In 
the main, this is not a question of overt discrimination or prejudice, it is an 
altogether more subtle (and less conscious) process' (Schneider, 1999: 4). 
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 The term 'mainstreaming' is used more in the public sector, as pointed out in the report. It is also 
noted that mainstreaming is '[p]romoted strongly by the European Commission' where it 'moves 
beyond equal treatment and even positive action approaches to equal opportunities to: “the 
incorporation of EO [equal opportunities] issues into all actions, programmes and policies from the 
outset”' (Rutherford and Ollerearnshaw, quoting Rees, 2002: 26). 
 126 
 
A good part of the concrete operation of equality and diversity policies consists, 
then, in locating and correcting these seemingly neutral policies within 
organisations. One report contains some examples from surveyed 
organisations. For instance, an already mentioned company, BT 
 
provide an example of undoing unintended bias within its appraisal system. On an 
individual level reviews appeared to be fair, but when they looked at the total, a 
trend emerged which showed that women were consistently scoring less in certain 
competencies – direction setting, strategy and analysis. And they saw a trend in 
which ethnic minorities scored less in team communication. 
 
The report then adds that these: 
 
results could have been attributable to the fact that women and ethnic minorities 
were: (1) indeed acting according to stereotype or (2) that they were merely being 
perceived to act in that stereotype by their managers. It is obviously hard to 
distinguish the two. 
 
What did matter, however, was that these competencies in which they scored lowly 
were valued highly in the appraisal system. The discovery of these trends led BT to 
start looking at the values that were placed on certain skills as well as issuing much 
more focused guidance to managers who did appraisals (Rutherford and 
Ollerearnshaw, 2002: 26). 
 
In this case, having discovered an inequality of outcome (which, it should be 
noted, is what is meant here by 'unintended bias') in terms of how minority 
groups were doing in appraisals it is, interestingly, unimportant whether this is in 
fact reflective of a natural difference between minority and majority (i.e. if they 
were 'indeed acting according to stereotype'), or whether this inequality merely 
appears to reflect a natural difference. Either way, this inequality/bias needs to 
be corrected through adjusting the process (part of the 'objective systems') 
through which the appraisal is carried out. 
 
It should also be mentioned that important to this project of culture change is an 
emphasis on the need to change the behaviour, values and beliefs of 
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individuals within organisations. As it is put by one company in Talent not 
Tokenism: 
 
Our experience has shown that building a strong business case for diversity, 
making it a strategic imperative backed up by policies and processes is just not 
enough. Tackling the complexity of organisational culture requires a focus on what 
drives behaviour – this has taken us into the realms of organisational psychology so 
that we can each better understand ourselves and thus each other (CBI, 2008: 11). 
 
At times it is made clear that what is subject to control by organisations is 
specifically individual behaviour and not states of mind such as values, beliefs, 
attitudes and so on. A manager in one report is quoted as saying that: '[w]e say 
yes, you can have your personal views, but your behaviours at work must 
express the company values. We are very, very tough and will sack anyone 
who transgresses these' (Rutherford and Ollerearnshaw, 2002: 42). A few 
pages later it is reported that, at the same company, 'the focus on behaviours 
cuts through any argument on what people are really thinking. They [the 
managers] accept that there will be resentment, ridicule and backlash but have 
made a company policy of not accepting any expression of it in the workplace' 
(ibid: 52). 
 
At other times, however, something more 'spiritual', more deeply-embedded in 
the minds of employees needs to be targeted. Take these two examples from 
the Runnymede discourse, which while from an NGO is nevertheless clearly 
reflective of the diversity management discourse: 
 
Racial equality of opportunity needs to be broadly aligned with resourcing, so that 
the diversity consciousness is always there when making key decisions about 
succession and filling pivotal posts. Requiring suppliers of talent to develop that 
racial equality consciousness too is very important, given their role in accessing the 
talent pool (Sanglin-Grant, 2002: 5). 
 
Another Runnymede report, on the topic of language and the importance of 
communication in the promotion of equality and diversity, argues that beliefs 
can be 'very powerful' in 'shaping how an organisation operates, so there might 
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be strong beliefs that need to be addressed and changed before the behaviours 
can become more inclusive' (Sanglin-Grant, 2003: 8). 
 
This last aspect of 'culture change' (focusing on individual behaviour and 
psychology), especially in the form of diversity workshops and 'race awareness 
training' (RAT), has attracted critical attention, and ridicule, from both the left 
and right.95 Indeed, the idea of focusing on organisational culture more 
generally, has, just as we saw with the focus on the individual above, attracted 
critics from the left for entailing 'softer' diversity measures at the expense of 
'harder' equality ones. Miller (1996: 207), for example, argues that 'it is easier to 
appear to address organizational culture, which may indeed have some positive 
outcomes vis a vis the treatment of workers in an organization rather than tackle 
the “harder” issues of access and reward and ultimately power within 
organizations'. However, at the same time there is undoubtedly also recognition 
that some of the impetus behind 'culture change' meets more critical voices in 
shining a spotlight on apparently neutral practices within organisations that in 
fact disadvantage particular groups – as is conceded in the quote from Miller 
just cited. Kirton and Greene (2005: 125) also understand it as 'meeting one of 
the major criticisms of the dominant liberal equality approach', and add that it is 
'one area where various terms within the [more radical] "difference" literature 





A key finding, more generally, in this chapter is that the emphasis on 'diversity' 
in diversity management should not be seen as a replacement of equality as 
such. Rather, I believe that what the two case studies analysed in this chapter 
demonstrate is that diversity management is best viewed as a deployment of 
the framework described in the previous chapter – one that requires the 
balancing of equality and diversity, albeit with a firmer emphasis on the latter 
than we find elsewhere, particularly in the individualist sense of this term. This 
clearly neoliberal-influenced refinement of the framework undoubtedly causes 
                                                 
95
 Sivanandan's (1990: 77-122) critique of RAT is well known in the literature. From an alternative, 
right-wing, perspective see Wood (2003: 202). 
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tensions with equality and diversity's more politicised adherents. However its 
basic ideological success in gaining support for group-based equality measures 
in the workplace should not be underestimated. As Thomas and Gabarro put it: 
'[i]t was hard to find anyone who liked affirmative action or who was for quotas. 
On the other hand, it was equally hard to find anyone who was against diversity 
and inclusion' (quoted in Ben-Galim et al, 2007: 22). This is despite the fact that, 
as Kirton and Greene (2005: 131) again argue, in practice 'many diversity 
policies look very similar to that within a traditional equality approach' and 
'social groups appear very salient, despite the rhetoric'.96 This seems to be a 
good example, then, of the effectiveness of ideology in enabling the 
reproduction of contested social practices. 
 
In relation to this point, it is also worth drawing attention again to the early date 
of what is certainly the key text in this chapter: From Equality to Diversity 
(Schneider-Ross, 1992). This timing gives us a useful insight into one precise 
point at which diversity is offered as a new approach by an organisation in 
response to the conflicts and resistances that had been generated towards the 
end of the 1980s over the promotion of equal opportunities. As we've seen, as a 
result of this deadlock what was considered both practically possible and 
politically necessary was an integration of the framework into the everyday 
workings of organisations, with the aim that equality and diversity would 
become part of the common-sense understanding of individuals and how they 
relate to each other. In this way, as I've suggested, the precise nature of 
difference that diversity names can be understood as arising from this process 
of integration, rather than simply pre-existing it in the form of various group 
characteristics. 
 
Finally, the business case – as outlined in the first section of this chapter – is 
the key discursive device directly linking the equality and diversity framework 
with the corporate pursuit of profit. This is undoubtedly reflective of the more 
general phenomenon in neoliberal societies of the need to justify social policies 
                                                 
96
 On this point see Liff & Wajcman (1996: 84) and also Miller (1996: 207). Also, Schneider-Ross 
themselves make clear, in an article on the UK government's review of equality then being 
undertaken, the 'new system under consideration [i.e. diversity management – the new 'diversity' 
approach to equal opportunities] recognises that particular groups face discrimination but it also 
embraces diversity' (Schneider, 2002: 21 – my emphasis). As the emphasised content illustrates, 
diversity includes a continued recognition of group inequality. 
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in economic terms. Not just in the case of business either: the Equal 
Opportunities Commission (former gender-equality watchdog that has now been 
disbanded) linked equality with 'economic efficiency' in 1991 (as cited in 
Schneider-Ross, 1992: xxi); Gordon Brown also offers words to this effect in 
1996 when he argued that 'now in the 1990s in the new economy, equality of 
opportunity is also the key to economic prosperity' (quoted in Callinicos, 2000: 
38). More specifically, the business case highlights the necessity of 'translating' 
the terms involved in order to extend the equality and diversity framework to 
interests that were previously thought to be excluded. The business case plays 
an important role, then, in the successful journey from left-wing local-
government interventions in community politics to the board rooms of large 
multinational corporations. 
 
Once again, this would appear to be a case of ideology over practice: serious 
academic studies of the claims that 'diversity' can improve the 'bottom-line' 
appear to be, at best, sceptical. Wrench (2005: 78-9), for example, has cited a 
literature review that examined the empirical findings of 33 studies on the 
potential benefit to businesses of diversity. The authors of this review (Wise and 
Tschirhart) conclude that, in their words, '[g]iven the weaknesses in the body of 
research on diversity, we can draw no firm conclusion for public administrators. 
We cannot claim that diversity has any clear positive or negative effects on 
individual, group or organizational outcomes'. The undoubted ubiquity and 
influence of the business case, and indeed the diversity management discourse 
more generally, is perhaps better understood then in terms of the expansion of 
the equality and diversity framework to appeal to different (and in this case, very 
powerful) social interests. In other words it can be understood, using the 
theoretical terms of the second chapter, as part of the framework's 
transformation from a 'myth' into a 'social imaginary'. 
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Chapter Six: Equality, Diversity and the Law 
 
In the previous chapter we saw that one of Schneider-Ross' central arguments 
is that, while the law serves a useful purpose in setting minimum standards, it 
cannot be relied upon in order to make sustained progress. Take this passage 
as an example of this argument: 
 
Most employers seem prepared to do the minimum to ensure that they are not at 
risk of being punished, but they will not go any further. The law, therefore, has 
some deterrent effect. However, because the law defines discrimination in terms of 
the groups who are most likely to suffer it, over-concentration on the law turns 
equal opportunities into a confrontational issue. There is a 'them' and an 'us'EThe 
law marks a starting point, not the finishing point (Ross and Schneider, 1992: 19-
20). 
 
In the context of diversity management, then, the impact of diversity, as 
examined in the previous chapter, is to take us away from the law into the 
transformation of organisational processes and culture. In contrast, in this 
chapter I want to focus on how diversity has had an impact on the development 
of the law itself. While the law may indeed mark a 'starting point' – a way of 
setting minimum standards for individual and organisational behaviour – it is a 
starting point that has been transformed since Ross and Schneider wrote the 
above in 1992, and the concept of diversity has, as I will show, played a key 
role in these changes. 
 
I should make it clear that I will not attempt to provide a critical analysis or 
assessment of equalities law,97 which would involve looking closely at the 
concepts involved and the cases where it has been applied. I will also not be 
looking in any detail at the party politics behind the various developments that I 
describe. My aim in this chapter is more specific: it is to trace the impact of the 
equality and diversity framework on the law through a number of key 
developments: 1) the increasing emphasis on equality legislation as applicable 
to all individuals in society, not just minority groups; 2) the shift, within the law, 
                                                 
97
 I use the term 'equalities law', or simply 'equality law', to reflect the fact that I include in this 
chapter developments that take the law beyond the concept of discrimination. This distinction 
between discrimination law and equalities law will become clearer below. 
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from a prohibition of discrimination against individuals to a wider concern with 
the social structures and institutions generating inequality; 3) the consolidation 
and rationalisation of equalities legislation; 4) the recognition of socio-economic 
inequality within equalities law. 
 
The case study organisation – whose texts I will use to explore these 
developments – is the New Labour government. In other words, my focus is on 
the executive of the British state headed by the Labour Party, from its return to 
power in 1997 until its defeat in the 2010 general election. As with the other 
chapters, it is worth saying a few words about both the political and 
administrative wings of this executive. The political wing, the Labour Party, is 
one of the two largest political parties in the United Kingdom. Formally social-
democratic in ideology, it has played an important role in the historical 
development of ideas of equality and diversity in Britain since the Second World 
War. While for some, as a ruling party, it has had to make too many 
concessions and compromises along the way thereby undermining its 
progressive intentions, it is also the case that it has introduced all of Britain's 
race relations legislation98 and generally been, in the view of a recent study, the 
'principal site of struggles for minority representation' (Pitcher, 2007: 31).99 Its 
legacy in power during the period being studied here could be seen as similarly 
ambiguous: certainly that is the view of some commentators who have argued 
that New Labour policies on race contain both progressive and reactionary 
elements (Back et al, 2002).100 However, despite the reservations of critics, 
what cannot be disputed is the critical role played by the Labour party in 
establishing equality and diversity as elements of a ruling ideology. 
 
The administrative wing of the executive – the various government departments 
responsible for producing the texts that I will look at – is harder to describe for 
two reasons. Firstly, the government department that is now responsible for 
equality and diversity issues, the Government Equalities Office, wasn't set up 
until 2007. Before that a specialised non-departmental unit was created in 1997, 
                                                 
98
 Indeed, all equality legislation more generally with the exception of the Disability Discrimination 
Act 1995 which was introduced by the Conservatives (Macnair, 2010: 3). 
99
 We saw in chapter three, for example, how it was under, specifically, Labour councils that the 
multicultural policies of the early 1980s were introduced. 
100
 Newman also makes this argument (2001: 172). 
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the Women's Unit, which became the Women and Equality Unit in 2001 
signifying its take-up of more general equality issues alongside that of gender. It 
worked with a number of different departments at different times making it hard 
to single out specific departments as responsible for the agenda.101 Secondly, 
the departments themselves have been subject to change in terms of both 
name and areas of responsibility. Despite this it is possible to pick out two 
departments that reflect the two main ways in which equality and diversity 
impacts on the work of government. The Department for Communities and 
Local Government (created in May 2006 from the then Office of the Deputy 
Prime Minister, which had previously been the Department for Transport, Local 
Government and the Regions until May 2002) tends to deal more with equality 
as a community-relations issue. The Department for Business, Innovation and 
Skills (created in June 2009 through the merger of the Department for 
Innovation, Universities and Skills and the Department for Business, Enterprise 
and Regulatory Reform – the latter was the Department of Trade and Industry 
until June 2007) tends to deal with equality as an employment issue. 
 
As for the texts that I have used to trace the developments described below, I 
have focused on a relatively small number of government documents. These 
include consultations on proposed legislative changes to equalities law (the 
Discrimination Law Review, A Framework for Fairness, is particularly useful in 
this regard), and two reports (interim and final) of the Equalities Review, 
commissioned by Tony Blair to look at the root causes of inequality in society 
and which went on to inform the legislative changes just mentioned. Other 
documents looked at include guides to legislation (such as A Fairer Future, 
which provides an overview of the 2010 Equality Act) and also correspondence 
between the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the government's Solicitor 
General, Vera Baird, at the time of the 2010 Act – this last source provides 
some particularly useful insights into the government's thinking behind the Act. 
 
 
                                                 
101
 As Squires and Wickham-Jones (2004: 88) point out, the idea of a unit working across different 
departments was a product of New Labour's modernisation program: 'joined-up government' meant 
developing policies without being 'constrained by departmental boundaries'. The Social Exclusion 
Unit, which I will be looking at in chapter six, is the better-known example of this. 
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6.1 Equalities Law and the Individual 
 
The first, probably most obvious, way in which equalities law has changed is 
simply the expansion of the prohibition of discrimination to cover new grounds. 
The early legislation of the 1960s and 1970s applied to gender and race, 
prohibiting unequal treatment on these grounds, and this was followed by 
legislation to outlaw disability discrimination in 1995. During the following years 
the number of grounds grew further still. The 2010 Equality Act lists nine 
'protected characteristics', which include, alongside those already mentioned: 
sexual orientation, religion or belief, age, marriage and civil partnership, 
pregnancy and maternity, and gender reassignment. 
 
What is of particular interest here is the link between this expansion of the law 
and an increasing focus on the individual within the equality agenda. As we 
have seen, the individual is an important aspect of the diversity management 
discourse where there is a clear attempt to shift the focus away from group 
concerns – the latter are seen to threaten the foundational importance of the 
individual in a meritocratic society. The recognition of different inequalities 
contributes to this move, replacing single group identities with the individual who 
may be subject to many different types of discrimination. As Ross and 
Schneider (1992: 51) argued in the previous chapter, the 'danger associated 
with tackling the issue piecemeal, one group at a time, is that one group, often 
women, receives a great deal of attention and little thought is given, for 
instance, to people with disabilities, ethnic minorities or older people'. The same 
point is perhaps made even clearer by Thomas (1990: 114): 
 
Managers usually see affirmative action and equal employment opportunity as 
centering on minorities and women, with very little to offer white males. The 
diversity I'm talking about includes not only race, gender, creed, and ethnicity but 
also age, background, education, function, and personality differences. The 
objective is not to assimilate minorities and women into a dominant white male 
culture but to create a dominant heterogeneous culture. 
 
Here there is an appeal to various characteristics beyond race and gender with 
no obvious link to inequality (such as personality differences), and with no 
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obvious limit as to what can be included.102 In contrast, when it comes to the 
law there is a need to clarify and rationalise what characteristics should count in 
the prohibition of discrimination.103 However, despite this difference, there is, I 
think, a similar 'individualising tendency' (to use John Wrench's phrase) at work 
in the extension of equality legislation to an increasing number of grounds.  
 
Evidence for this claim can be found in the foreword to one government 
document, where Barbara Roche argues that there is a need to 'move beyond 
the idea that discrimination legislation is only about protecting minority groups, 
important though that is. It is now very much about providing protection for 
everyone – for example, we will all be covered by the age regulations being 
introduced under the Article 13 Race and Employment Directives' (Department 
of Trade and Industry, 2002). Further on it is stated that: 
 
People are increasingly looking for equal treatment that respects the many facets of 
their identities. Everyone's identity has multiple aspects, drawing for example on 
their gender, age, ethnicity and religious affiliations among other characteristics. As 
people recognise the strengths Britain draws from diversity, they are becoming 
more conscious of this (ibid). 
 
In other words, there is a need to shift the focus from minority group identities to 
the different 'facets' or 'aspects' that constitute every individual's identity. 
 
This idea is taken a step further with an increasing focus in the literature on the 
issue of 'multiple discrimination', leading up to the recent Equality Act 2010 
where it is, for the first time, the subject of legislation. In chapter three I noted 
the impact of the critique of identity on earlier formulations of multiculturalism 
and the development of a theory of 'intersectionality': this is where attention is 
paid to the points at which inequality arises due to a combination of 
characteristics, and can only be properly understood and responded to if this 
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 According to one article, the diversity programme of a business in the United States, Federated 
Department Stores, went from covering two groups (women and minorities) to 26 groups in just six 
years (Daniels cited by Wrench, 2005: 76). 
103
 While, as I've said, I won't enter into the complexities of how characteristics are judged to be 
eligible for protection under the law, it's worth noting that the decision tends to revolve around a 
number of central criteria: the existence of a group identity of some kind relating to the characteristic 
(e.g. an ethnic identity); the 'immutability' of the characteristic such that matters of 'lifestyle choice', 
for example, are excluded; also, evidence of discrimination against the group defined by the 
characteristic (see Fredman, 2002: 67-82). 
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combination is taken into account. 'Multiple discrimination' is, in effect, the 
application of this theoretical idea to equalities law. Alongside the idea then of, 
what might be called, the 'multi-faceted' individual, potentially subject to a 
number of different grounds of discrimination, emerges an idea of the 
interaction of these different inequalities and the effect of this on the individual 
subject.104 
 
A Framework for Fairness gives this explanation of the concept of multiple 
discrimination: 
 
Our discrimination law protects everyone in our society from unfair treatment on the 
basis of a number of different characteristics – their sex (including gender 
reassignment), race, disability, sexual orientation, age and religion or belief. People 
therefore belong to more than one protected group. If a person experiences 
discrimination, it may sometimes be hard to disentangle which of their protected 
characteristics is driving the less favourable treatment to which they have been 
subjected, or whether more than one protected characteristic was involved; they 
may have experienced multiple discrimination (Department for Communities and 
Local Government, 2007: 122). 
 
Multiple discrimination is a recognition by the government, then, of the 
complexity of discrimination as it arises in society, that it is difficult to 
'disentangle' the different types of characteristic that may be implicated in an 
individual's disadvantage. The key idea being captured here is not simply a 
disadvantage in which one ground is added to another, in the sense that ethnic 
minority women (a commonly used example of multiple discrimination within the 
literature) face racism – considered as a single 'protected ground' – as well as 
sexism – considered as another, separate, 'protected ground'. Rather, race and 
sex are understood to combine to produce a qualitatively distinct disadvantage 
with a distinct group subject to it – in this case, ethnic minority women.105 
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 Ben-Galim et al draw a strong link between this idea and the rise of diversity: for them 
'recognising and addressing multiple inequalities' is 'central to the concept of diversity' (2007: 25 – 
my emphasis). 
105
 A government consultation on the subject makes this distinction between 'additive multiple 
discrimination' and 'intersectional multiple discrimination': in the former a person suffers from 
discrimination on two grounds, but, 'although the two forms of discrimination happen at the same 
time, they are not related to each other'; in the latter, however, 'it is the unique combination of 
characteristics that results in discrimination, in such a way that they are completely inseparable' 
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As is the case in relation to the extension of characteristics to be protected by 
law, there is clearly a need to set limits to this recognition of multiple 
discrimination when it comes to transferring this concept into legislation. In this 
sense, the recognition of complexity, the 'entangled' causes of inequality in the 
passage above, is, to a certain extent, counter-balanced by pragmatic concerns 
requiring the simplification of the proposed legislation. For example, the 
government made the decision to limit the possibility of multiple-discrimination 
claims to two characteristics, not three or more. Vera Baird, in response to the 
Joint Committee on Human Rights' questioning of this limit, gives two main 
reasons for the decision: 1) that two characteristics are sufficient to cover most 
multiple discrimination cases; 2) that more than two characteristics could be 
burdensome for employers: 
 
A higher number of permitted combinations could make the law more complex and 
significantly increase the burdens for employers.
106
 Therefore, the proposal based 
on combinations of two protected characteristics would ensure, in the Government's 
view that protection is provided for the great majority of incidents of multiple 
discrimination, without imposing disproportionate burdens (Joint Committee on 
Human Rights, 2009: Ev 73). 
 
There is, then, a clearly perceived need on the part of the government – as 
when deciding what counts as a ground of discrimination – to ensure that the 
law reflects real inequality in society and does not legislate unless there is a 
good reason to. In an era of unquestioned neoliberalism (certainly by 
mainstream political parties) avoiding 'burdens' on business is also an important 
factor – something stressed throughout the New Labour discourse. 
 
A similar shift towards the individual is noticeable in the method used by the 
Equalities Review to analyse inequality in society. The interim report sets out 
the thinking behind this shift: 
 
                                                                                                                                               
(Government Equalities Office, 2009b: 11). It is only the latter type that was not covered by 
equalities law before the 2010 Equality Act. 
106
 Interestingly, there is a precise numerical limit to this complexity: Baird comments that '[i]f 
unlimited (in number and as to protected characteristics), there are 511 possible combinations' that 
would have to be considered (Joint Committee on Human Rights, 2009: Ev 73). 
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when we came to consider the framework within which we might determine our 
priorities for action we concluded that the traditional approach of considering 
inequality by 'strand' or domain – that is to say, by reference to the broad effect of 
non-socio-economic markers [identity-based characteristics, in other words] – is 
increasingly unhelpful. This approach typically compares average outcomes for 
large groups – the pay levels or educational achievement of millions of women, 
ethnic minorities, lesbians and gays – with those of the rest of society. The 
difference between the averages tells us a lot but not always the whole story about 
equality penalties. In some instances the variation within a group is much larger 
than the average difference with the rest of societyEThere is also a wider political 
and cultural reason for a modernised framework for our analysis. The focus on 
correlating unjust inequality with groups defined by domain (the equality 'strand' 
framework) has led some unfairly to label many perfectly reasonable efforts at 
reducing inequality 'political correctness' (Equalities Review, 2006: 9).  
 
'More justifiably', the report adds, 
 
it has been suggested that it [the group-based approach] invites a demoralising 
sense of victimhood amongst disadvantaged groups on the one hand; and on the 
other it leads even those well-disposed towards, say, ethnic minorities or disabled 
people to consider all Asians or wheelchair users as somehow deficient and one-
dimensional, defined entirely by the one aspect of their lives (ibid). 
 
There is a need then for a different 'framework' on which to base the analysis, 
one that moves away from the group-based model for reasons of both accuracy 
of results and moral/political considerations. 
 
A new approach is then set out: 
 
we propose that we see the emerging inequalities in a different way, which 
recognises that chronic and persistent inequalities leading to penalties are the 
product of two key measurable dimensions. One dimension is what we call 
vulnerability, distinguished by membership of a social group defined by class, race, 
gender and so forth.
107
 The other dimension is based on our finding that whilst 
many persistent and unjust inequalities are disproportionately associated with some 
vulnerable groups it often takes a specific life event, or a trigger episode for the 
                                                 
107
 As we will see in the final section of this chapter, in the Equalities Review class is not in fact 
treated as the characteristic of an unequal group in an analogous sense to race and gender, as this 
sentence suggests. 
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penalty to take effect. It is the combination of vulnerability and a trigger episode in a 
field such as education, employment or health which helps to identify a specific 
target for action against inequality (ibid: 10). 
 
The answer then is not to reject the use of 'non-socio-economic markers' 
(identity-based characteristics) entirely, instead they need to be combined with 
life-events so as to locate the specific points at which group identity interacts 
with individual lives, rather than assuming a blanket outcome for all members of 
that group. We see the shift in emphasis towards the individual not just in the 
legislation itself, then, but also in the kind of analytical frameworks used by the 
government to understand inequality. 
 
A final development worth mentioning here is that equality and human rights are 
seen as two increasingly close and complementary fields of government 
responsibility – as illustrated, for example, in the new equality body: the Equality 
and Human Rights Commission (see below for more on this body). As the 
government explains: 
 
Bringing together equality and human rights in the new Commission marks an 
important shift in the way we think about equality. It places equality firmly in the 
context of people's fundamental rights and freedoms. It recognises that we are all a 
complex mixture of the different characteristics that influence how we see the world 
and how the world sees us. These issues matter to all of us, not just those facing 
discrimination. They are about how people deal with and respect each other in 21st 
century Britain; how we ensure that our communities are strong and cohesive and 
allow people to flourish (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2007: 
11). 
 
Placing equality 'in the context of people's fundamental rights and freedoms' 
can be seen as another way in which equality policies are linked with the 
individual – this time in relation to the individual as a citizen, a holder of rights in 
a liberal-democratic society. Of course, seeking to bring group-based equality 
claims alongside more traditional individual rights such as freedom of speech in 
this way is not without its problems. For now, it is enough simply to note the 
attempt to do this. In chapter eight I will look at the conflicts that arise as a result 
of this attempt and the response, within equality and diversity discourse, to 
those conflicts. 
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6.2 From Discrimination to Inequality 
 
As is the case with diversity management, the recognition of the rights-endowed 
individual, potentially subject to discrimination on a variety of grounds, is 
combined with, rather than a replacement of, an acknowledgement of the 
group-based nature of this discrimination. In particular, social structures and 
institutions are increasingly seen as the cause of this discrimination, not merely 
individual behaviour and prejudice. The second chapter of the final report of the 
Equalities Review, Fairness and Freedom, describes this historical shift in how 
the concept of discrimination is understood and how that is reflected in 
legislation. Here, the concept of indirect discrimination is said to emerge from 
the recognition that the formal anti-discrimination measures outlawing direct 
discrimination established in the 1960s and early 1970s were not enough to 
shift deeper inequalities: 
 
it was increasingly evident that efforts to stamp out specific individual acts of direct 
discrimination would not be sufficient to eliminate the disadvantage faced by 
women or ethnic minorities. This 'indirect' discrimination took a far subtler form, not 
an overt bias against a particular individual, but barriers likely to affect a kind of 
person – far harder to spot and much more difficult to prevent (Equalities Review, 
2007: 34). 
 
Here, the existence of deeper inequalities that cannot be remedied through 
standard anti-discrimination measures leads to a redefinition and expansion of 
discrimination as a concept, rather than its rejection: indirect discrimination 
recognises that there are 'barriers' built into supposedly neutral institutions that 
disadvantage particular groups.108 
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 We have already seen how an equivalence between race and gender has played a strategic role in 
the development of discrimination law in both Britain and the United States: in chapter three I noted 
that legislative gains had been won for one ground by drawing an equivalence with the other ground 
that had, at the time, comparably more advanced legislation relating to it. Interestingly, in Fairness 
and Freedom we see a similar move recorded in the development of the idea of indirect 
discrimination, but this time involving disability: the 'insight that discrimination might not be 
restricted solely to consciously prejudicial acts by one individual against another was a profound 
breakthrough in all aspects of equality. In the field of disability, the development of the "social 
model of disability" began to change the way in which people thought about equality overall. This 
view held that disadvantages faced by disabled people arose less from their particular impairment, 
and more from the way that society constructed (often literally) the world and erected barriers. This 
meant that campaigning efforts shifted from a focus on a disabled person's particular impairment(s) 
to the action that should be taken to remove barriers faced by disabled people in everyday life' 
(Equalities Review, 2007: 34). This is a useful strategic move, I would suggest, because the idea of 
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More recent developments have then built on this important idea: 
 
In 1999, the gradual trend towards focusing less on individual acts of prejudice and 
more on the way in which systems and organisations routinely disadvantaged entire 
categories of people reached its most radical, and controversial, stage. Prompted 
by a sustained community campaign led by the family of the murdered teenager 
Stephen Lawrence, the report of the Macpherson Inquiry introduced the term 
'institutional racism' to Britain. Though widely misinterpreted to mean that all 
individuals in an institution should be regarded as racist, a close reading of the 
report shows that the idea behind the term was exactly the reverse: that even 
where there was good will and substantial effort by individuals to eliminate different 
kinds of discrimination, the rules, culture and habits of a particular body could 
frustrate efforts to stamp out disadvantage (ibid: 35). 
 
Here we have the familiar idea of indirect discrimination in a new, more 
politicised form: institutional racism. In order to combat this problem 
'Macpherson proposed a new idea': a public sector duty designed to bring about 
racial equality (ibid).109 The importance of the Lawrence inquiry in relation to this 
new idea is also mentioned by Robin Schneider who, while generally wary of 
relying on legislation (as we have seen), nonetheless welcomes the duty as an 
important tool in promoting change: 
 
I share the prevailing assumption that regulation may not provide the best 
motivation for organisations to change. However, what the Stephen Lawrence case 
showed all too graphically is that we can't just rely on good intentions. 
 
Despite fine words from the top about the desire for racial equality, getting 
everyone to pause and properly work through the implications in the way that they 
go about their day-to-day jobs takes systematic planning. 
 
The public duty to promote racial equality and good race relations is a piece of 
regulation, which requires public sector organisations to take this systematic 
approach (Schneider-Ross, 2003: 2). 
                                                                                                                                               
indirect discrimination is surely easier to demonstrate, and also, more importantly, to 'sell' to a 
sceptical public, in the case of disability than in relation to race or gender. 
109
 In fact, this was not a completely new idea as something similar had been introduced in the 1976 
Race Relations Act, though applying only to local authorities (I am grateful to Neil Cobb for 
pointing this out to me). 
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In other words, the Stephen Lawrence case shows that an ethical or business 
case aimed at an enlightened leadership is not enough; what is required is 
legislation that will help to embed equality policies at the heart of institutions and 
change the way those institutions operate. 
 
Once again, the development in discrimination law here mirrors developments 
described in the previous chapter, particularly the idea of 'integration' or 
'mainstreaming': 
 
The public duty is, in effect, legislation which is deliberately designed to bring about 
'mainstreaming' of racial equality. This is about ensuring that racial equality is not a 
separate 'add on', but an integral part of how an organisation goes about all its 
activitiesEIn other words, it is about institutional change – getting the concept of 
inclusion into the bloodstream of an organisation so that it reaches every part of the 
body – and therefore everything it does (ibid: 13). 
 
In fact, this idea of mainstreaming was already underway in relation to 
government policy-making as early as 1998. Then, a short document written for 
civil servants entitled 'Policy Appraisal for Equal Treatment' was circulated 
stating that 
 
Government Departments must take full account of the needs and experiences of 
those affected by their policies. We must understand how policy can have a 
different impact on different groups in society. We have to bring this understanding 
to policy development and work to ensure that the results are fair, lawful and 
practical, and promote equal opportunities in its widest sense. 
 
This means that in policy making and employment practice, we have to consider 
the impact on those who have found the actions and attitudes of others placing 
obstacles in the way of equality of opportunity. Most particularly, the impact upon 
women, people from different ethnic minorities and disabled people. This process 
has come to be known as "mainstreaming". These guidelines are intended to help 




                                                 
110
 In fact, according to an EDF (Equality and Diversity Forum) text, the Conservatives introduced 
an earlier version of such guidelines in 1992 (O'Cinneide, 2004: 18). 
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We can see then the relatively early emergence of a theme that will be taken up 
and radicalised in the idea of a duty – radicalised in the sense that the latter 
applies, in principle, to organisational activities across the public sector (not just 
governmental policy making), and, most importantly, in the sense that a duty is 
cemented in law. 
 
The significance of the duties (the race equality duty was joined by duties in 
relation to gender and disability) is that they represent a 'qualitative change 
from the law that preceded them'. The key shift being that up until then the law 
had taken the form of a negative duty not to discriminate, but here public sector 
bodies must: 
 
– 'give due regard to the need to eliminate unlawful discrimination and to 
promote equality of opportunity' (this is called the 'general duty') 
– then perform specific actions in order to carry out this general duty 
(referred to as the 'specific duties') (Macnair, 2010: 5). 
 
A duty differs then from the concept of indirect discrimination. While the latter 
extends the meaning of discrimination to capture how apparently neutral 
features of social structures (practices, procedures, culture etc) may 
disadvantage a 'kind of person' (as the Equalities Review puts it), it still puts the 
burden on victims to bring attention to specific cases where discrimination has 
occurred. A duty, on the other hand, provides a more general recognition of 
inequality in society with the burden for change placed squarely on public 
bodies. As Sandra Fredman (2002: 122) explains: '[e]ven indirect discrimination 
requires proof that an individual employer has imposed a practice or condition 
which excludes disproportionate numbers of women or blacks. At the root of the 
positive duty, by contrast, is a recognition that societal discrimination extends 
well beyond individual acts of racist prejudice'. The solution to the problem 
changes accordingly: from the compensation of individual victims, in the case of 
indirect discrimination, to 'restructuring institutions'. 
 
The significant point here is that while indirect discrimination could be said to 
have 'stretched' the concept of discrimination in order to move beyond the 
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treatment of individuals,111 the idea of an equality duty moves beyond the 
concept of discrimination altogether. Discrimination law becomes equalities law: 
an attempt to legislate against social inequality in a much more general sense. 
As Sarah Spencer from the EDF has explained: this new approach 'broadens 
the goal, from tackling one cause of inequality, discrimination, to the promotion 
of equality – tackling whichever barriers are standing in the way' (Spencer, 
2007). 
 
The idea of a duty should also be distinguished from positive action. Positive 
action, as we have already seen, is an important aspect of the diversity 
management discourse and it is defended by the government as a necessary 
practice in similar terms. To take one example: '[a]llowing voluntary positive 
measures by political parties when selecting candidates [e.g. imposing all-
female shortlists] is designed to overcome a persistent though generally 
unconscious bias against candidates who break the usual mould, or who are 
thought of as “risky” – perhaps because they are female and/or from an ethnic 
minority group' (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2007: 77). 
It is also worth noting that the same danger is acknowledged by the government 
that we saw in the previous chapter: that legitimate positive action will slide into 
illegitimate positive discrimination. For example: 
 
There is currently confusion about what types of positive action measures are and 
are not allowed under our discrimination law. Perhaps most crucially, the lack of a 
clearly understood purpose for positive action measures gives rise to confusion with 
positive discrimination. This risks fostering unjustified concern about favouritism 
being shown to disadvantaged groups. Instead, we want everyone to recognise 
there may be occasions when positive action to address their particular needs may 
help them, and that this can actually lead to a fairer outcome for all (ibid: 72). 
 
However, as I say, there is an important difference between positive action and 
a duty.112 While they are both described by the government as 'balancing 
measures' (ibid: 70), positive action is a voluntary policy option, to be used as 
and when required in response to specific situations where there is a need to 
                                                 
111
 As Jopke has put it: indirect discrimination provisions 'created a space for the language of group 
rights and for the result-oriented logic of achieving statistical parity between the races' (quoted in 
Bleich, 2003: 104). 
112
 Again, I am grateful to Neil Cobb for his thoughts on this distinction. 
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prevent or compensate for group disadvantage. A duty, by contrast, is a 
mandatory requirement that aims to permanently change the institutional 
environment. As an EDF report on the subject explains, the latter ensures that 
organisations are more willing to use potentially controversial policies, such as 
positive action. By 'requiring proactive action', duties 
 
give a legal backbone to mainstreaming and equal opportunities policies [such as 
positive action measures], both strengthening their “internal” development and 
ensuring an “external” compliance standard. By compelling the taking of adequately 
implemented procedural steps, they create a climate of openness to new diversity 
initiatives and ensure a greater focus upon the proactive promotion of equality 
(O'Cinneide, 2004: 79-80). 
 
We can see here then something of the nuanced relationship between the 
mandatory/permanent and the voluntary/temporary, and the importance of both 
types of action in the functioning of equality and diversity as an ideology. On the 
one hand, equality policies that require differential treatment (such as positive 
action measures) need to remain a temporary response to instances of 
inequality, in order to avoid the asymmetry between groups introduced (i.e. the 
preferential treatment of minorities) becoming a permanent feature of social 
relations. On the other hand, those same policies also require a more 
permanent institutional base in order to remain effective. A duty provides, then, 
not just a recognition of the deeply embedded reality of inequality in society, it 
also provides a way of institutionalising the need to act on this recognition in 
organisations across society.113 
 
 
6.3 The Consolidation of Equalities Law 
 
In October 2002 the government launched a review of equality institutions that 
was described by them as the 'most significant review of equality in over a 
quarter of a century'; the review threw up 'vociferous calls for new legislation 
and a single equality bill' (Squires, 2007: 542, 544). A key issue behind these 
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 Rob Berkeley (2012) – director of Runnymede – has recently described this legal mechanism as a 
way of 'turning 30,000 public institutions into activists for equality'. 
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calls was the sheer complexity of discrimination law with different grounds of 
discrimination covered by different pieces of legislation. Added to this was the 
impact of both the Human Rights Act 1998 and devolution on equality law; the 
latter meant that different legislation applied to different parts of the UK (ibid: 
544-5). In summary, towards the end of the 2000's discrimination law was made 
up of a 'patchwork' of (at a minimum) 30 Acts of Parliament, 38 Statutory 
Instruments, 11 Codes of Practice and 12 EC Directives. According to Squires, 
this led many of those working in the equality and diversity field to argue that 
discrimination law 'was itself a source of inequality' with varying levels of 
protection afforded to different groups in different geographical areas (ibid: 546). 
 
The government, although 'initially resistant', did eventually begin the process of 
bringing together these different pieces of legislation into a single equality act. 
The product of a lengthy consultation process, this new act was passed in 2010 
with many of its provisions not taking effect until 2011. As a guide to the 
legislation makes clear: it 'consolidates, simplifies, and improves on the 
ramshackle protections that previously applied' by bringing 'together in one 
place those characteristics on which it is unlawful to discriminate and to 
establish a single approach to discrimination' (Wadham et al: ix).114 While 
previous legislation dealt with prohibited behaviour that was 'directly tied' to the 
ground with which it was dealing, the new act has separate chapters dealing 
with the nine recognised characteristics in need of protection, on the one hand, 
and the prohibited behaviour, on the other (Karim and Maynard, 2010: 13). This 
means that '[i]n general, discrimination is defined in the same way for each of 
the protected characteristics' – though there are, as with any legislation, 
exceptions to this (Uccellari, 2010: 31). 
 
The Act also introduces a new single equality duty replacing the three previous 
duties that dealt with race, gender and disability. This extends the idea of a duty 
to all characteristics included in the Act (with the exception of marital status), 
                                                 
114
 It should be noted, though, that this was not the only reason for the legislation. The 'basic case for 
legislation was presented [by the government] as twofold: first, although the position of some 
disadvantaged groups was improving, progress was not fast enough; secondly, the government 
pointed to the present state of the law, describing it as “complex and difficult”…The intention that 
the Act would not just consolidate and “declutter” or tidy up the relevant law, but improve the 
position of disadvantaged people, was apparent throughout the preparation and progress of the Bill. 
Wherever the rights of different victims of discrimination were uneven, they were to be levelled up, 
not down' (Macnair, 2010: 7-8). 
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and will therefore require a 'range of public bodies to consider the needs of 
diverse groups in the community when designing and delivering public services 
so that people can get fairer opportunities and better public services' 
(Government Equalities Office, 2009a: 11). We see here how the specific 
groups covered by the previous duties – women, the disabled and ethnic 
minorities – have been replaced by the more general idea of 'diverse groups in 
the community'. This echoes the general trend in legislation towards a focus on 
the individual that I highlighted in the first section of this chapter: without 
separate duties for each 'strand' (i.e. the different inequalities covered in the 
legislation) a public authority is more able to deal with different aspects of 
inequality as and when they arise, recognising that all individuals are made up 
of different characteristics that will affect how they are treated. 
 
This consolidation of the law is also supposed to bring improved efficiency. The 
previous duties had been criticised for being too bureaucratic and process 
driven (Burnham, 2010: 161). A single equality duty, on the other hand, would 
enable public bodies to have more autonomy and flexibility in responding to 
inequality: 
 
Our proposed approach wouldEmean that the law would no longer specifically 
require, for example, employment monitoring of different racial groups, but would 
instead set out the key principles which support effective performance of a single 
equality duty, and require these to be applied proportionately. This would give 
public authorities greater autonomy in determining their priority equality objectives 
and how they will be achieved, by reference to their particular functions and the 
communities they serve, while ensuring that the duty is performed in an inclusive, 
evidence-based and transparent way (Department for Communities and Local 
Government, 2007: 93). 
 
One example of this might involve a public body that works in an area of the 
country with low numbers of people from ethnic minority groups. Employment 
monitoring in relation to race might in this situation be inappropriate; resources 
could instead be used for other equality issues that are more prevalent in the 
area – there may, for example, be evidence of limited facilities for disabled 
people. In this way the more general concept of inequality at the heart of a 
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single equality duty would enable a more specific, and therefore more effective, 
targeting of resources.115 
 
We also find, alongside this new harmonised equality legislation, a replacement 
of the previous single-ground equality commissions (the CRE, Equal 
Opportunities Commission and Disability Rights Commission) with a single 
overarching organisation: the EHRC (Equality and Human Rights Commission). 
In December 2001, the government stated their belief that 'in the longer term, 
there are arguments in favour of a single, statutory commission offering 
integrated advice, guidance and support on equality matters'; it would 'help to 
ensure a coherent approach to equality issues across the board' (Cabinet 
Office, 2001: 26). In 2003 Patricia Hewitt similarly argued that a new 
commission would 
 
give greater support and more joined-up advice to individuals, businesses and 
communities to crackdown on discrimination, and promote equality and 
diversityEtackling discrimination in the 21
st
 century requires a joined-up approach 
that puts equality in the mainstream of concerns. As individuals, our identities are 
diverse, complex and multi-layered. People don't see themselves as solely a 
woman, or black, or gay and neither should our equality organizations (quoted by 
Squires, 2007: 543). 
 
Here we see that – alongside a recognition of issues that have already been 
explored in relation to the rise of diversity (multiple discrimination, 
mainstreaming and so on)116 – a new organisation would bring, again, a more 
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 It should also be noted that the two aims of the new legislation that I mentioned in footnote 114 
are apparent in the formulation of the new duty, in that alongside this process of consolidation there 
is also an attempt to strengthen the new duty. As Burnham explains (2010: 162-3): 'the general duty 
has been considerably fortified by the replacement of the requirement to “have due regard to the 
need to promote equality of opportunity” with the obligation to have such regard to the need to 
“advance equality of opportunity”. The use of the word “advance” does chime with a commitment to 
make the duty action-based and conjures a potentially measurable target rather than an ephemeral 
aspiration'. 
116
 It should also be noted that the concept of diversity is explicitly mentioned in the legislation 
responsible for creating the new organisation. The responsibility of the EHRC as set out in the 2006 
Equality Act is 'to encourage and support the development of a society in which (a) people's ability 
to achieve their potential is not limited by prejudice or discrimination; (b) there is respect for and 
protection of each individual's human rights; (c) there is respect for the dignity and worth of each 
individual; (d) each individual has an equal opportunity to participate in society; and (e) there is 
mutual respect between groups based on understanding and valuing of diversity and on shared 
respect for equality and human rights' (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2007: 
87 – my emphasis). 
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rationalised and streamlined approach to equality issues (a 'joined-up 
approach'). This would help to, for example, avoid the 'duplication of functions 
between organisations' (Department of Trade and Industry, 2002), as all 
equality issues are brought within the remit of a single institutional structure. 
 
This process of merger has not gone completely unchallenged, however, with 
some scepticism and concern expressed regarding the ability of different types 
of inequality to be brought together in one organisation. As Ben-Galim et al 
(2007: 24) have observed, this '“one size fits all” approach has been criticized 
for its implicit assumptions that inequalities are equivalent'. It is clear from the 
discourse however that the government do not believe (echoing theories of 
multiculturalism more generally) that an equivalence between inequalities 
means having to treat them all in the same way. In Making it Happen, for 
example, the government argue that equality commissions of other countries 
'have been effective in delivering benefits through an integrated approach – for 
example in promoting good practice across the equality agenda, raising the 
profile of diversity, and providing integrated advice, while continuing to meet the 
needs of the specific groups they serve', and that there 'must be no loss of 
focus on the needs of any of the groups, or “strands” covered by equality 
legislation. Any new body must serve all the strands effectively'. Ultimately, a 
balance is required: '[w]hatever leading principle is chosen, any such body 
would need to balance the need for coherence across the organisation, so that 
an integrated approach to equality is delivered, with the need for proper focus 
on each strand' (Department of Trade and Industry, 2002 – my emphasis). 
 
The different inequalities (race, gender, disability etc) are, then, considered 
different but equal. Not only can they be brought together within a single 
equality act and a single equality commission, a key reason for this process of 
consolidation is that this will help promote equality between the different 
'strands' thereby avoiding a hierarchy of inequalities with varying levels of 
protection afforded to different grounds. In this sense, in principle, race and 
gender (which undoubtedly have the longest and most politicised history as 
inequalities) should be placed on an equal footing with, for example, age 
(perhaps the least politicised): '[t]he interests of all the groups served must carry 
equal weight. It would be quite wrong for any group either to predominate or be 
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marginalised. The mission, structures and processes of any new organisation 
would need to be designed to ensure these risks were minimised' (Department 
of Trade and Industry, 2002). It is worth emphasising how widely accepted this 
principle is within the literature and perhaps helps to explain the relatively 
smooth progress of the establishment of the EHRC; while there were some 
tensions surrounding the process – the CRE, in particular, had some concerns 
– these were generally fairly small-scale and related to the specific details of 
how it would in practice function, rather than the principle itself.117 
 
 
6.4 Socio-Economic Inequality and the Law 
 
It should be emphasised that the business case for equality and diversity, and 
many of the themes of the diversity management discourse more generally, are 
central to the New Labour government's discourse and its reformulation and 
development of equality legislation (for a succinct statement see Department of 
Trade and Industry, 2003). For obvious reasons issues of class and economic 
inequality are more or less absent from the diversity management discourse 
with consequences for its use as a way of legitimising government policy. As 
Squires (2007: 554) argues: 
 
What is striking in relation to the government's framing of the equality review is the 
centrality of the business case for equality and the absence of 'class' in 
considerations of inequalityEPerhaps because it has framed the pursuit of equality 
and diversity in terms of a business case, there has been no sustained 
consideration of economic inequality throughout the consultation period, rendering 
issues of poverty and mal-distribution marginal to the equality debate. 
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 See Squires (2007: 548-554) for an account of the negotiations surrounding the establishment of 
the EHRC between the government and the equality commissions that would be replaced by it. On 
the point about the general acceptance of the principle behind the EHRC she writes: the 'key 
advocates of the six equality strands have generally been very enthusiastic about the government's 
proposals to create the CEHR [the Commission for Equality and Human Rights – the old name for 
the EHRC], notwithstanding a difference in framing of equality and diversity concerns. Even the 
CRE's concerns about the CEHR are focused on the pragmatic detail of remit, location and resources 
and do not hinge on a principled objection to the proposal. One of the striking things about the 
consultation process, therefore, has been the consensus in favour of the idea of developing an 
integrated approach to equality, such that intersectional discrimination might be addressed and a 
hierarchy of competing equality strands be avoided' (ibid: 552-3). 
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While this, in general terms, seems a pretty fair assessment, it's worth 
emphasising that, in contrast with the business-focused literature, concerns 
about class and economic inequality are not entirely absent from the New 
Labour discourse – no doubt reflecting the fact that as a governing party, unlike 
business, there are both the social-order problems that can result from this type 
of inequality to consider, as well as the need to maintain the Labour vote in 
working-class constituencies. It is also a concern that clearly increases over 
time, particularly in the later years of Labour rule.118 This can be illustrated by 
comparing the treatment of the issue in the Equalities Review (2006-7) with its 
appearance in the later Equality Act 2010. 
 
As I argued in chapter four, the key feature of the place of socio-economic 
inequality within the equality and diversity framework is less the varying extent 
to which the former is an issue, and more the separation between this type of 
inequality and that relating to the presence of disadvantaged identity-based 
groups in society. We can see that this separation lies at the heart of the 
Equalities Review. For example, in the foreword to the interim report, Trevor 
Phillips, chair of the review, describes the influence of Tony Blair on the 
direction taken: 
 
We were invited by the Prime Minister to consider especially those areas of 
inequality which are not the product of pure economic disadvantage. It would be 
unrealistic to suppose that socioeconomic disadvantages would not be a 
fundamental part of the background to our review. But we concluded very early on 
in our deliberations that some kinds of inequalities can be identified which are partly 
or wholly separate from those caused by socio-economic factors...What we have 
tried to do therefore is to set out the degree to which other kinds of group 
differences or “domains” besides the ones we traditionally call ”class”, may lead to 
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 This shift led to anxiety among those in the equality and diversity field that this focus on socio-
economic inequality might replace a concern with identity-based inequality. See, for example, Derek 
McGhee's response to an article by John Denham (former minister at the Department for 
Communities and Local Government): 'there is a concern that the new discourse (promoted by the 
Government's Equality Office) that "class" "trumps" other social categories including race, gender, 
disability and age is a regression from the appreciation of "our" multi-faceted identities and the 
complex intersectionality of the advantages and disadvantages associated with these different aspects 
of our identities' (McGhee, 2010: 11). This issue also emerged in the national media after a speech 
where Denham proposed a more 'complex' approach to equalities, one that would give class more 
emphasis and that would not assume that ethnic minorities were 'always disadvantaged' (Denham 
quoted in BBC, 2010b). This move was criticised by a number of commentators – see, for example, 
Harker (2010). 
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individuals or groups of individuals suffering unjust inequalities (Equalities Review, 
2006: 3). 
 
Socio-economic inequality is considered to be important, then, in the review,119 
but it has a distinct role in providing a 'background' against which various group-
based inequalities are situated. 
 
This distinction between the two types of inequality enables the review to place 
the issue of socio-economic inequality outside the main focus of its inquiry. This 
is made clear in the final report where it's stated that, given the importance of 
the issue of socio-economic inequality, the review 'welcomes the Government's 
focus on reducing poverty, increasing employment, tackling social exclusion, 
improving education and skills, and building neighbourhood and community 
renewal, as part of its wider role in reducing economic inequality'. However, 
because of 'factors over and above socio-economic drivers of inequality that 
affect particular groups to their disadvantage' the 'aim has been to complement 
the Government's other programmes and to focus on reducing inequalities 
between disadvantaged groups and the rest of society' (Equalities Review, 
2007: 27-8). Socio-economic inequality lies firmly within a different domain of 
government activity then and, as we will see in the following chapter, this 
enables it to be channelled into a social exclusion agenda that significantly 
affects how the issue is dealt with. 
 
However, two years after the publication of Fairness and Freedom there is an 
interesting development in this area, with a relatively late addition to the bill that 
would become the 2010 Equality Act. A 'socio-economic duty' was proposed 
that meant that this type of inequality was registered as an issue to be dealt with 
through equality legislation itself – not something to be bracketed as an issue of 
social welfare policy as it is in the Equalities Review. This was certainly 
understood as a significant move by politicians and commentators at the time: it 
was hailed as 'legislation of extraordinary radicalism' by Polly Toynbee (2009), 
from the left, and denounced as a return to class warfare by the Conservative 
opposition, from the right (BBC, 2009). The actual wording of the provision is 
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 The final report even goes so far as to call it the 'biggest driver of continuing disadvantage and 
inequality for many in society' (Equalities Review, 2007: 26). 
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somewhat more low-key than this reaction might suggest however: '[a]n 
authority to which this section applies must, when making decisions of a 
strategic nature about how to exercise its functions, have due regard to the 
desirability of exercising them in a way that is designed to reduce the 
inequalities of outcome that result from socio-economic disadvantage' (cited by 
Burnham, 2010: 169). Hardly the Communist Manifesto I think it's safe to say! 
 
As the government explains, the duty 'will affect how public bodies make 
strategic decisions about spending and service delivery. It will enshrine in the 
law the role of our key public bodies in narrowing gaps in outcomes resulting 
from socio-economic disadvantage'. For example: 
 
A local education authority could evaluate the schools application process and find 
that some parents in social housing were having difficulty navigating the system 
and getting their child a place at a school. The authority could then target support at 
people living on housing estates to help them with the application process 
(Government Equalities Office, 2009a: 10). 
 
The concrete measures proposed do not necessarily differ that much, then, 
from those carried out under New Labour's social welfare agenda – the Sure 
Start scheme, for example, deliberately targeted disadvantaged communities in 
order to help young people from those communities get a better start in life.120 
As was also acknowledged by a civil servant involved in the development of the 
proposed legislation at a joint EDF-Runnymede seminar on the subject: it is the 
kind of action that many public authorities have already been taking. The duty 
simply provides, as with the identity-based duties, a 'legal backbone' for this 
work and aims to bring the organisations that aren't performing well in this 
regard up to the standards of those that are (EDF, 2009b). Its 'radicalism' in 
practice, the actual impact the duty would have on the large socio-economic 
inequalities that exist in Britain, is certainly debatable then, and is anyway a 
purely hypothetical question as the provision has not been carried forward by 
the present coalition government. Its significance is that, as a duty, it 
represented an attempt at a legally binding recognition of socio-economic 
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 In the passage from the Equalities Review (2007: 27-8), cited above, Sure Start is mentioned 
alongside the New Deal and the National Minimum Wage as examples of the 'Government's other 
programmes' that deal with economic inequality – in contrast with the Equalities Review. 
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inequality in society and the necessity for a proactive response to redress this 
imbalance. 
 
However, despite this attempt to recognise socio-economic inequality within 
equality legislation – and the use of a legislative device taken from equality 
legislation to do this (a public sector duty) – the distinction between socio-
economic and identity-based inequality remains, as is clear from the need for 
two separate duties. Interestingly, the question of why socio-economic 
inequality should not be one of the protected grounds in the 2010 Equality Act, 
and therefore why two separate duties are needed, is raised by the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights. Baird's answer is worth quoting at length: 
 
The Government did consider extending protection against discrimination to cover 
socio-economic status. But it concluded that (a) beyond a crude income or poverty 
measure, it would be very hard to define socio-economic disadvantage in a way 
that could be used to give individual rights; and (b) this would not in any case be 
the best way to address the inequalities of outcome which result from that socio-
economic disadvantage. 
 
Socio-economic disadvantage is not like the other protected grounds. It is not a 
single, unchangeable condition, or a fundamental aspect of someone's being. On 
the contrary, it is a situation characterised by complex, inter-related factors; and is 
[a] situation that people will, it is hoped, rise above and move on from. It is a 
situation that the Government ultimately wishes to eradicate altogether. 
 
However, socio-economic disadvantage underlies, and can manifest itself as a 
consequence of, many of the inequalities associated with the protected 
characteristics. But it is not like them, and should not be treated as such. Putting 
the onus on public bodies specifically to eliminate discrimination against people 
facing socio-economic disadvantage, would not be the best way to address the 
inequalities of outcome associated with that disadvantage. While it is, of course, 
possible that some people suffer discrimination, in particular cases, as a result of 
their socio-economic status, that is not the key cause of the inequalities of outcome 
we are looking to address. What is required is a measure to address the underlying 




Despite its importance, then, 'socio-economic disadvantage' cannot be the 
basis of individual rights in the way that the other grounds can.121 Why? The 
reason given is that unlike the others it is not a 'single, unchangeable condition, 
or a fundamental aspect of someone's being' – in other words, it is not the basis 
of an identity in the way that the other grounds are. 
 
Furthermore, according to Baird, the cause of each disadvantage differs. The 
cause of identity-based disadvantage is discrimination; in contrast, socio-
economic disadvantage is a 'situation characterised by complex, inter-related 
factors', which (echoing the Equalities Review) forms a background condition of 
more specific relations of injustice: it (socio-economic disadvantage) 'underlies, 
and can manifest itself as a consequence of, many of the inequalities 
associated with the protected characteristics'. The use of the term 'manifest' is 
interesting here, as it suggests not just a separation between the two types of 
inequality, but a particular kind of relationship whereby socio-economic 
inequality only appears as something significant and tangible through the 
various identity-based inequalities recognised in the discourse. Despite, then, 
superficially appearing as a closure of the gap between socio-economic and 
identity-based inequality, the socio-economic duty remains, at bottom, a 
reflection of this ideological separation. Furthermore, the lack of political will 
shown in failing to implement the duty in law contrasts with the willingness, on 
the part of the current Conservative-led coalition, to take forward the 
controversial 'tie-breaker' clause enabling positive discrimination for identity-
based groups, further demonstrating the different levels of concern shown to the 





In this chapter we have found two developments in equality law that we also 
found in the diversity management discourse: 1) an increasingly official and 
radical recognition of identity-based inequality in relation to various protected 
                                                 
121
 The same issue – the difficulty of linking socio-economic concerns with individual rights – was 
also given as the reason for a separate socio-economic duty by Harriet Harman (the minister in 
charge of the proposed legislation), when questioned on the issue at the EDF seminar mentioned 
above (EDF, 2009b). 
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characteristics. This culminates in the idea of a duty: a legal requirement placed 
on public bodies that officially recognises the institutionalised inequality that 
relates to a group's disadvantaged position in society, and, furthermore, places 
an obligation on that body to proactively act to reverse that inequality. 2) The 
increasing influence of diversity in linking this recognition of group inequality to 
the individual as the central rights-bearing subject of contemporary society. 
Here we see a shift from the idea of a minority group suffering inequality – to 
which some individuals in society may belong – to the 'diverse' individual 
composed of a combination of different characteristics that change over the life-
course of that individual and that affect how they are treated by society. It is 
interesting to see then how equality legislation has evolved over time away from 
the 'them' and 'us' model that, as we saw at the start of this chapter, was the 
main reason for Robin Schneider's criticism of relying on the law as an engine 
of social change. 
 
We also find that, as with diversity management, this concern with diversity 
contains the potential to alienate those most committed to equality, who see it 
as a weakening of the latter. Ben-Galim et al (2007: 22) undoubtedly speak for 
others when they warn that: 
 
while diversity speaks to long-standing concerns about cross-cutting inequalities, it 
tends to be tied to the level of individual opportunity and experience. This is 
problematic for the practice of anti-discrimination and equal opportunities 
legislation, particularly in the UK, which has emphasised individual rights and 
redress...more than the positive action that may be necessary to address group 
inequalities. 
 
In other words, the danger is that an emphasis on the diverse individual at the 
heart of equality legislation will be too successful, and will put the continued 
need for group-based policies in jeopardy. 
 
There are also two more novel features of the discourse that have been 
considered: 1) the need to consolidate legislation that had become increasingly 
complex and fragmented due to its ad-hoc development over the years. The 
function of legislation is to provide basic parameters for behaviour and clearly 
this task is more successful the more streamlined and straightforward that 
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legislation is, in accordance with a single, rationalised model of equalities law. 
As we have seen, this should also help to make the legislation more effective in 
its application. This is important in responding to often-made criticisms of the 
overly formal, 'tick box' nature of equality and diversity policies. 2) The 
recognition of socio-economic inequality as an important issue. Here we saw 
that the distinction between identity-based and socio-economic inequality 
begins to cut across (albeit to a limited extent) the distinction between two areas 
of government work: equality legislation, on the one hand, and social welfare 
policy on the other. While the two distinctions coincide in the earlier Equalities 
Review, the proposed socio-economic duty brings this type of inequality into the 
heart of equality legislation.122 However, as I've shown, the underlying logic that 
separates the two types of inequality is nonetheless maintained. 
 
                                                 
122
 According to Macnair (2010: 12), the fact that the 'most novel provisions' of the 2010 Equality 
Act relating to the socio-economic duty are set-out at the beginning of the Act 'far adrift' from the 
other, general equality, duty suggests that the government 'may have wished to give them some 
prominence, possibly at the expense of the logical ordering of the material'. 
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Chapter Seven: Class, Inequality and Diversity 
 
This chapter is concerned with equality and diversity from the point of view of 
discourses that take socio-economic or class inequality as their starting point. 
The two discourses in question relate to the issue in very different ways, 
however, partly reflecting the important difference between socio-economic 
inequality and class inequality, but also because the discourses are products of 
very different organisational aims. The TUC (Trades Union Congress), which I 
will look at first, is a class-based organisation to the extent that, as a 
confederation of trade unions, it can be said to represent workers: a specific 
group that exists in a relationship with employers and the state. As is to be 
expected – given the historical changes outlined in chapter three – the visibility 
of class inequality significantly declines over the years from the 1960s to the 
present day. At the same time – again unsurprisingly – the visibility of non-class 
inequalities increases. Dealing first with the decline of the idea of class conflict 
within the TUC discourse and secondly with the rise of diversity, I will try to 
bring out some of the complexities involved in the relationship between these 
two developments. 
 
In contrast, the second case study in this chapter – the New Labour 
government's social exclusion discourse – clearly has something more like 
socio-economic inequality as its central concern, rather than the interests of a 
specific group or class. This partly reflects the fact that – as I've already noted 
in, again, chapter three – New Labour tended to avoid using the terminology of 
class while in office;123 it also, at a deeper level, reflects the use of a distinction 
made between equal opportunity and substantive equality in which the latter is 
associated with an out-of-date Left. I look first at this distinction as well as the 
broader ideological context for the rise of social exclusion as a policy agenda. I 
then go on to look more closely at the way in which social exclusion is identified 
and how it is to be remedied, before, in the final section of the chapter, looking 
at the relationship between the social exclusion agenda and the equality and 
                                                 
123
 James Avis (2011: 84) points out that this did change somewhat in 2009 when the term 
reappeared in government publications. As I said in the previous chapter, renewed attention more 
generally was paid to issues of class and economic inequality towards the end of Labour's period in 
office. 
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diversity agenda. More precisely, I want to consider the important place that 
racial equality – usually associated with the latter – comes to occupy in the 
former. One report on how to reduce high levels of unemployment in certain 
areas – which I will look at in some detail – provides a particularly good 
example of this relationship in the context of concrete policy formulation, and 
allows a more detailed look at the distinction that I have drawn in this thesis 
between socio-economic and identity-based inequality. 
 
 
7.1 The Decline of Class Struggle 
 
As I've said, the TUC is the main confederation of trade unions in Britain. 
Founded in 1868, it describes itself as the 'voice of Britain at work' with, 
according to its website, 54 affiliated unions that represent just over six million 
workers between them. It seeks to secure not just a 'fair deal at work', but also 
'social justice at home and abroad'. Given this, as well as its historic links with 
social democratic ideology and the Labour party, it is perhaps not surprising that 
equality features heavily in its work. It is one of seven topics featured on their 
website (alongside: 'Economic Issues', 'Workplace Issues', 'International Issues' 
and so on) with a large amount of information available on the subject (TUC, 
2012). 
 
There is also a vast non-electronic literature available in the shape of reports, 
newsletters, leaflets and so on – certainly more than the other organisations I 
am looking at (with the possible exception of the New Labour government). This 
is mainly due to the nature of the TUC as a large umbrella organisation: its size 
and resources enable it to cover a huge number and variety of equality-related 
themes: domestic violence, recession reports, workers with mental health 
problems, monitoring sexuality in the workplace, combating the far right, racism 
at work, the gender pay gap, to name only a few. Also, while my other case 
study organisations are generally smaller, with a single, more consistent 
authorial voice, different perspectives are readily available in the TUC literature. 
Particularly relevant here are the separate groupings of workers organised in 
relation to the equality 'strands' (the different grounds of inequality): there are 
annual conferences for LGBT, disabled, black and female workers, along with 
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regular newsletters devoted to these areas. The fact that these different groups 
have been recognised, and have a strong presence within the TUC, suggests 
that the size of the literature on equality is also testament to the significant 
influence the idea of equality and diversity has had on the organisation. 
 
As has already been shown however, the meaning of equality has changed 
significantly over time. As with my study of the Fawcett Society, I paid particular 
attention within the TUC literature to these changes and it's no surprise to see 
similarities in both organisations. So, for example, when issues of race and 
gender inequality are dealt with in earlier texts we see the same importance 
attached to class in understanding and dealing with that inequality. In particular 
we can see that the idea of class struggle or class conflict has a central role. 
 
An example of this in the TUC texts is the portrayal of both racial and gender 
inequality as a divide-and-rule tactic employed against workers by both the 
government and employers. For instance, in a debate on equal pay for women 
at the 1969 TUC conference of women workers, one speaker argues that 
 
While the policy [the government of the day's Prices and Incomes policy] does not 
actually prohibit the abolition of cheap female rates, it implies that the achievement 
of equal pay must be within the ceiling for the industry. I think the majority of 
delegates here are well aware that this is one of the subtlest “divide and conquer” 
tactics that has been used against the working class for many a yearEIf it persists 
in its despicable efforts to divide the workers on this issue by saying that equal pay 
for women must come out of the pockets of their male colleagues, then the 
Government is implying that the men do not earn their wages but they have been 
subsidised by the women. There is a very impolite term for men who live on the 
earnings of women. Is this what the Government is now calling our male trade 
union colleagues? (TUC, 1969: 50) 
 
In an educational workbook on racism published in 1983 there is a similar 
understanding of racial inequality: '[r]acist attitudes among trade unionists serve 
toEswitch the blame for economic problems from policies of governments and 
employers to fellow workers' as well as 'weaken union organisation at the 
workplace through divide and rule' (TUC, 1983: 16). In both passages the idea 
of divide and rule ensures that gender and racial inequality, on the one hand, 
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and class conflict, on the other, are closely related phenomena: the former has 
a strategic role within the latter, enabling employers and the government to gain 
the upper hand. 
 
We also find in the earlier TUC texts the signs of a struggle over who will best 
represent the interests of the groups facing non-class inequalities: the trade 
unions on the one side, or employers and the government on the other. So, for 
example, we find arguments like this made by the then chairman of the TUC: 
 
This [is] one of the differences between the Government's incomes policy and the 
incomes policy of the Trades Union Congress. The Trades Union Congress gives 
priority to the claims of women, the Government does not. Not only that, there is 
some evidence to show that in the application of incomes policy the Government 
has one minimum standard for low-paid men and another minimum standard for 
low-paid women. It is within my own experience that women earning about £9 a 
week are not classified as low-paid workers. This certainly does not convince the 
trade union Movement that the Government is supersensitive to the considerable 
industrial disadvantage of working women (TUC, 1969: 43). 
 
Again, the 1983 workbook on racism contains similar sentiments: '[w]e cannot 
rely on government or employers to help achieve equality for black people'; the 
'background to these problems [of inequality faced by black people] lies in 
Britain's colonial past and the willingness of governments and employers to see 
black workers as a source of cheap labour' (TUC, 1983: 1). Two pages later: '[i]f 
members' racist views are ignored by the union, when it comes to opposing cuts 
in services, jobs or closures, workers will be divided. Members are likely to 
blame each other for the difficulties they face rather than those responsible – 
government and employers' (ibid: 3). Those that are responsible for racial 
inequality, so the argument goes, cannot be relied upon to help solve the 
problem. 
 
In later texts the idea of a clash of interests between workers and opponents is 
much harder to find, while the idea of a mutually beneficial partnership between 
the different agents is more visible. In relation to non-class inequalities this is 
reflected in a shift towards portraying the goal of equality for various groups as 
the outcome of a cooperative venture with government and business rather than 
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an aspect of the struggle between the TUC and their opponents. In a response 
to a government consultation on tackling race inequality, for example, it is 
stated that the TUC 'believes that trade unions are an important social partner in 
tackling discrimination in relation to access to work and in the workplace' (TUC, 
2009a: 8), and later on concern is expressed that the government document in 
question 
 
makes no mention of the important role that trade unions play in tackling race 
discrimination in the workplace. Our response to this consultation demonstrates the 
involvement and commitment of the trade union movement to working with 
Government as a major social partner in tackling problems of race discrimination in 
the labour market and wider society (ibid: 16). 
 
Even where the context of wider social and economic inequalities is alluded to 
in the later texts the idea of an antagonistic relationship, of social conflict, tends 
to be missing. For example, in response to the question 'Why tackle racism?' 
the TUC argue, in a later workbook on the issue published in 2000, that in a 
society 'which continues to have social and economic winners and losers, it is 
important to avoid approaches which lead to polarisation around racial identity, 
gender, skills or language as this helps to divide workersERacism saps the 
strength of union organisation, which needs unity to defend and improve jobs 
and conditions' (TUC, 2000: 9). So while in the earlier workbook the TUC had 
written that racism helped to 'switch the blame for economic problems from 
policies of governments and employers to fellow workers' here it is a, more 
neutral-sounding, 'society which continues to have social and economic winners 
and losers' that provides the context for racism. 
 
Of course, care must be taken not to draw too strong a conclusion without a 
more comprehensive study of the texts.124 It would no doubt be oversimplifying 
matters to contrast a militant, oppositional TUC in previous years with a 
completely tamed force in the present. There is, for instance, the glimpse of a 
more assertive stance in a 2008 regional survey of equality within trade unions. 
                                                 
124
 It should also be kept in mind that I am comparing texts with different speakers, goals and 
intended audiences – the language of an official response to a government consultation, for example, 
may vary with that of a speaker at a conference. The workbooks on racism are useful in this regard 
as they allow comparisons between texts over time with these other variables largely eliminated. 
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In the foreword to this text Martin Gould – the president of the Southern and 
Eastern Regional Council of the TUC (SERTUC) – argues that: 
 
Malcolm X once said, “Nobody can give you freedom. Nobody can give you equality 
and justice or anything", and he went on to say that "you (must) take it”Eultimately, 
we must not depend on the state, legislators, the courts, employers or HR 
departments to deliver equality at work and in society for us, we must secure our 
own agenda by force of argument, by organisation and by effective campaigning 
(SERTUC, 2008: 1).  
 
The business-focused variant of diversity, diversity management, has also not 
been received uncritically by the TUC. We saw in chapter five that it was at the 
TUC's Black Workers' conference that a motion was carried opposing this trend 
(a point I return to in the following section). 12 years later, an emergency motion 
carried at the 2009 conference opposed Gordon Brown's nationalist slogan, 
'British jobs for British workers', claiming it has 'no place in the trade union 
movement' and that it 'aids employers in dividing workers' (TUC, 2009b: 3). 
Here we see something of the 'divide and rule' argument that featured more 
prominently in earlier TUC texts. 
 
Despite the caution needed a clear change of tone is nonetheless noticeable, a 
shift that, as I've said, is unsurprising given the historical context of the decline 
of trade unionism from its height in the 1960s and 1970s to the present day. In 
their study of the changing relationship between social democratic parties and 
trade unions in Western Europe, Upchurch et al (2009: 96) describe the 
incoming New Labour government's approach to industrial relations in the 
changed neoliberal context, as well as the TUC's response. They note the 
attempt on the part of New Labour to 'encourage an ideological shift in thinking 
away from traditional adversarialism towards a consensus-based system of 
industrial relations'. This is clearly expressed in a quote taken from Tony Blair's 
introduction to a 1998 report, 'Fairness at Work': '[t]his White Paper is part of the 
Government's programme to replace the notion of conflict between employers 
and employees with the promotion of partnership' (ibid). Despite some concerns 
about the 'phraseology' used by Blair among trade union leaders, the new 
partnership model 'initially appealed' to the TUC. Upchurch et al argue that this 
reflected a 'certain strategic intent', on the part of the TUC, to 'once more be 
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seen as a legitimate actor both within society in general and with employers in 
particular' (ibid). 
 
This shift can also be registered within social democratic thought. Ruth Levitas 
has provided an analysis of Will Hutton's idea of 'stakeholding' (the recognition 
and inclusion of the different interest groups that have a 'stake' in an economic 
enterprise, beyond the shareholders). After noting that his general attempt to, 
using Hutton's words, 'achieve some proper balance between capital and 
labour' is resolutely not an attempt to revive 'the failures of British corporatism', 
Levitas writes that 
 
Corporatism here means formal tripartite consultation between employer 
organizations, trade unions and government. This rested on the assumption that 
trade unions existed to represent the interests of workers collectively, and that such 
collective interests were meaningful, real and legitimate. In stakeholding, the 
negotiation between the two sides of industry occurs at the level of the firm, where 
mandatory union representation on company boards would 'force the two sides of 
industry into a partnership'. But an important element in this representation is the 
assumption that workers have interests only as individuals, not as a collectivity, and 
it is these individual interests which unions exist to defend (Levitas, including quote 
from Hutton, 1998: 57). 
 
The crucial difference, then, between corporatism and more recent social 
democratic ideas is that in the former the working class was recognised as a 
collective identity, and this is a critical element, of course, to any notion of 
conflict or struggle between different social interests. 
 
Hutton (1995: 297) himself has explained that '[r]ather than see themselves as 
the embodiment of a Labour movement dedicated to the transformation of 
capitalism, they [trade unions] have started to redefine themselves as social 
partners in the management of capitalism' – they can still represent their 
members' interests 'but within the framework of a capitalist economy'. Does this 
not somewhat overplay the radicalism of the corporatist model however? Surely 
the point was that under corporatist arrangements a notion of class conflict, 
along with the collective identity on which it relies, was integrated into the 
'framework of a capitalist economy'; capitalism operated through giving the 
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working class a 'stake' in the industrial process. In this sense, the interesting 
aspect of Hutton's argument would be less the rejection of a collective working-
class identity in favour of the capitalist framework, than the fact that they are no 
longer deemed compatible – there is no possibility of adjusting the way in which 
that framework is reproduced such that collective working class interests can be 
legitimately expressed within it. What we can add to this analysis is the process 
described in the previous two chapters: the rise of diversity can be understood 
as a similar attempt to combine the recognition of group inequality with the 
'framework of a capitalist economy'. The difference, of course, is that the group 
recognised in this case is the non-class 'minorities' of equality and diversity (e.g. 
women, ethnic minorities, gay people and so on). 
 
 
7.2 The Rise of Diversity 
 
As with the Fawcett discourse, the 1980s is when we see the first calls for 
group-based equality policies, such as positive action, in order to accelerate the 
progress of equality. For example, a leaflet of 1982 on positive action states that 
the TUC Congress two years earlier 
 
carried a composite resolution which noted with concern that very little progress 
had been made towards equality for women at work and that there was a need for 
new strategies to establish genuine equality of opportunityEExpectations that 
employment for women would be on the same basis as for men were fuelled by the 
enactment of the Equal Pay Act in 1970 and the Sex Discrimination Act in 1975 
which were designed to achieve equality in pay and conditions, recruitment and 
promotion at work, and in society generally. However, while some progress has 
been made, it has not kept pace with these expectations and, in some areas, there 
are signs that the improvements which the legislation originally triggered off have 
been reversed (TUC, 1982: 2). 
 
Towards the end of the same decade, we see similar concerns expressed about 
the lack of progress in another workbook on racism published in 1988. Under 
the heading 'Getting worse' it is argued that the 
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employment position of black workers remains as bad and in some cases worse 
than when the first Race Relations Act was passed over twenty years ago. This is 
the conclusion of a report published in March 1988 by the Runnymede Trust. The 
report focuses on the failure to implement positive action policies in both the public 
and private sectors. Employers are not doing enough to train black workers and 
provide new job opportunities (TUC, 1988: 30). 
 
In both passages we find the recognition of a continuing, stubborn, possibly 
worsening inequality, requiring new positive action measures to help combat it. 
 
Again, as with the Fawcett texts, the idea of diversity appears after these 
concerns about the pace of change and the need to accelerate progress. 
According to my findings, the term appears earlier in the TUC discourse though: 
having scanned the Black Workers' conference motions for use of the term from 
1993 to 2002, 'diversity' first appears in 1995 when it is mentioned twice. There 
is also a peak in its use in 2000 with six mentions. In this context it is worth 
recalling the Schneider-Ross survey of organisations, mentioned in chapter five, 
that found that overall 48% of respondents had established equality and 
diversity as a business priority from 1997 onwards. In the same period, Erik 
Bleich (2003: 6-7) names 1997 as an 'especially pivotal year' in terms of 
European Union anti-racist activity, and in Britain 1999 sees the report of the 
Stephen Lawrence enquiry and, according to the Parekh Report (CFMEB, 2000: 
82), the point at which New Labour's initial colour-blind approach to social 
exclusion policy began to shift to a more race-conscious strategy (more on this 
below). Also, the Parekh Report – itself an important moment in the 
development of equality and diversity – was published the following year. The 
period between 1997 and 2000 is clearly key, then, in the rise of equality and 
diversity. 
 
Certainly by the time we get to the 2000s the term has become a central 
component of the TUC's equality discourse. For example, a report published in 
2002 on gay and lesbian rights argues that  
 
good employers now understand that equal treatment and the recognition of the 
diversity of our community, are not threats to business. Rather it is the case that 
fairness and justice at work, and policies that recognise and reflect the diversity of 
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the workforce and of the wider community are necessary to the success of any 
modern, progressive organisation. Organisations that fail to recruit, retain and 
promote the most talented people, regardless of the communities from which they 
come, are increasingly putting themselves at a serious disadvantage. To achieve a 
diverse workforce, to attract applications from an increasingly discerning workforce 
in a tight labour market, employers need actively to tackle discrimination. 
 
The policies reported here are the result of trade unions taking forward the interests 
of all their members, and of far-sighted organisations understanding that diversity is 
a strength, not a threat (TUC, 2002: 4). 
 
In a more recent report the TUC (2009c: 5) writes that the 'aim of unions, 
employers and government is to achieve a diverse and productive workforce 
reflecting the complex strands in today's society'. We also saw in chapter five 
that the TUC co-produced Talent not Tokenism with the CBI – a text that lays 
out the business case for diversity. In all three examples, then, we see not only 
the presence of diversity in the TUC discourse, but also the influence of the 
diversity management variant of equality and diversity. 
 
Perhaps the best demonstration of the arrival of diversity comes through 
comparing the earlier workbooks on racism produced in 1983 and 1988 with the 
later one published in 2000, in the wake of the Stephen Lawrence inquiry. We 
can see, for example, that while the term is more or less absent from the earlier 
workbooks,125 the very first aim of the later workbook is to 'show the positive 
contribution of diverse racial groups' (TUC, 2000: 5 – my emphasis).126 There is 
also an entire chapter entitled 'All Different – All Equal'. Even more clearly, the 
arrival of diversity is demonstrated by the difference between two otherwise 
identical sentences: in 1983 and 1988 the TUC (1983: 3, 1988: 6) state that 
'[r]acism breeds on views which play-up the differences between workers' 
(exactly the same wording is used in each book); compare this with the 2000 
                                                 
125
 The closest to a mention of diversity that I can find is a 'talking point' in the 1983 book that asks 
'[d]o your children get a chance at school to question racist views and tackle topics in a multi-
cultural way?' (TUC, 1983: 10). 
126
 The other three are: to 'raise awareness of how trade unions are helping to root out racism in the 
workplace', to 'give step by step help to union representatives and others to turn well-intended 
policies into meaningful action', and to 'encourage and inspire to help challenge and integrate 
equality principles into day to day activities and processes'. The last of these can also be seen to be 
influenced by diversity and the idea of integration or mainstreaming – as outlined in the previous 
two chapters. 
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workbook where it is written that: '[r]acism thrives on views which play up the 
differences between cultures and nationalities' (TUC, 2000: 9 – my emphasis). 
'Workers' as a group that racism divides has been replaced, then, with a 
number of different cultures. In 1983 and 1988 the following sentence is: 
'[d]ifferences in skin colour or beliefs are used to justify discrimination'. In the 
later workbook the following sentence is: '[m]yths and misinformation give 
negative and inaccurate views about people's beliefs and their way of life'. In 
the earlier discourse racism uses differences in beliefs to justify discrimination; 
in the later discourse the problem is the miscommunication between people 
defined by these different beliefs.  
 
More than in any of my other case study organisations, however, there is 
evidence that the passage of diversity to its current position of prominence in 
the TUC discourse has not been an entirely smooth one. We have already seen 
in chapter five the motion carried in the 1997 Black Workers' conference 
opposing the 'increasing trend' that seeks to 'replace existing equal opportunity 
policies and procedures with those titled managing diversity or mainstreaming'. 
The SERTUC President, Martin Gould, similarly cautions that 
 
since our previous survey [2004], what was once almost universally called 
'equalities' has evolved into 'equalities', 'diversity' and inclusion', which are not all 
the same thing. Where the new vocabulary denotes new best practice, unions are 
firm advocates of it. But the substitution of 'equalities' by 'diversity' can conceal a 
dilution of values and objectives, which unions will remain sensitive and alert to 
(SERTUC, 2008: 1). 
 
This point has also been made in research carried out by Greene et al (2005: 
187). In their comparative study of the reception of diversity management 
among unions in the UK and Denmark, the authors record that British trade 
unionists 'consistently revealed scepticism or even outright hostility' towards 
diversity management – a level of opposition not found among their Danish 
counterparts. Diversity management, for British activists, is 'typically perceived 
as a purely managerialist intervention, in contrast to equal opportunities which 
include a “grass-roots” dimension'. In particular, the inherent individualism and 
focus on a business case in diversity management can be seen to be in conflict 
with traditional trade union values. In a TUC official's own words: there is 'a 
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suspicion that managing diversity is all about individualsErather than the 
commonality of disadvantage that some groups can experienceEThe concept 
that we still cling toEis overcoming disadvantage and getting rid of 
discrimination [which] is not something that employers feel comfortable with' 
(ibid).127 
 
It is also worth highlighting evidence of tension between unions and 
management over the issue of diversity from the opposing perspective. A close 
read of Ross and Schneider's book, From Equality to Diversity, gives a clear 
idea of where unions stand in the thinking of the authors: as necessary partners 
in the process of change (where they are formally recognised), but with 
nonetheless inherent conservative tendencies that could hold progress up. The 
opening lines of the introduction to the book quote a trade union official from 
1919, W.A. Appleton, arguing against the idea of equality between men and 
women. The authors then comment: 'we have come some way since 
1919EEven the TUCEset up an Equal Rights Department, although admittedly 
not until 1988' (Ross and Schneider, 1992: xiii – my emphasis). Elsewhere in 
the book the authors comment that it 'should not be surprising' if unions are 
'informally resistant' to equal opportunity policies as 'shop stewards are often 
the defenders of “custom and practice” and the “status quo”'.128 
 
Again, it is the individualism of diversity management that clearly conflicts with 
the trade union tradition of collective action: 
 
Paying people in a way that reflects their contribution to the organisation is easy to 
say but difficult to do. Yet, it lies at the heart of the employment contract – an 
individual sells his or her labour in return for particular rewards – and is increasingly 
important as the United Kingdom moves towards a know-how economy. 
Collectivisation appears to be a dying force, as even traditional manufacturing 
workers are embracing individual contracts, because they believe that this can 
                                                 
127
 In another article, Kirton and Greene also make the point that where there is an explicit use of the 
diversity management discourse by trade unions (which as I have shown is quite common in 
contemporary TUC texts) this can be a sign that a pragmatic, strategic step has been taken, rather 
than evidence of a complete ideological acceptance of the diversity management approach: '[w]e 
have accepted…that if we're going to get anywhere in talking about equality, we have to talk about 
the business case' (Kirton and Greene quoting a TUC official, 2004: 17). 
128
 Middle managers – who practise 'passive resistance' – are also marked out as a potentially 
conservative block to equal opportunity policies. The answer to both cases of resistance: 'people 
need to be able to see how equal opportunities can help them' (Ross and Schneider, 1992: 206). 
 170 
more accurately reward them for their contributionEAs far as equal opportunities is 
concerned, this is a healthy trend. If equal opportunities is about ensuring each 
individual is properly rewarded (and what else can it mean?) then individual 
contracts must be the best way of doing this. Collective bargaining obscures 
differences in contribution. The outcome is not decided through any particularly 
logical argument but simply expresses the current state of the power balance 
between employers and employees. Unions have not been particularly assiduous in 
looking after the interests of women and minorities (Ross and Schneider, 1992: 
161-2). 
 
Compare this with the TUC discourse where there is a 'need for concerted and 
co-ordinated action by government and also by trade unions through collective 
bargaining to eliminate race and sex discrimination in the labour market and in 
society' (TUC, 2006: 14). For Ross and Schneider, then, we can see that 
collective bargaining conflicts with the principle of individual merit and the 
individual differences contributed by employees. Also, as suggested in the final 
sentence, they draw a link between trade union collectivism and an alleged lack 
of interest in minority issues. For the TUC, on the other hand, equal opportunity 
is something to be achieved through the practice of collective bargaining. 
 
We can see in contemporary texts, then, evidence of a struggle over who will 
best represent the interests of minority groups that, as we saw above, was a 
feature of the older TUC texts. The question I want to raise in the rest of this 
section is the precise change that diversity brings about in relation to this 
tension. More specifically, are the signs of conflict that we see in the later texts 
over the idea of diversity itself, or rather the particular way in which that term is 
used in the diversity management discourse? In other words, is diversity flexible 
enough to be rearticulated within a class-focused discourse, or is the dominant 
neoliberal version of the concept the only one available? There are two points to 
make here that relate to this issue and, in particular, the question of identity. 
 
First of all, take the quote from the trade union official cited above: there is 'a 
suspicion that managing diversity is all about individualsErather than the 
commonality of disadvantage that some groups can experience' (quoted in 
Greene et al, 2005: 187 – my emphasis). What groups are the TUC talking 
about here? It is probably most common for criticism of the individualism of 
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diversity management to be made from the point of view of those politicised 
group identities generally associated with equality and diversity (in particular, 
women and ethnic minorities). What about 'workers' as a collective category 
though? This is an identity that is clearly visible in older TUC texts (and, indeed, 
in older Fawcett texts – as we saw in chapter four), but which, as I've argued, 
tends to disappear in contemporary equality discourse. As is to be expected, 
along with the decline of class struggle in the later texts there is also an 
observable lack of reference to a working class identity. However, while this 
decline of class may accompany the rise of diversity, it is not necessarily an 
effect of diversity. 
 
Another way of looking at the question would be to ask if there is textual 
evidence that suggests that it would be possible to combine the idea of diversity 
with the promotion of a working class identity. A motion carried by the SERTUC 
Regional Council in October 2006 suggests that this may be possible, at least in 
discursive terms: 
 
Our combined regions are the most ethnically, culturally and socially diverse in the 
United Kingdom. We believe that racism and fascism will only divide worker from 
worker using our diversity as a weapon to attack us. On the other hand, we believe 
our diversity is a strength and a cause for celebration (Unionlearn, 2007: 38). 
 
One argument against the possibility of combining diversity with a working class 
identity would be that diversity makes any cohesive identity impossible. 
However, there is an interplay within the texts not only between diversity and 
equality, but also diversity and cohesion (in the sense of a cohesive identity that 
contains diversity). While we see the attempt to combine cohesion with diversity 
most commonly in relation to a national identity (a project I will explore in detail 
in the following chapter), what the above quote suggests is that it may be 
possible to combine diversity with a cohesive class identity. 
 
The second point follows on from the first: it is possible to find an articulation of 
diversity with a working-class identity in discourses that stand much further to 
the left of the TUC in terms of a clear rejection of neoliberalism. For example, in 
his recent book on class, which argues that the working-class has been 
systematically 'demonized' and neglected as a key accompaniment to the 
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growing inequality in society over the last few decades, Owen Jones (2011: 
101-3) claims that the pursuit of multiculturalism, in the context of the neoliberal 
abandonment of class politics, has meant that disadvantaged identities are 
constructed solely along ethnic rather than class lines. Echoing the analysis of 
the Runnymede publication that we saw in chapter four, he criticises the Labour 
party's response to the growing concerns about immigration in working-class 
communities in recent years: '[r]ather than focusing on the economic ills shared 
by the working class of all creeds and colours, New Labour redefined them as 
cultural problems affecting the white working class. The white working class 
became one marginalized ethnic minority among others' (ibid: 103). However, 
this analysis is combined by Jones with a defence of multiculturalism and the 
idea of diversity at its heart: '[w]e are rightly encouraged to embrace and 
celebrate ethnic minority identity, not least as a counterweight to continued 
entrenched racism' (ibid: 102). 
 
Perhaps surprisingly given his earlier critique of multiculturalism, Sivanandan (in 
an interview given in 2006 with the Socialist Workers Party's newspaper) 
similarly seeks to defend the idea of diversity. He acknowledges the 
'weaknesses in what multiculturalism became', distinguishing between 
'multiculturalism' and 'ethnicism', with the latter defined as a focus on the 
cultural divisions between disadvantaged ethnic minority communities rather 
than what they had in common (this is the focus of his critique that I cited in 
chapter three). Nonetheless multiculturalism, according to Sivanandan, should 
be defended from its right wing, neoliberal critics: '[t]oday the forces of 
globalisation are attempting to culturally flatten us and force us all to adopt a 
single culture – that of the free market. Multiculturalism is a barrier to this 
process because it legitimises the idea of diversity'. This analysis coincides with 
the job of the left to build a 'new working class movement, one that involves all 
those who have only recently arrived on these shores' (Socialist Worker Online, 
2006). 
 
My purpose here is neither to defend nor criticise this ideological move, but 
simply to show that it is a possibility. In other words, it seems that what I have 
called the equality and diversity framework can be detached from the neoliberal 
ideology with which it is most associated and reattached to a class-based 
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ideology. If with the TUC it might be difficult to distinguish their acceptance of 
diversity from their attempt to be a social partner with employers and 
government, this is clearly not the case with those explicitly anti-neoliberal 
discourses that also accept the idea of diversity. What this suggests, then, is 
that any answer to the question posed above (of the precise relationship 
between the decline of class and the rise of diversity) has to take into account 
the flexible nature of the equality and diversity framework and its combination 
with different political ideologies. 
 
 
7.3 Social Exclusion and Inequality 
 
While we can trace the effects of neoliberalism on the TUC discourse, allowing 
a useful comparison of texts before and after the neoliberal transformation of 
British society, the New Labour government's social exclusion agenda is a 
relatively recent innovation in public policy. The agenda became a central part 
of the New Labour project with the establishment in 1997 of the Social 
Exclusion Unit (SEU) – an inter-departmental body that, as with the Women and 
Equality Unit (WEU), would work across government departments to 'develop 
integrated and sustainable approaches to the problems of the worst housing 
estates, including crime, drugs, unemployment, community breakdown, and bad 
schools' (Social Exclusion Unit report quoted by Percy-Smith, 2000: 2).129 As 
with the WEU, the cross-cutting nature of the SEU makes it difficult to pick out 
specific departments responsible for the discourse, though it's worth noting that 
the unit was based at the Cabinet Office, reflecting the high priority given to its 
work by the government. I have also again taken only a small number of these 
reports. The aim – as with the other case studies more generally – is not to gain 
a comprehensive knowledge of this particular discourse, but rather to use it as a 
reference point in understanding the broader development of equality and 
diversity in Britain. 
 
As a policy agenda, social exclusion is a response to the familiar problems of 
poverty, inequality and disadvantage. Its specificity stems from the term 
                                                 
129
 The work of the SEU is in relation to England only – the other countries in the UK have their 
own devolved arrangements. 
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'exclusion'. Why should the problem be understood in this way and, conversely, 
why is the goal 'inclusion'? Those critical of the concept, or at least the way in 
which the Labour Party have adopted it, often draw a contrast between 
exclusion and inequality, arguing that the rise of the former replaces the 
previous social-democratic concern with the latter. Ruth Lister, for example, 
describes it is as an 'important paradigm shift in thinking about the welfare 
state'; she cites, as evidence of this, Will Hutton, a supporter of the agenda, 
who argues that underpinning his notion of 'stakeholding' is the idea that (in his 
words) social inclusion, not equality, 'should be the overriding objective for the 
contemporary left' (quoted in Lister, 1998: 215). Janet Newman (2001: 151-4) 
also describes a shift from equality to inclusion and argues that social exclusion 
represents an attempt to separate poverty and economic inequality from the 
'politics of social rights and redistribution' (ibid: 151-2).130 From a historical 
perspective, Janie Percy-Smith (2000: 1-2) – in locating the origins of the term 
in French social policy in the 1980s and then, more broadly, as a goal of the 
European Union – similarly describes the way a concern with exclusion began 
to replace a concern with poverty among European elites. A critic might argue, 
then, that a concern with exclusion is simply a way of avoiding the more 
substantive issues of inequality and poverty. Dealing with the 'worst housing 
estates' is, in this sense, simply a palliative measure that detracts attention from 
the injustices of mainstream society that the excluded are to be integrated 
into.131 
 
The suggestion that the social exclusion agenda may detract attention from a 
more substantive approach to inequality brings us to another way in which 
equality is conceptualised in New Labour ideology. This is based on a 
distinction between equality of outcome and equality of opportunity, in which the 
former is rejected as an outmoded element of old left ideology in favour of the 
                                                 
130
 What Newman doesn't do – as far as I know – is highlight the link between this separation and an 
application of the 'politics of social rights and redistribution' to groups defined by their non-
economic 'identity'. This is what I try to do in this chapter, though, as we will see, this is a complex 
issue. 
131
 Levitas (1998: 7) writes that social exclusion as a term is 'intrinsically problematic…The solution 
implied by a discourse of social exclusion is a minimalist one: a transition across the boundary to 
become an insider rather than an outsider in a society whose structural inequalities remain largely 
uninterrogated'. 
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latter (Lister, 1998: 216-7).132 In a debate with Roy Hattersley on this shift in 
Labour party thinking, Gordon Brown explained that New Labour rejected 
equality of outcome as 'neither desirable or feasible, imposing uniformity and 
stifling human potential' (Lister's words, ibid: 217); in contrast, equality of 
opportunity is favoured that would be 'recurrent, lifelong and comprehensive' 
(Brown quoted in ibid). If the idea of social exclusion in some sense implies an 
acceptance of historically high levels of inequality – as critics have suggested – 
we can see why the opportunity versus outcome distinction may be a useful one 
in helping to legitimise social exclusion as a policy agenda. By attempting to 
shift the meaning of equality towards a focus on opportunities, rather than the 
actual distribution of resources, the argument can be made that social exclusion 
does not replace the goal of equality but rather is partnered with a more 
sophisticated version of the idea – a version that allows 'human potential' full 
reign through enabling equal opportunity rather than stifling that potential in 
favour of crude social engineering. 
 
The aim so far has to been to place the social exclusion agenda within the 
broader context of New Labour ideology; I will now consider the social exclusion 
discourse itself in more detail. In particular, what constitutes social exclusion? 
How, in other words, is it to be identified in society? 
 
In answer to this question, a commonly used metaphor within the discourse is 
that of a 'cycle'. The term is understood in two ways. On the one hand it refers 
to a cycle in people's lives in which various problems accumulate: 
 
Social exclusion is about more than income poverty. It is a shorthand term for what 
can happen when people or areas face a combination of linked problems such as 
unemployment, discrimination, poor skills, low incomes, poor housing, high crime, 
bad health and family breakdown. These problems are linked and mutually 
reinforcing so that they can create a vicious cycle in people's lives (SEU, 2004: 3). 
 
In other words social exclusion describes a process in which different problems 
begin to accumulate in people's lives and reinforce one another, thereby gaining 
                                                 
132
 These two conceptualisations of equality in New Labour ideology – the distinction between social 
inclusion and exclusion and that between equality of outcome and opportunity – are taken from 
Callinicos (2000: 38-41). 
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a significance that taken on their own they may have lacked. The idea of a 
'vicious cycle' suggests that this process serves to trap people, excluding them 
from the opportunities that exist in mainstream society. Two particular points in 
this passage should be highlighted here – both of which I will return to below: 1) 
the space in which these problems accumulate is understood not only in relation 
to individual lives but also geographical areas; 2) as the passage makes clear, 
the problems that accumulate are not only economic ones in the sense of a lack 
of wealth or resources – in particular, discrimination is included in the list. 
 
The second meaning of 'cycle' refers to what the same report calls the 
'intergenerational transmission of social exclusion' (ibid: 11): '[p]overty and 
social exclusion can also pass from one generation to the next. For example, 
experiencing poverty in childhood and having parents who did not gain 
qualifications at school or college are powerful influences on a child's life, often 
continuing to affect their life chances as they get older' (ibid: 3). Here the 
cyclical effect of disadvantage refers to the way in which a child born into a 
family affected by social exclusion is then more likely to be themselves socially 
excluded, who then, in turn, will pass this disadvantage on to their children, and 
so on. As an earlier report puts it: 
 
The key to tackling disadvantage in the future is the eradication of child poverty. 
Children who grow up in disadvantaged families generally do less well at school, 
and are more likely to suffer unemployment, low pay and poor health in adulthood. 
This poverty of opportunity is then more likely to be experienced by the next 
generation of children. Breaking this cycle is at the heart of our strategy for tackling 
poverty and social exclusion. That is why the Prime Minister has made it our aim to 
create a fairer society, within the next two decades, in which no child lives in 
poverty. We need to break the cycle of deprivation, to stop it being transmitted 
through generations (Department of Social Security, 1999: 5). 
 
We can see, then, that a 'cycle' names a qualitative transformation of inequality 
from something that occurs naturally, as a result of freeing human potential and 
creativity, to an unnatural blockage that reproduces itself in individual lives, 
geographical areas or across generations. It marks the point where the formal 
equality promised by the system – the opportunity everybody has to succeed 
regardless of the social conditions from which they originate – fails to occur. In 
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other words, as long as people in your area or different generations in your 
family are able to do well inequalities can be justified. It is only if this inequality 
begins to take on a clear pattern in one of these dimensions (i.e. geographically 
or generationally) that we might then have a case of unjustifiable disadvantage 
that needs to be targeted. 
 
 
7.4 Social Exclusion and Diversity 
 
What does all this have to do with equality and diversity? The latter could be 
said to represent a third way in which equality is understood in New Labour 
ideology (alongside the inclusion/exclusion and opportunity/outcome 
distinction). How these different understandings of the idea interact is the 
question I want to consider in the rest of this chapter. As mentioned above, the 
Parekh Report records a relatively early shift in the government's position on the 
issue of social exclusion, departing from a 'generally colour-blind approach' only 
two years after New Labour first assumed power. Three government documents 
are cited as evidence of this, published between late 1999 and the summer of 
2000, all of which deal with the issue of race equality as a specific aspect of 
social exclusion policy. The point the Parekh Report makes, in arguing strongly 
in favour of this shift, is not simply that, as has already been mentioned, 
discrimination should be recognised as one of the problems that may combine 
to produce social exclusion, or, in a related sense, that disproportionate 
numbers of the socially excluded are from disadvantaged identity-based groups. 
Rather, from the report's point of view, it should be explicitly recognised that 
achieving the aims of social exclusion will not necessarily help to remove 
identity-based disadvantage if the 'colour-blind approach' is not transcended. In 
other words, a colour-blind approach to social exclusion makes it possible for 
the 'specific objectives [of the social exclusion agenda] to be achieved but for 
inequalities between Asian, black and Irish people and the rest of the population 
to widen' (CFMEB, 2000: 82). 
 
The question raised here concerns the, for want of a better term, 'vantage point' 
from which the overlap between social exclusion and ethnicity is seen. The 
'colour-blind' perspective criticised by the Parekh Report is that which sees high 
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numbers of ethnic minority people among the socially excluded as a product of 
the same dynamic that produces social exclusion more generally, so that race 
equality will be dealt with simply through reducing social exclusion.133 The 
opposing, 'colour-conscious', perspective is to see high numbers of socially 
excluded ethnic minority people as a product of ethnic disadvantage – 
disadvantage that affects all in the ethnic group, including the many that are not 
socially excluded. As it is put by one of the three government documents cited 
by the Parekh Report: 
 
Minority ethnic social exclusion is complex and varies according to the economic, 
social, cultural and religious backgrounds of the particular people concerned. This 
complexity is not always understood or appreciated, partly because there is limited 
data available about different minority ethnic groups. But there is sufficient data to 
demonstrate that people from minority ethnic communities disproportionately 
experience various aspects of social exclusion...This chapter...deliberately focuses 
on problems faced by minority ethnic communities, but it should be borne in mind 
that many people from minority ethnic communities experience few, if any, of these 
problems (SEU, 2000: 17). 
 
Similarly, from an earlier report: '[e]thnic minority disadvantage cuts across all 
aspects of deprivation. Taken as a whole, ethnic minority groups are more likely 
than the rest of the population to live in poor areas, be unemployed, have low 
incomes, live in poor housing, have poor health, and be the victims of crime' 
(SEU, 1998: 30 – my emphasis). It is this shift of perspective, from which the 
same phenomenon (in this case, the overlap between exclusion and ethnicity) is 
viewed, that is critical to the rise of equality and diversity. It is this which enables 
the counter-argument to those critics of multiculturalism who argue that 
multiculturalism assumes that all members of ethnic minority groups are 
disadvantaged (and that conversely all members of the majority are 
advantaged). Rather, what multicultural policies assume is simply that 'taken as 
a whole' minority groups are disadvantaged. 
 
We get a good view of how this idea (the 'colour-conscious' perspective) is 
incorporated into the functioning of the social exclusion discourse if we consider 
another of the three documents mentioned by the Parekh Report: Jobs for All: 
                                                 
133
 See Brian Barry's (2001b: 52-3) discussion of this issue in his critique of the Parekh Report. 
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National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal. In her foreword Tessa Jowell, 
the minister of what was then the Department for Education and Employment 
(DfEE), states that the report 
 
has been considering how best to ensure that the delivery of Government labour 
market policies helps jobless people in deprived neighbourhoods and from ethnic 
minority backgrounds into work. 
 
The Government is taking forward the most ambitious programme of labour market 
reform we have seen to enable people to move from welfare into work – a 
programme which the PAT
134
 endorses. But in doing this, which will have benefits 
across the labour market, we must not ignore the inequalities that currently exist. 
People from ethnic minority backgrounds and people in deprived neighbourhoods 
have much less good chances in the labour market than the rest of the population. 
They have lower rates of employment and higher rates of unemployment. This is 
unacceptable (DfEE, 1999: ii). 
 
In response to this problem, the remit of the report is to: 'reduce the difference 
between levels of worklessness in poor neighbourhoods and the national 
average', and 'within that to reduce the disproportionate unemployment rates for 
people from ethnic minorities' (ibid: 7). 
 
The second chapter of the report continues in a similar vein: '[o]pportunities in 
the labour market are unequal. Your chances of having a job depend markedly 
on where you live and on your ethnic background. So do your chances of 
remaining unemployed if you lose your job or if you fail to get one on leaving 
education and training' (ibid : 14). After going on to look at the evidence for, 
what is termed, 'geographical' and 'racial' inequality, the report concludes: 
 
In short, opportunities to work and prosper in our society are strongly influenced by 
where you live and by your ethnic origin. No one would agree to play a game with 
loaded dice. But, as things stand, life chances are heavily loaded for people from 
some areas and from some ethnic backgrounds. We must now act to change that 
(ibid : 20). 
                                                 
134
 PAT stands for Policy Action Team. 18 PAT's were set-up by the government involving 
personnel from different government departments as well as non-governmental experts and those 
with experience on the ground. The aim was to fill in the gaps in the government's overall social 
exclusion strategy by focusing attention on specific cross-cutting issues. The report I am looking at 
here is the report of the PAT on jobs. 
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In these passages we can see not only the incorporation of the diversity 
perspective in viewing unequal employment opportunities in terms of race, but 
also some of the other issues that I have discussed above in relation to the 
social exclusion discourse. For the remainder of this chapter I want to look at 
three particular points in more detail. 
 
First of all, it is clear from the passages just cited that there is a recognition of 
inequality in dealing with the particular problem focused on in this report, 
together with an aim to reduce unequal outcomes. In other words, there is a 
recognition of what might be called the failure of formal equality: that the rules of 
the game while appearing fair, are, in fact, unfair (the dice are 'loaded'). This 
means, in the context of this report, that the aim is a substantive reduction of 
unequal rates of employment, not merely a removal of unfair barriers. Of 
course, this is a familiar idea in relation to equality and diversity and, as I have 
shown in the previous two chapters, it is one that has become increasingly 
accepted over the years. Here, though, we see the same idea applied to socio-
economic inequality. 
 
The second notable feature of the report is the manner in which geography acts 
as a way of understanding socio-economic inequality, such that the inequality of 
people in poor and deprived neighbourhoods is understood as 'geographical 
inequality'. In fact, this is quite a common feature of the equality and diversity 
literature more generally. Take this passage from the final report of the 
Equalities Review (2007: 33), for example: 'on the simple measure of income 
inequality, some parts of the country have fared much worse than others. 
Inequality and the distribution of disadvantage still show distinct geographical 
patterns'. Two years later, in justifying the new socio-economic duty (as 
discussed in the previous chapter), the government claimed that 
 
We know that inequality does not just come from your gender or ethnicity; your 
sexual orientation or your disability; your age, or your religion or belief. Overarching 
and interwoven with these specific forms of disadvantage is the persistent 
inequality of social class – your family background or where you were born 
(Government Equalities Office, 2009a: 9). 
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Here it is more specifically class, not socio-economic inequality, that is 
understood in geographical terms. What is also noticeable in the latter quote is 
that 'family background' acts as a second way of understanding this type of 
inequality. This brings to mind the discussion above of how social exclusion is 
identified, and the two ways in which it can take a supra-individual (i.e. social) 
form: disadvantage can be 'transmitted' both geographically and generationally, 
creating 'cycles' that serve to trap people, preventing them from accessing 
opportunities in society. Geography, in the context of this report then, is a way 
in which inequalities in employment rates can be recognised as significant and 
tangible; it helps mark the points in society where 'natural' inequality135 
becomes unnatural and thereby the legitimate target of social policy. 
Understanding inequality in geographical terms also crucially differs from the 
way in which inequality is understood as a consequence of identity-based group 
membership. 
 
This takes us to the third notable feature of the 'Jobs for All' report, where we 
see the incorporation of the diversity perspective discussed above: the clear 
distinction and separation between two types of inequality – socio-
economic/geographical, on the one hand, and identity-based/racial, on the 
other. Interestingly, the separate nature of the two inequalities is portrayed as 
less an empirical finding, and more a way of structuring the research to begin 
with: '[a]t its first meeting the PAT agreed that it wouldElook separately at the 
causes of high unemployment in poor neighbourhoods and among people from 
ethnic minority backgrounds and at the best ways of reducing unemployment in 
both cases' (DfEE, 1999: 8). On the following page: the team 'decided that it 
was important to look separately at the reasons for the higher rates of 
unemployment experienced by people from ethnic minority backgrounds' (ibid: 9 
– my emphasis). The report – as far as I could see – does not say what the 
reason was for this separation or why it was felt to be so important; it has the 
character of an unquestioned assumption structuring the way in which the 
report is carried out. 
 
                                                 
135
 'Income inequality in itself need not be disturbing or surprising in a dynamic economy if matched 
by equality of opportunity to move up the economic scale' (DfEE, 1999: 22). 
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The report goes on to list four reasons for why 'people living in low 
employment/high unemployment neighbourhoods and people from ethnic 
minority backgrounds fail to secure the jobs that exist': firstly, the lack of skills in 
deprived areas, poor formal qualifications and low levels of self-confidence, 
commitment, self-discipline etc; secondly, the inability to match workers with 
employers; thirdly, the fact that many people 'regard the certainty of benefit as 
preferable to the potentially higher but more risky (as they see it) rewards of 
work'. The fourth reason specifically relates to ethnic minority people: '[n]either 
qualifications, nor geography explain why people from ethnic minority 
backgrounds do less well in the labour market' leaving discrimination as an 
'explanatory factor'. This means 'employers are setting on one side employable 
people who could add value to their businesses because they come from ethnic 
minority backgrounds' (ibid: 24-28 – I have rearranged the order that these 
reasons appear in the text). Only the fourth cause then, relating specifically to 
ethnic minorities, involves unjust treatment and inequality in the form of 
discrimination, and it is clearly this term, discrimination, that is important in 
distinguishing the two types of inequality. 
 
In relation to this issue of discrimination we see an interesting way in which the 
two types of inequality are not so easily distinguished in the report: according to 
the report all people from deprived neighbourhoods face discrimination not just 
ethnic minorities. Significantly, this is mentioned not in the fourth, but in the 
second cause of unemployment (as listed above): the 'lack of fully effective 
mechanisms for building bridges between employers and employable, but 
jobless, people in deprived neighbourhoods'. The report notes that the 
 
reasons varied for these failures to link people without jobs to jobs without 
peopleEIn many cases employers lacked confidence that people from the areas 
concerned would meet their needs and decided not to take the risk of recruiting 
from them. In effect, employers were sifting by area or “red-lining” deprived 
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 As emphasised, this type of discrimination appears here as a fairly common practice, although it 
should be noted that this finding is downplayed in a later chapter: '[w]e found some evidence of 
discrimination based on a person's post code or the particular estate on which someone lived. This 
was not a universal practice by employers but does occur in some areas of the country' (DfEE, 1999: 
91). 
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We've already seen above that discrimination is one of a 'combination of linked 
problems' that can cause social exclusion. Here we see, though, that this 
discrimination is not necessarily linked to one of the 'protected characteristics', it 
is clearly also a feature of geographic/socio-economic inequality. 
 
In the previous chapter we saw the Labour government's Solicitor General, Vera 
Baird, while defending the separation of socio-economic and identity-based 
inequality in the 2010 Equality Act, also acknowledge that people may be 
discriminated against because of their 'socio-economic status'. We also saw 
that for Baird, while the existence of this kind of discrimination is recognised, it 
is not a cause of the unequal situation in the way that it is for identity-based 
disadvantage. However, while this seems like a straightforward proposition it 
should be pointed out that, within the terms of the discourse that I have been 
describing so far (i.e. aside from the question of its empirical validity), this 
proposition leads us into far boggier ground than might at first be thought. This 
is because, as described in the previous chapter, the meaning of 'discrimination' 
has been transformed over the years. Much of what now goes under the term in 
relation to identity-based groups is indirect discrimination, and, as we saw, this 
means looking for the source of inequality in underlying cultures and institutions 
rather than in individual interactions. Conversely, while it may be obvious that 
discrimination is not the cause of socio-economic inequality, it should be kept in 
mind that what is meant by the term in this context is solely direct discrimination 
– i.e. it does not include how a group may be disadvantaged in relation to these 
same underlying social structures. 
 
Furthermore, as we saw with the arrival of the public duties and the shift from 
discrimination to equalities legislation, the general trajectory of the law runs 
counter to Baird's characterisation of discrimination as the defining cause of 
identity-based disadvantage. Another way of putting this is that it is the focus on 
a more substantive, material type of inequality that defines identity-based 
inequality, in contrast to socio-economic inequality. Here we join up with the 
distinction between formal and substantive equality that has already been noted 
as a feature of New Labour thinking about equality (in the guise of an opposition 
between opportunity and outcome). If we return to the report we can see a good 
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example of this distinction in the different targets set for the amelioration of 
geographical and racial inequality respectively: 
 
We shall never altogether eliminate the regional and local variations in rates of 
employment and unemployment which stem from differing patterns of employment 
and the differing economic impacts to which they are subject. A dynamic economy 
will lead to relative imbalances between regions and, within regions, between areas 
as industries wax and wane. At ward level, high unemployment and low 
employment rates may reflect a tendency for people to move out as and when they 
secure a job. The important thing is that the balance should not become 
permanently tilted against particular areas (DfEE, 1999: 32). 
 
The report then recommends halving the percentage point differential between 
employment rates in deprived neighbourhoods and the national average. For 
racial inequality, however, the report states that in the 'case of people from 
ethnic minority backgrounds the PAT believes that our national aspiration can 
be straightforwardly stated: it should be to eliminate inequalities in employment 
and unemployment rates between people from ethnic backgrounds and the rest 
of the population' (ibid: 34-35). We can see then that for geographical 
inequality, differences in employment rates are only a problem, an inequality to 
be remedied, when these differences become concretised in particular areas – 
when the natural dynamism of the economy fails, and relative imbalances 
become permanent imbalances. This contrasts sharply with racial inequality 
where any difference in employment rates is understood as a problematic 





These three features of 'Jobs for All' – the recognition of inequality and the need 
to adjust outcomes in order to produce formal equality, the understanding of this 
inequality in geographical terms, and the distinction drawn between 
geographical and racial inequality – all reflect the broader themes that can be 
                                                 
137
 It should be pointed out that differences of age, qualifications and geographical residence are 
taken into account. The goal, properly stated, is that 'people from ethnic minority backgrounds 
should be as likely to be employed and as unlikely to be unemployed as the rest of the local 
population with the same level of qualification and of the same age' (DfEE, 1999: 35). 
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found in the social exclusion discourse in the context of a concrete policy 
problem. What is particularly useful to find, in relation to the argument running 
throughout this thesis, is a more detailed look at the discursive separation of 
socio-economic and identity-based inequality that accompanies the increasing 
presence of equality and diversity issues within the social exclusion agenda. 
What we can see is that the separation has less to do with the particular 
problems faced by those who are unequal (socio-economic inequality includes 
discrimination, identity-based inequality includes poverty), and more to do with a 
difference in the outcomes sought: complete group equality in response to 
identity-based inequality, reduced inequality in response to socio-economic 
inequality. 
 
There is another way of putting this that focuses on the relationship between 
inequality and group identity – an issue that also lies at the heart of the 
changing nature of the TUC discourse. Both types of inequality have, at source, 
the same fundamental problem: the failure of formal equality to guarantee 
individuals opportunities in society. Where they differ, however, is how to 
respond to this problem: socio-economic inequality focuses attention on how to 
prevent inequality from gaining a social presence. In other words, the central 
challenge is how to stop the 'transmission' of disadvantage between individuals 
(as it is put in the social exclusion discourse) such that inequality becomes 
embedded in particular localities or passed on from parent to child. In policy 
terms, as we have seen, this means interrupting generational and geographical 
cycles through, for example, child poverty initiatives and sure start centres on 
the one hand, and area-based regeneration schemes on the other. In relation to 
unemployment levels in Jobs for All, we have seen that halving the differences 
between areas was deemed to be the quantitative reduction necessary to 
prevent this transmission from taking place. To respond to identity-based 
inequality, in contrast, means to recognise the social reality of inequality as 
'manifested' (to use a term of Baird's) in particular groups, and then seek to 
equalise the position of that group in society by bringing it up to the level of a 
comparatively advantaged group. In the report just analysed the aim is 




In contrast, what we find in earlier TUC texts is a response to inequality that 
differs from both of these options. Like the examples from the Fawcett texts 
cited in chapter four, the working class is a recognised identity requiring 
something of the substantive, group-based gains that we find promoted in 
contemporary equality and diversity discourse. However it has an identity rooted 
in the economy rather than the various 'protected characteristics' of race, 
gender, sexuality etc, and this serves to prevent class from being properly 
included in the equality and diversity agenda.138 We also found that this earlier 
centrality of class inequality meant that non-class inequalities, while clearly 
recognised and important in older texts, tended to be placed in the context of a 
more fundamental class conflict such that racism and sexism, for example, were 
commonly seen as forms of divide and rule. It is this specific class identity that 
is largely missing from later texts and that, as we saw, coincides with the rise of 
diversity to a currently prominent place within the TUC discourse. 
 
                                                 
138
 I will revisit this issue in the final chapter in order to explain in more detail why class gets 
excluded from the socio-economic/identity distinction. In particular I do not believe that, in the final 
analysis, this distinction overlaps quite as neatly with the equality of opportunity/outcome distinction 
as it may seem. 
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Chapter Eight: Conflict and Cohesion 
 
So far I have been principally concerned with the rise of equality and diversity – 
the way in which, in particular, the concept of diversity has gained an 
increasingly prominent place, in a variety of institutional contexts, as a value to 
be recognised alongside equality. We have also seen the important role played 
by conflict in this process: in chapter three we saw how the origins of 
multiculturalism lie in the response by local governments to the civil disorder of 
the first half of the 1980s; we also saw in chapter five how the idea of diversity 
emerged as a new way of promoting equal opportunity policies, in response to 
the controversy surrounding them in the second half of the 1980s. In this 
chapter my concern is also with conflict, but here the problem appears at a later 
stage in the development of the framework. More specifically, I want to look in 
detail at the way in which, in response to the problem of conflict, a third value is 
emphasised in the literature, cohesion, to be pursued alongside equality and 
diversity. 
 
To make this clearer it is helpful if we turn to the two case studies that I will use 
to explore this topic. Both discourses originate in the early 2000s and both are, 
in different ways, products of the successful institutionalisation of equality and 
diversity that I have described in the previous chapters. The EDF (Equality and 
Diversity Forum)139 is an NGO that is unique, as far as I know, in having been 
established as a way of giving a single voice to the disparate groups and 
organisations campaigning for the different types of inequality increasingly 
recognised in law. As we will see from an analysis of the EDF discourse in the 
first two sections of this chapter, this expansion of strands (types of inequality) 
brings with it the danger of conflict as the different interest-groups recognised 
grow in number and confidence in making identity-based claims. What is 
particularly interesting about the EDF is the mediating role it attempts to play in 
dealing with some of the issues that arise from this – a role that clearly springs 
from the organisation's claim to represent the equality and diversity agenda as a 
whole. I will look first at the role of human rights in the EDF's response to the 
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 I should add that I am a former employee of the organisation. 
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problem of conflict; in the second section I will look at some of the non-legal, 
policy-based solutions suggested by the organisation. 
 
In the third and fourth sections of the chapter I will look at the New Labour 
government's community cohesion discourse, which developed as a response 
to civil disturbances that took place in 2001. As the government saw it, these 
disturbances were, at least in part, caused by the widespread promotion of 
equality and diversity without an accompanying stress on the common values 
that help bind different communities together. It is the attempt to correct this that 
I will explore first, focusing on the attempt to advance an inclusive British 
identity and sense of citizenship that would unite disparate communities, while 
still respecting cultural diversity. While it is probably fair to say that this project is 
what the community cohesion discourse is best known for, we can also see in 
the discourse not just the need to combine unity and diversity but also the need 
to combine unity and equality. In other words, there is a clearly articulated need 
to rethink the way in which equality policies are carried out on the ground, 
including the social exclusion policies that I looked at in the previous chapter. I 




8.1 Conflict and Human Rights 
 
To begin with I want to say a little more about the EDF as an organisation. It 
describes itself as a 'network of national organisations committed to equal 
opportunities, social justice, good community relations, respect for human rights 
and an end to discrimination based on age, disability, gender and gender 
identity, race, religion or belief, and sexual orientation' (EDF, 2012a). It also has 
three more-specific objectives: 1) to promote equality and eliminate 
discrimination on the grounds or 'strands' just mentioned (i.e. age, disability 
etc); 2) promote human rights; 3) to 'promote for the public benefit the efficiency 
and effectiveness of Voluntary Sector Providers' who work in the different areas 
of equality (EDF, 2012b). 
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The EDF was first formed in January 2002 and has grown steadily since then. 
In the 2008-09 Annual Report Sarah Spencer, former chair of the organisation, 
describes how she and the secretary of EDF, Patrick Grattan, initially 'organised 
a meeting of organisations across the equality spectrum, to see what we had in 
common', in a context in which 'these organisations had little or no contact with 
each other and limited understanding of each other's agendas' (EDF, 2009a: 3). 
She continues: 
 
Few of us would ever have imagined that this first meeting would lead to the birth of 
the influential network that is the EDF. Our aim – to develop the dialogue and trust 
that are needed to enable equality and human rights organisations to work together 
towards common goals – has not changed but our activities have expanded beyond 
all recognition, testament to the immense value that equality and human rights 
organisations experience in practice from working together (ibid). 
 
It currently has 31 member organisations – all of them national NGOs – who 
meet regularly to discuss on-going developments in the equality and diversity 
field.140 EDF activities include (alongside these regular monthly meetings): 
issuing joint responses to government reports and consultations, organising 
conferences and commissioning research on specific equality and diversity 
topics, and producing a fortnightly email newsletter circulated to all with an 
interest in the latest equality and diversity news. As an organisation in its own 
right, the EDF is also probably the smallest of my case studies, with only four 
members of staff. The amount of material produced is correspondingly small 
and – along with the joint statements mentioned, which are written by the EDF 
staff but involve gaining a consensus from member organisations – include 
specially commissioned research pieces on various topics and seminar reports 
with accompanying papers and presentations by various speakers. 
 
Turning now to the texts themselves, the first, most obvious, distinguishing 
feature of the EDF discourse relates to, what could be called, the management 
of the strands (the six grounds of discrimination mentioned at the beginning of 
this section). In other words, in order for the EDF to speak as an overarching 
equalities organisation, it is necessary to maintain a certain minimal coherence 
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 There are also 67 'observers': organisations that are present at EDF meetings but are not 
represented by the forum as a collective voice – including government departments. 
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among the different inequalities that their members campaign against. As with 
the EHRC there is, in order to do this, an emphasis laid on both the 
fundamental equality between the strands and the importance of ensuring that 
the specific nature of each strand is not lost: 
 
It is our view that the scope for addressing issues across the six strands is one of 
the strongest arguments for moving towards a single equality approachEWhile 
each strand has certain issues which are unique and need to be addressed 
separately, much of the diversity agenda is common across the various strands and 
should be dealt with “in the round”EIn the Forum we have found that the various 
groups mutually reinforce rather than compete with each other (EDF, 2003: 2). 
 
In the context of this balance to be struck between equality and diversity there is 
also a clearly identified danger: that the recognised differences between 
equality grounds will become artificial separations – or, a term often used, 
'silos'. This is of particular concern for the EDF because, as I have said, its very 
existence as an organisation depends on a unified equality and diversity field 
that it can then represent. 
 
We find in later texts an emphasis not just on preventing 'silos', but also 
preventing conflict between the different strands. This is potentially a more 
serious issue. While a concern that accompanied the initial meetings which 
founded the organisation,141 it is also one that – I think it's fair to say – becomes 
more prominent in the EDF discourse over time. In the Annual Report for 2008-
09, for example, the EDF make this issue – what they call 'competing rights' – 
one of two priorities for the year:142 
 
As equality law covers new grounds, the potential for tensions between different 
areas of rights has increased. Gender, sexual orientation and religion or belief are 
often cited as arenas of possible conflict, but there are others, including the 
balancing of different human rights such as freedom of expression and freedom to 
manifest a religious belief (EDF, 2009a: 9). 
 
                                                 
141
 Sarah Spencer (2007) has described how some observers predicted that the different strands 
represented at the meetings would fight 'like ferrets in a sack'. 
142
 The other being 'public procurement', which, in this context, refers to public bodies using their 
economic power as a purchaser of goods and services to promote equality. 
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We can see here that two types of conflict are specified. The first is where the 
rights of one protected group clash, or are perceived to clash, with those of 
another. For example, disabled people have a right to be able to access 
services; however, the fact that some Muslims believe that dogs are 'unclean' 
may mean a clash with the right of religious groups to have their beliefs 
accommodated – if, say, a taxi driver is forced to carry guide dogs (Malik, M, 
2008: 15). In the second case the right of a group to equality clashes, or is seen 
to clash, with an individual right. A common example here is that of freedom of 
speech versus the protection of a religious identity – e.g. the Danish cartoons 
controversy (ibid: 30). 
 
It is also worth emphasising the point made in the EDF quote, above, that the 
historical context to this problem is the successful expansion and the 
strengthening of legislation to cover new grounds. In chapters five and six I 
linked this development, in part, to the influence of diversity and the attempt to 
broaden equality policies out beyond the narrower (and more politicised) 
confines of race and gender, towards an approach that embraces all the many 
facets of an individual's identity. What we find particularly emphasised in the 
EDF discourse are the problems that then arise as a consequence of this 
process: as 'society becomes more diverse and as more excluded groups have 
access to legislative protection under equality law, there is likely to be more 
competition between groups (not just race and faith groups but all groups) for 
access to resources or influence to help address "their" equality issues' (Afridi 
and Warmington, 2010: 16). In other words, the more rights that exist, the 
stronger those rights are and the more groups that have them, the more likely it 
will be that conflicts will be generated. 
 
The EDF discourse does not simply highlight the issue of conflict, it also offers 
some detailed accounts of possible solutions. However, before I look at some of 
these in more detail, another feature of the texts to note is the general concern 
to downplay the problem: 
 
competing interests and conflicts in equality law and policy are a reality, however, 
there are also political forces that exaggerate the extent and nature of these 
conflicts. In particular, the principles of gender equality and secularism are 
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sometimes used as a weapon with which to attack minority communities rather than 
acting as a guide to pursuing a coherent equalities framework (Malik, M, 2008: 1). 
 
The author of this report, Maleiha Malik, goes on to argue in more detail that 
public debate – and, in particular, the media – can present the 'problem of 
conflicts in equality law and policy as widespread and intractable' and that this 
serves to exaggerate the extent of the problem. One possible reason given for 
this exaggeration is that racism may help to instil in people the 'assumption that 
there is a radical difference of values between different social groups in society'. 
Moreover, Malik argues that this 'source of “competing interests” is likely to 
continue as past and present patterns of migration into Western Europe from 
non-Western cultures are mapped on to majority/minority asymmetries of power' 
(ibid: 6-7). The fact that those critical of equality and diversity tend to emphasise 
a link between conflict and the framework, while its proponents, such as the 
EDF, tend to downplay the issue, is, of course, unsurprising. However, as we 
will see below, there is a clear difference on this point between the EDF and the 
community cohesion discourse. 
 
Having recognised that while these conflicts may be exaggerated by 'political 
forces' they are nonetheless a reality, a number of different solutions can be 
discerned in the EDF texts. Perhaps the most interesting general feature of 
these solutions is the role played by human rights and the effort, more 
generally, to construct a neutral legal language through which arbitration can be 
conducted. I have already mentioned the increasingly interwoven nature of the 
equality and human rights agendas: in chapter six I argued briefly that this was 
another example of the way in which group-based equality claims have been 
combined with the formal, rights-bearing individual fundamental to a liberal-
democratic society such as Britain. In this chapter I want to look at this 
relationship in more detail, and, in particular, the utility of human rights in 
dealing with conflict. For the EDF the human rights agenda clearly helps to 
provide a common link, a shared set of principles that bind different individuals 
and groups together enabling potentially antagonistic perspectives to be 
reconciled. As Malik (2008: 1) puts it in summing up her paper's main argument: 
'[a]t the most general level, this paper recommends that competing interests 
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and conflicts should be resolved by treating human rights standards as the non-
negotiable floor within which all equalities law and policy analysis takes place'. 
 
Another EDF text explains how this would work in more detail: 
 
Most rights are not absolute but can be limited where they infringe the rights of 
others, for instance if the freedom of speech of members of one group infringes the 
right to private life enjoyed by others. The key tool that the HRA (the Human Rights 
Act 1998) uses in this balancing act is the principle of necessity and proportionality: 
it is legitimate to restrict the right of one person, for instance to free speech, only if it 
is necessary and proportionate to protect the rights of another (EDF, 2006: 16). 
 
For example, it may be the case that the right to non-discrimination for gay 
people can be limited in certain circumstances if it is deemed a necessary and 
proportionate measure that will enable the accommodation of the needs of 
religious groups (in relation to making religious appointments, for example). The 
idea, in essence, is to construct basic legal principles that can provide – in 
principle at least – a neutral language all parties can accept, enabling the kind 
of modification to claims necessary to avoid conflict.143 
 
A second example of this idea is worth looking at in more detail. In another 
paper given at an EDF seminar, Robin Allen, a human rights lawyer, begins with 
what he describes as the 'turning point' reached in 2005 for diversity as a 'value 
to be respected in a modern society' (Allen, 2006: 1). According to Allen, the 
term was, for the first time, recognised officially in legislation requiring a Judicial 
Appointments Commission to have regard to the 'need to encourage diversity in 
the range of persons available for selection for appointments' (quoting the 2005 
Constitutional Reform Act, ibid: 2).144 
 
While this development is, for the author, laudable, the success of diversity and, 
in particular, the rapidity of its rise to prominence can generate problems. 
However, unlike the examples above, the concern this time is not with potential 
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 Jack Straw has described human rights as an 'ethical language we can all recognise and sign up 
to, a…language which doesn't belong to any particular group or creed but to all of us. One that is 
based on principles of common humanity' (quoted in CFMEB, 2000: 91). 
144
 The term had been used in previous legislation but not as a value to be pursued alongside 
equality. In other words, it was not 'really used to reflect a greater understanding of the diversity of 
society which required to be reflected in the make up of its institutions' (ibid: 5). 
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in-fighting between protected groups, but rather the confusion and hostility 
arising from the term's reception in wider society: 
 
the relative legal novelty of this focus [on diversity] has real consequences. Not only 
does it mean that the public are unlikely to have a generalised understanding of the 
idea, but importantly judges, also, will still be casting about for an understanding of 
it. Bluntly put, we are not yet in the territory of legal certainty, let alone widespread 
acceptance, of the value of diversity in ordinary conversation. It needs to be said 
explicitly that diversity is really still a social aim rather than a well-defined legal 
concept. 
 
Allen goes on to draw on his own experience promoting the ideas contained in 
the HRA: 
 
I know only too well that the promotion into society of an idea such as this is not as 
straight forward as one might hope. It is too often true that conferences about 
equality of opportunity attract only those already interested in the subject and not 
those who need to know about it. The resistance to this kind of thinking by people 
who would not dream of joining an equality and diversity forum must never be 
under-estimated (ibid: 5-6). 
 
The body set up to oversee the equality and diversity agenda, the EHRC, is 
also tasked with the job of promoting these values in wider society, however 'it 
must expect that ordinary people will ask questions such as: “What does 
diversity add to equality?”, “Why is equality and diversity so important?” and 
“Why should I care about diversity?” We need to have compelling answers to 
those questions which can be answered simply and effectively' (ibid: 7). 
 
Allen gives an example of the kind of confusion that can be generated by, in 
particular, the idea of indirect discrimination. He cites a BBC news story that 
told of the controversy surrounding a builder who claimed that he was accused 
of racism by an equality and diversity team at a local job centre. The cause of 
the dispute being that the advert he wanted to place specified that the applicant 
must be English-speaking. For the builder in question, and the Shadow Work 
and Pensions Secretary at the time, the advert was an entirely reasonable 
request for someone with a specific qualification. For the job centre, on the 
other hand, it was potentially discriminatory due to the fact that English is a 
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requirement that may disqualify disproportionate numbers of applicants from 
different racial groups (ibid: 8-9). 
 
As Allen points out, the truth of the accusation would depend on the extent to 
which English was in fact a 'necessary requirement' of the post. However, the 
important point for the author is the effect of well-publicised cases, such as this, 
on the public standing of the important principles that lie behind the legislation 
being invoked: 'in this simple story we can see immediately' how easy it was 
 
for a Government agency – no doubt working with the best of intentions to promote 
equality and diversity – to get into an apparent mess and indeed, importantly, in the 
process become vilified. 
 
Fortunately the BBC story was relatively straightforward but it is all too easy to see 
how the repetition of this kind of mistake could swiftly lead the whole idea of 
equality and diversity into disrepute. Simply to say we were seeking to promote 
diversity would not have been adequate to the task of explaining the Job Centre's 
decision (ibid: 10). 
 
While, as we saw in chapter five, diversity first emerged in response to similar 
controversies surrounding equality policies, it is clear that for Allen the concept 
is not now able to fulfil that stabilising role without further ideological 
reinforcement. 
 
What is the solution that Allen proposes? He argues that 'unless this new 
emphasis on diversity is sufficiently simple and robust to apply, and based on 
well-established and clear legal principles, it will not be able to weather such a 
storm of complaint'. What is required then is a supplement to accompany the 
progress of diversity, one that can provide a sense of certainty and simplicity 
that diversity alone cannot, a 'legal construct which accurately secures what we 
want diversity to mean when ordinarily used in a simple discourse like this'. For 
Allen this can be provided by the concept of dignity as a 'touchstone', a 'guide to 
help the public to consider more deeply what is the right approach to a situation 
in which the diversity of our society comes up against some rule or requirement' 
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(ibid: 10).145 While there are 'certainly limitations to its practical use, an 
assessment, in a situation in which equality law is in play, of the way in which 
objectively the dignity of those involved is affected is helpful and may well lead 
to the right resolution of a diversity issue' (ibid: 13). In other words, the term 
provides a simple, shared point of concern that the general public can accept, 
and that may help in negotiating the complex issues and conflicts that arise 
from the concrete operation of equality policies. 
 
 
8.2 Non-Legal Solutions 
 
So far we have considered a legalistic approach to the issue of conflict.146 
However, there are other types of solution proposed in the EDF discourse that 
are worth mentioning. For example: 
 
Although ECHR jurisprudence permits national authorities to introduce hate speech 
legislation, the use of the criminal law to protect freedom of religion or belief clearly 
raises the risk of a conflict between freedom of expression and equality norms. One 
solution to this conflict is to avoid the use of the criminal law altogether in favour of 
non-legal responses that aim to achieve some of the goals of protection for 
minorities, but that do not create the possibility for a conflict with a fundamental 
human right such as freedom of speech (Malik, M, 2008: 31). 
 
Malik goes on to cite David Richards who 'argues that free speech is an 
important constitutional and legal tool for minorities who have suffered injustice. 
It allows them to criticise and challenge dehumanising stereotypes' and 
'empowers the legitimacy and integrity of the politics of identity in the 
reasonable understanding and remedy of structural injustice of group and 
national identity whose political power has rested on invisibility and 
                                                 
145
 According to Allen the concept of dignity is, alongside equality, a fundamental value on which 
human rights are based. 
146
 While I have focused on the role of human rights in the previous section, it should be mentioned 
that the EDF also sees some of the developments described in chapter six as having an important 
role in conflict resolution – in particular, the single, harmonised, public sector equality duty 
proposed in the 2010 Equality Act: 'the mechanism of the public sector equality duty could provide a 
unique opportunity to consult widely with local groups in the design of public policies to ensure that 
potential conflicts are minimised or resolved before they become entrenched. This is a proactive 
promotion of equality which can prevent conflicts that could lead to costly litigation and tensions in 
community relations' (Malik, M, 2008: 11). 
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unspeakability of such injustice' (the first quote is Malik's words, the second 
quote is Richards' words, ibid). This, Malik argues: 'enables a focus on the 
structural disadvantage of minorities who are the targets of hate speech. It also 
suggests that giving more voice to all members of minority communities is a 
more appropriate response to instances of hate speech by individuals from 
those communities than criminalising them' (ibid: 32). In this case, then, the 
solution lies in the empowerment of a group through utilising the right to free 
speech rather than seeking to limit it. 
 
Something similar is proposed in relation to the problem of what is sometimes 
referred to as 'minorities within minorities' – the problematic status that women 
or gay people, for example, may have within a religious or cultural group. In this 
case, rather than seeking to legally limit cultural or religious rights in order to 
protect the internal minority in question, a better approach may be to empower 
the latter within the larger community: 
 
In some cases, the conflict can be resolved by taking a more complex view of the 
definition of equality or the ground of discrimination (e.g. ensuring the category 
'woman' includes the viewpoints of Muslim women, or the category religion or belief 
includes the viewpoint of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) faith-
holders). In other situations the issue can be resolved by taking a more complex 
view of membership of the group and empowering 'minorities within minorities' 
(such as women and LGBT people) who often lack the power to pursue their 
interests (ibid: 2). 
 
It should be stressed that according to Malik there are definite limits to any 
attempt to reconcile group claims in this way: 'where there is a risk of harm or 
coercion there should be a policy of zero tolerance which requires state 
intervention to protect women' (ibid). In other words, once an individual's 
physical wellbeing is threatened, the 'non-negotiable floor' provided by human 
rights is activated. However, if this is not the case other non-legal practices may 
be more appropriate. 
 
More generally, there is quite a strong questioning in the EDF discourse of the 
concept of a community or group – certainly in relation to my other case studies. 
This can again be explained with reference to the EDF's role in covering all the 
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strands: too firm a conception of a group – especially, in this context, one based 
on culture or religion147 – may help to draw attention away from other 
inequalities that cut across the boundaries of those communities. In this 
passage for example – taken from interviews conducted with representatives of 
EDF's member organisations – the critique of 'groups' echoes quite closely 
some of the commonly-made criticisms of multiculturalism: 
 
Groups can be oppressive: leaders may not accurately represent the range of 
people on behalf of whom they are empowered to speak. This can lead to the 
oppression or exclusion of those who have a different perspective or do not share 
the dominant values. 'Poor' relations between communities can lead to 
marginalised communities feeling threatened and retreating into 'traditional' roles in 
a way that has a negative impact on minorities within minorities – for example 
women and young people (EDF, 2006: 10). 
 
More recently, the EDF have offered a broader critique of 'identity-based 
equalities thinking'. In discussing the causes of the Lozells disturbances in 
Birmingham, which saw conflict between Black and Asian communities in 2005, 
the authors (Asif Afridi and Joy Warmington) write that Lozells 'demonstrated 
the limitations of the tools available to authorities in resolving such community 
conflict. They were operating with a vocabulary and an equalities-set which 
were largely irrelevant to the circumstances: identity-based equalities thinking 
might be said to represent the chains which shackled all of the parties to this 
dispute' (Afridi and Warmington, 2010: 15-6). Further on, it is similarly argued 
that the 'tendency for equality groups to feel that their experience is unique and 
cannot be fully understood by anyone outside the groupEcan prevent different 
equality groups from recognising the common experiences or causes of 
discrimination' (ibid: 31-2). While, for the EDF, the continued reality of group 
inequalities means the identity-based framework cannot be done away with 
completely,148 it is worth emphasising the strength of the internal critique of the 
                                                 
147
 The extent to which actual examples of conflict tend to involve religion is noted by the EDF. One 
report quotes Hanne Stinson (former CEO of the British Humanist Association) on this point: 
'[s]omehow, when people mention equality and human rights and “conflicting rights”, they always 
seem to be talking about religion' (Afridi and Warmington, 2010: 10). 
148
 There is a 'need to recognise that questioning the role of identity in determining individual need 
does not preclude interventions to address inequality experienced by particular equality groups. The 
latter is obviously something that will need to continue given the level of inequality experienced by 
particular groups. This is a message that has not been widely received – and if received, little 
understood' (Afridi and Warmington, 2010: 38). 
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equality and diversity framework that we find in the EDF texts – particularly in 
response to the problem of conflict. 
 
A final, brief example from the EDF discourse on this issue: having noted the 
apparent intractability of some – particularly, what they call 'win-lose'149 – 
situations, Warmington and Afridi recommend that those dealing with conflicts 
attempt to instil a sense of interconnectedness among those involved. This 
entails getting the latter to appreciate the extent to which decisions affecting 
themselves also affect others: 
 
Decision-makers and public officials can help to create the kind of environment in 
which communities recognise the interconnected nature of decisions regarding 
equality, especially perhaps those involving the allocation of public resources. 
When combined with good quality evidence regarding the levels of inequality 
experienced by vulnerable groups, this could help to facilitate discussions where 
equality groups 'let go' of particular equality claims, recognising that a successful 
claim for them might mean another more disadvantaged or more discriminated 
against group loses out (ibid: 28). 
 
Having referenced the communitarian theorist Robert Putman, the authors of 
the paper concede that there is 'of course a level of sophistication to this debate 
which may take some time to translate into the practice of employers and public 
service providers'. However, 'at the heart of much of these ideas is the need to 
find better ways to recognise that “my equality claims” are not the only issues at 
stake in a conflict' (ibid: 29). In other words, there is a need to provide a 'bigger 
                                                 
149
 These situations typically have 'little middle ground for compromise and often end up requiring 
formal and in some cases legal resolution'; they can also make it 'much harder to repair relationships 
between parties involved in a conflict in the longer term.' While 'win-lose' conflicts 'can be 
motivated by a sense of injustice', this 'desire for justice can also become a desire for revenge or 
retaliation. All of these factors can limit the potential for discussion, negotiation and compromise 
between groups'. Interestingly, in the same passage, the process described in chapter six – the 
formalisation of identity-based equality claims into a set of individual rights recognised in law – is 
also cited as a potential obstacle to more harmonious relations. The authors cite Mary Ann Glendon's 
description of how 'the act of making a claim into a “right” has the effect of reducing the grounds on 
which compromise might be achieved: rights can become “trump cards” that outweigh other claims 
or positions' (see also Dworkin, 1984). Warmington and Afridi (2010: 12) add that even where 
'rights are accepted as qualified and are subject to an assessment of their proportionality and 
reasonableness the act of invoking “a right” can dramatically reduce a claimant's willingness to 
compromise'. 
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8.3 Community Cohesion and Diversity 
 
The idea behind this last example from the EDF discourse is a simple one: a 
solution to conflict generally requires finding or producing something that the 
antagonists can share in some way; a sense of interconnectedness provides 
actors with a common social space in which claims of one will affect the other 
and vice-versa. The same could be said for the importance of human rights in 
the EDF discourse: human rights help provide a shared framework that actors, 
whatever their differences, can identify with. The importance, stressed by Malik, 
of the non-negotiable nature of this legal framework is explained by this role. If 
an interest-group or identity were able to gain an exemption from it then it would 
no longer be shared; human rights would instead become simply another terrain 
of battle within the fragmented world of identity politics – a situation that the 
EDF and others are keen to avoid. 
 
This idea of the importance of something shared, something that can 'bind all 
the relevant parties' together, is also the fundamental idea behind the New 
Labour community cohesion discourse. However, there are obvious differences 
between the two discourses, reflecting the very different problems that each 
organisation has to confront. The EDF's main concern is to ensure that the 
problem of conflict does not prevent the formation of a coherent equality and 
diversity agenda, an agenda that the EDF can then represent. For the New 
Labour government, on the other hand, it is social order itself that is at stake 
and the first job of government is, of course, to maintain order – equality and 
                                                 
150
 This promotion of the interconnected nature of inequality is a common theme in the EDF 
discourse. This is the case not just in relation to the equality and diversity field, but, interestingly, 
also in relation to the separation between – what I have termed – identity-based inequality and socio-
economic inequality. In a speech given in 2007, Sarah Spencer referred to this as the 'gulf among 
those working for social justice, a strange cavern in the equalities movement which we have not yet 
addressed' and which has 'serious consequences on equality outcomes'. She ends with a plea: 'for 
those of us leading NGOs in the parallel equalities and poverty worlds, it's time to talk! We've 
overlooked your agenda [for] too long, and we'd like to introduce you to ours. If we can secure the 
same rapprochement between our two fields as we have across the six equality 'strands', then who 
knows what we might deliver!' (Spencer, 2007). 
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diversity is of only secondary importance compared with this task. We can see 
this central difference in organisational aims reflected in a number of features of 
the community cohesion discourse that are worth mentioning: 1) the discourse 
was initiated in response to a single manifestation of conflict – the disturbances 
that took place in various Northern towns in the summer of 2001; 2) the 
diagnosis of the problem appears to suggest that the equality and diversity 
agenda may itself be – at least partially – responsible; 3) the solutions proposed 
take us, to some extent, outside the narrower confines of the established 
equality and diversity discourse that the EDF puts forward. In particular, and 
probably what has generated most controversy, there is an appeal not just to 
shared values in terms of a human rights framework, but to shared British 
values stressing the importance of integrating minority communities into a 
national culture. There is, in other words, a shift from a 'thinner', formal, legal 
solution to conflict to a 'thicker', more substantive focus on a common national 
identity. 
 
As I've said, the starting point for the community cohesion discourse is 2001. It 
comes at the end of the period (roughly the mid-1990s to the early 2000s) that I 
have already identified as a key period for the development of equality and 
diversity – in particular, when diversity becomes firmly established alongside 
equality. I've also already mentioned the importance of the Stephen Lawrence 
murder and its aftermath in previous chapters; it is worth emphasising the 
impact it had on a young New Labour government and the impetus it gave to 
that government's determination to tackle race inequality (Hewitt, 2005: 52). 
Another important parallel development is the increasing significance of 
terrorism and, more importantly, its link with Islamic fundamentalism in the 
formation of New Labour policy – 9/11 in 2001 and the 7th July bombings in 
2005 are obvious reference points here. The latter has been important in 
increasing the extent to which integrating, specifically, Muslim communities has 
come to be seen as the main challenge to a successful multicultural society (as 
I mentioned in chapter one). I won't explore these developments further here 
though, or the way in which they overlap with the community cohesion 
discourse. My focus is solely on the modification of the equality and diversity 
framework that community cohesion brings about. 
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In terms of the texts used for this analysis, I've again taken a relatively small 
sample – most of which have been produced by the Home Office. Community 
Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review Team (also known as the 
Cantle Report) and the Government's response to this report are probably the 
best known of the documents I have relied on – certainly in the earlier phase of 
the development of the cohesion agenda (Home Office, 2001a, 2001b).151 Other 
key texts are Strength in Diversity (Home Office, 2004a) and Our Shared 
Future. The latter is the report of an organisation set up by New Labour to 
investigate the problem of social conflict: the Commission on Integration and 
Cohesion (2007b). The other texts used in this chapter are less significant but 
provide some useful insights into community cohesion as a functioning policy 
discourse. 
 
If we turn, first of all, to the Cantle Report of 2001 into the disturbances that took 
place in the summer of that year, the first thing to notice is the strength of the 
language used in the report's portrayal of the areas affected by the violence: 
 
Whilst the physical segregation of housing estates and inner city areas came as no 
surprise, the team was particularly struck by the depth of polarisation of our towns 
and cities. The extent to which these physical divisions were compounded by so 
many other aspects of our daily lives, was very evident. Separate educational 
arrangements, community and voluntary bodies, employment, places of worship, 
language, social and cultural networks, means that many communities operate on 
the basis of a series of parallel lives. These lives often do not seem to touch at any 
point, let alone overlap and promote any meaningful interchanges (Home Office, 
2001a: 9). 
 
The idea of 'parallel lives' was a particularly resonant phrase to emerge from the 
review, capturing the sense of acute segregation among the different 
communities that composed the towns affected by the violence (Bradford, 
Burnley and Oldham). While we saw the issue of conflict and division played 
                                                 
151
 I should also mention three reports that were carried out into each of the areas affected by the 
disturbances in 2001: the Clarke report (Burnley), the Ritchie report (Oldham) and the Ouseley 
report (Bradford) – though the last of these was in fact published just before the riots occurred. I 
have focused on the national reports however as I believe these give a better indication of the more 
general interaction between the concept of cohesion and the equality and diversity framework that I 
am trying to capture here. 
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down in the EDF discourse, here we see a strongly made claim for the reality of 
such phenomena. 
 
It is made clear in the community cohesion discourse that the problem is not the 
existence of differences as such, but rather the fact that the differences found 
do not appear to be the result of the exercise of individual choice: 
 
There are a number of reasons why people may choose to be close to others like 
themselvesEThere is nothing intrinsically wrong about people exercising choice in 
this wayE[However] there are reasons why we should be concerned about the 
apparent trend towards more segregated communitiesEgeographical segregation 
is likely to contribute to a lack of opportunity for different communities to meet, to 
have a dialogue and work togetherEsegregation may not reflect choice but a real 
and damaging lack of choice about housing, jobs and schools (Home Office, 2001b: 
12-3). 
 
If, as we have seen, one of the primary aims behind the introduction of diversity 
is an attempt to individualise group-based equality claims, what appears to be 
registered here is a failure of that attempt. Behind the disturbances lies the 
existence of 'parallel lives': segregated communities that negate individual 
autonomy and do not enable the harmonious co-existence of different cultures 
in which an individual is free to choose their social attachments. 
 
Of course, both the facts on the ground that the Cantle review team claim to 
uncover, as well as the explanation of those facts, is a hugely contested and 
controversial area. The community cohesion discourse has certainly itself 
caused controversy among proponents of multiculturalism: in arguing that 
segregation is both a reality and one which is to some extent attributable to the 
promotion of diversity, the community cohesion discourse appears to side with 
the critics of multiculturalism. This critical view has been put forward, perhaps 
most famously, by Trevor Phillips, former head of the CRE, who argued, as 
mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, that there was a danger of 
'sleepwalking to segregation'.152 Defenders of multiculturalism, on the other 
hand, tend to reject that segregation is an empirical reality on the scale that 
                                                 
152
 In full, Phillips argued that 'we are sleepwalking our way to segregation. We are becoming 
strangers to each other, and we are leaving communities to be marooned outside the mainstream' 
(quoted in Hasan, 2010: 1). 
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critics suggest (see, for example, Finney and Simpson, 2009). Furthermore, for 
those on this side of the debate, even where there is evidence of 'parallel lives' 
this can be explained by inequality and the legacy of discrimination rather than 
the pursuit of multicultural policies.153 
 
While the latter argument is certainly recognised in the texts – and, as we will 
see below, equality policies more generally continue to be seen as important – 
the community cohesion discourse nonetheless puts forward, as its central 
message, that there is a problematic lack of unity among different groups and 
that this is a key cause of the segregation found. In response, emphasis is put 
on the importance of commonly-held values as a way of bridging the gap 
between groups: 
 
It is easy to focus on systems, processes and institutions and to forget that 
Community Cohesion fundamentally depends on people and their values. Indeed, 
many of the present problems seem to owe a great deal to the failure to 
communicate and agree a set of clear values that can govern behaviour. This 
failure is evident at both the national and local levels, and it has led to community 
breakdown in some parts of the country, due to particular circumstances or triggers 
(Home Office, 2001a: 18). 
 
There is a sense in which it is less the values themselves that are important, 
however, and more the process through which different groups and people 
come to identify with those values: '[p]art of the power of the concept of shared 
values lies in the debate itself' (Home Office, 2004a: 8). In other words, 
integration is not just about finding values that everyone can agree to, it is, 
perhaps more importantly, about identifying with a dialogue through which these 
more substantive principles are produced. 
 
As already mentioned, in a related sense there is also a stress on a particular 
shared identity, as an important corollary of shared values, that sets the 
community cohesion discourse apart somewhat from the EDF discourse. More 
                                                 
153
 See, for example, Chris Gaine's response to John Denham's defence of government policy: 'I 
would take issue with…the assumption…that the 2001 riots in three northern towns were due to 
“divided communities”. This is true as far as it goes, but misleading when linked with an alleged 
self-segregation by south Asians, Muslims in particular. What this now largely accepted idea does 
not take into account is the years of discrimination, both in jobs and housing, experienced by Asian 
(and black) populations' (Gaine, 2010: 16). 
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specifically, an inclusive British identity needs to be constructed. This promotion 
of a strong national identity – a feature of New Labour ideology more 
generally154 – not only marks a point of divergence with the EDF discourse, but 
also the Parekh Report. In the latter, the authors argue explicitly for reimagining 
Britain as a 'post-nation' (though clearly the extent of the shift depends on how 
exactly the idea of a 'post-nation' should be interpreted) (CFMEB, 2000: 36). In 
contrast consider, for example, the following passage: 
 
To build a successful integrated society we need to promote an inclusive concept of 
citizenship, which goes further than the strictly legal definition of nationality and 
articulates the rights and responsibilities we share. Building this wider notion of 
active citizenship through participation, volunteering and civic action, underpinned 
by a sense of shared values, is one of the main ways in which we can strengthen 
the relationships and connections between communities. We need to ensure that all 
citizens feel a sense of pride in being British and a sense of belonging to this 
country and to each other, and to ensure that our national symbols, like the Union 
Jack and the flags of the four nations, are not the tools of extremists, but visibly 
demonstrate our unity, as we saw through the Golden Jubilee celebrations (Home 
Office, 2004a: 6). 
 
It is easy to see from passages such as this why the community cohesion 
discourse, and Labour policy more generally, has attracted the charge of 
assimilationism (see, for example, Back et al, 2002). 
 
However, while a shared British identity is certainly a strong theme, it is 
stressed at a number of points in the discourse that assimilation, in the more 
obvious sense of a single, homogenous national culture, is not what is being 
championed. For example, the same text argues that 
 
Integration is not about assimilation into a single homogenous culture and there is 
space within the concept of “British” for people to express their religious and 
cultural beliefs. We see this in practice in the sensitisation of public services to 
accommodate different expressions of identity or belief, for example the adaptation 
of uniforms in schools and key public services, like the police, to include Muslim 
hijabs and Sikh turbans (Home Office, 2004a: 7). 
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There are plenty of examples within the community cohesion discourse of this 
kind of statement. Indeed I would go so far as to say that we see – perhaps 
paradoxically – some of the strongest affirmations of the importance of 
difference or diversity here, as opposed to my other case studies. For example, 
in the Commission on Integration and Cohesion report (2007b: 161) the authors 
write of the need for the 'continued protection of distinct identities'. Similarly in 
the Cantle Report it is stated that while the 'promotion of “cohesion” could itself 
become a desirable and legitimate focus for funding', this approach 'should not 
be seen as an attempt to undermine separate and distinct cultures – this would 
not be compatible with valuing diversity' (Home Office, 2001a: 27). 
 
One final, unusually candid, example from a document reporting on the first six 
months of the 'Community Cohesion Pathfinder Programme' (a programme 
establishing template schemes promoting community cohesion in local 
settings): the text advises that 
 
It is important to use the Community Cohesion agenda as a means of celebrating 
diversity rather than emphasising multiculturalism as a problem. This is best 
brought about by frankness and transparency in communications with Members [of 
local councils], recognising both that there is natural competition between 
communities and that this is not necessarily unhealthy (Home Office, 2003a: 4 – my 
emphasis). 
 
These examples show much more than a gesture towards the value of diversity 
then; they demonstrate a very clear appreciation, from the government's point of 
view, of the positive benefits of difference using some strong terms: the 
'protection of distinct identities', the importance of not only distinct but separate 
cultures, and the healthy nature of 'natural competition' between 
communities.155 
 
                                                 
155
 The value of diversity is also recognised in the definition of cohesion adopted by the government 
in guidance for local authorities. A cohesive community has four characteristics: 'there is a common 
vision and a sense of belonging for all communities'; 'the diversity of people's different backgrounds 
and circumstances are appreciated and positively valued'; 'those from different backgrounds have 
similar life opportunities'; finally, 'strong and positive relationships are being developed between 
people from different backgrounds in the workplace, in schools and within neighbourhoods' (Home 
Office, 2003a: 1). 
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The point here is not to try to weigh up the textual evidence for either side – i.e. 
whether the community cohesion discourse is assimilationist or not – partly due 
to space constraints and partly because the very meaning of the term 
'assimilation' is not an easy one to pin down. Rather, I want to limit my 
interpretation of the community cohesion discourse to my overall argument 
about the evolving nature of the equality and diversity framework. In this sense, 
I would see community cohesion less in relation to the question of unity versus 
difference and more as a case of how unity (or cohesion) acts as a necessary 
third – and more recent – element of the framework. Just as it was possible to 
show how the rise of diversity did not mean a replacement of group-based 
equality policies, but a different way of pursuing those same policies, so the 
addition of cohesion does not imply a rejection of equality and diversity. This 
can be seen in both the continued affirmations of difference in this section and 
in the continued affirmations of the importance of equality policies in the 
following section. 
 
The key point, then, is the change in the way in which the same group-based 
policies are pursued with the addition of the idea of cohesion: 
 
We need more integration, but we also want each community to feel proud of its 
heritage and traditions – in other words we need a type of multi-culturalism in which 
everyone supports the values and laws of the nation, whilst keeping hold of their 
cultural identityEAll citizens, whether by birth or naturalised, White or from a Black 
and minority ethnic (BME) group, whatever their faith, need to be able to see 
themselves as 'British', whether or not they add their cultural identity to the term 
(Home Office, 2004b: 8). 
 
We can see here that the idea of different, sub-national, cultural identities is, 
again, very important (citizens need to keep 'hold' of them). However this is 
understood in relation to a single British identity. While the latter may lack the 
cultural significance it once had, it nonetheless retains its importance as a 
single, overarching object of identification. Of course, this solution is not 
necessarily without its problems and may involve another tricky balancing act 
alongside that which we have already seen between equality, on the one hand, 
and diversity, on the other. The continued promotion of sub-national cultural 
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identities, for example, may start to pull the individuals concerned away from 
the wider national identification demanded. 
 
The question, in other words, is whether Britishness can provide the more than 
purely legalistic or formal identity required for cohesion if sub-national cultural 
identities continue to be protected. This problem can also be expressed in the 
language of citizenship. We've already seen the need to 'promote an inclusive 
concept of citizenship' that 'goes further than the strictly legal definition of 
nationality' (Home Office, 2004a: 6). However, how can this be done without 
abandoning the ideal of cultural diversity? 
 
One suggestion that we find in the texts is to link citizenship to the locality – i.e. 
to the sub-national geographical area shared by the different groups in 
question. For example, the interim statement of the Commission on Integration 
and Cohesion report begins with agreeing that 'Britishness' is an 'important 
unifying force', but that it is 'at its best when developed in a way that resonates 
with all communities'. The text then goes on to state that a 'focus on the local 
provides a practical shared concern for communities to rally around'. 
Additionally, polling carried out for the report 'suggests that both national pride 
and local civic pride could be of equal importance when we are considering 
policies to build integration and cohesion' and that a 'focus on the local may well 
be what makes Britishness mean something to people at grassroots level' 
(Commission on Integration and Cohesion, 2007a: 30-1). More concretely, the 
text suggests 'fostering a local debate on shared values based around a 
national frameworkEenabling local authorities to negotiate local identities by 
posing the question "What is it to be from Birmingham?” (for example) and 
seeing if a local consensus can be built' (ibid: 31). There is, then, a second 
function of geography in the equality and diversity discourse, alongside its 
importance as a way of understanding inequality (as analysed in the previous 
chapter). Here it plays a kind of bridging role in helping to bring a more 
substantive dimension to national identity, but one that, as in the previous 




8.4 Community Cohesion and Equality 
 
As we have seen, the community cohesion discourse can be seen as an 
acceptance (up to a point) of, and a response to, the criticism of multicultural 
policies that the promotion of diversity encourages segregation and division. In 
a similar manner, the community cohesion discourse can also be seen as a 
response to another commonly-made criticism of multiculturalism, but this time 
in relation to the promotion of equality. The charge is that by emphasising ethnic 
minority disadvantage, equality policies end up ignoring the considerable 
disadvantage that exists among the white majority population. 
 
For example, there is a section on 'Disadvantaged and Disaffected 
Communities' in the 2001 Cantle Report that strongly criticises the 'equalities 
agenda' for not including white people within it, or, to put it another way, for 
assuming that inequality was exclusively a characteristic of black and ethnic 
minority communities. The report notes that the 
 
equalities agenda has become heavily associated with black and ethnic minority 
groups despite efforts to promote a more inclusive agenda. There is an assumption 
that black and ethnic minority groups are in need and, in general, that their needs 
will be the greatestEWe must, therefore, re-define the equalities agendaE[so that 
it] clearly and fundamentally, relates to need and is not seen to exclude any 
community, such as the white community (Home Office, 2001a: 39). 
 
The report also states that there is an 'urgent need to recognise a more diverse 
and sophisticated approach to “needs”, which takes on board, for example, the 
new requirements of recent asylum seekers and the growing disaffection of 
young males from some established white communities' (ibid). In other words, 
equality strategies risk missing particular disadvantaged groups that do not fall 
within the equality categories traditionally associated with those policies. We 
have seen the basic form of this argument a number of times already: that there 
is a need to broaden the appeal of equality and diversity policies beyond the 
minority groups most closely associated with them. What is specific about the 
community cohesion discourse is that this argument is linked very explicitly with 
the problem of social order. In other words, if there continues to be favouritism – 
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or, rather, the perception of favouritism156 – in the implementation of policies, 
there is a real risk that conflict between communities will be generated as a 
result. 
 
As we have seen with diversity, the problem is not with equality but with the 
particular way in which that value has been pursued. There are many strong 
affirmations of the importance of equality and the 'equalities agenda' within the 
community cohesion discourse. Indeed the cohesion agenda and the race 
equality agenda become explicitly linked as a joint government programme: one 
report makes this recommendation when advising that 'Community Cohesion 
needs to be “mainstreamed” and much more closely linked to the racial equality 
agenda' adding that the latter is still 'essential to tackle disadvantage' (Home 
Office, 2004b: 8).157 
 
So the need is to reformulate rather than reject equality, and while this point is 
sometimes made in relation to equality in general, it is the group mentioned at 
the beginning of this section that is clearly the main concern. Just as it is ethnic 
minority groups that tend to be most commonly thought to benefit from 
multiculturalism, so it is white disadvantaged communities that are most often 
understood to lose out. It is worth considering why this might be the case in 
more detail, as it helps us to gain a better insight into the nature of the 
community cohesion discourse and the particular problem to which it is 
responding. The situation is, at first glance, straightforward: while the white 
disadvantaged are clearly an unequal group in society, the most obvious marker 
of this group's identity, whiteness, is also the principal marker of a majority 
identity; they do not therefore benefit from an equality and diversity agenda that, 
as we have seen, pursues substantive, redistributive equality for various 
minority groups in order to rectify social inequality.158 
                                                 
156
 This is an important clause to add – generally, even the community cohesion discourse does not 
go so far as to say that the equality and diversity agenda actually does favour ethnic minorities.  
157
 The full titles of two Home Office (2004a, 2005) reports also demonstrate this: Strength in 
Diversity: Towards a Community Cohesion and Race Equality Strategy and Improving Opportunity, 
Strengthening Society: The Government's strategy to increase race equality and Community 
Cohesion. 
158
 We saw in chapter four that white racism has a fundamental, antagonistic, quality that sets it apart 
from other inequalities and sources of oppression in society. Furthermore, this recognition of a racial 
antagonism between white and non-white is an essential element of the equality and diversity 
framework, an element that sits alongside the attempt to universalise the framework so that all 
groups are included within it. 
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However, this is not the only point. What is particularly noticeable in the 
community cohesion discourse – unsurprisingly given its name – is the 
emphasis on white communities. In so far as the white disadvantaged suffer 
from socio-economic inequality (as opposed to identity-based inequality) they 
are, of course, recognised as unequal. What the community cohesion discourse 
is particularly attuned to however are the aspects of disadvantage that tend to 
fall more readily under the 'identity' label. By this I mean the kind of issues that 
cannot be dealt with through a quantitative reduction in inequality that cuts 
across distinct groups, but rather concern the qualitative relations between the 
disadvantaged, the state and other social interests. Take, for example, 
inequality as a lack of effective participation, both generally in relation to the 
democratic process, but also more specifically in terms of involving those who 
are to benefit from equality policies in the planning and delivery of those 
policies.159 In order to do this at a practical level the disadvantaged need to be 
represented, and in order to do this a significant, qualitative group identity of 
some kind is obviously required. We can see then that only rectifying socio-
economic inequality, as separated from identity-based disadvantage, may not 
be adequate to dealing with the inequality of the white disadvantaged. 
 
This point can be illustrated further by returning to a development mentioned in 
the previous chapter: the adoption of a race equality perspective as an 
important dimension of the social exclusion agenda. A key feature of this 
development is the need to ensure that ethnic minorities, through their 
representatives, are involved in the policy process. For example, one report 
states that 
 
neighbourhood renewal will not work and will not be sustained unless people living 
in deprived areas get involved. People from minority ethnic communities are more 
likely to live in deprived areas than others and this report highlights how important 
their participation and leadership in the design and delivery of services in those 
areas will be to the success of the National Strategy. It also suggests various ways 
in which such participation and leadership can be encouraged (SEU, 2000: 5). 
                                                 
159
 See the third part of the collection of debates, edited by Olson (2008), between Nancy Fraser and 
her critics that deals with this political, participatory element of justice as an addition to her famous 
distinction between redistribution and recognition. 
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If we then turn to the Cantle Report – published a year later – we can see the 
text respond to an obvious side-effect of this emphasis on ethnic minority 
participation: 
 
We would urge the inclusion of representatives (and leaders) of a broader range of 
groups in strategic level planning of regeneration, alongside existing black and 
ethnic minority networks. Indeed, there seems to be an absence of white 
community leaders in some areas and it is assumed that their needs are being 
addressed by mainstream political and institutional leaders. This means that the 
views of the white communities are unheard in discussions about the distribution of 
resourcesE Representation should be drawn from both white and non-white 
communities and the white community should be encouraged to develop a 
leadership capacity in the same way as the black and ethnic minority communities 




So we can see, then, a direct link between a race equality perspective in one 
policy area (social exclusion) and a concern with the effects of this in another 
(community relations). What is perhaps most striking is that this attempt in the 
community cohesion discourse to rebalance the concern with ethnic minority 
disadvantage takes exactly the same ethnic form: whiteness is explicitly 
suggested as a marker of identity enabling the participation of disadvantaged 
communities in the implementation of social policy. 
 
Interestingly, it is not only identity-based equality policies that are identified as 
problematic in the community cohesion discourse. Policies based on a 
geographical understanding of inequality are also criticised: '[h]istorically, the 
competitive nature of some regeneration funding has been a focus for inter-
community and inter-neighbourhood tension. Some regeneration schemes had 
the effect of pitting neighbourhoods against each other in competing for 
resources'. This has 'generated resentment and suspicion across communities 
in some areas – a feeling that "other" areas were being favoured in the 
allocation of resources. This seems to be exacerbated in parts of the country 
                                                 
160
 The same warning about excluding white communities appears throughout the cohesion 
discourse. For instance, another text advises those working on area-regeneration schemes that there 
is a 'tendency to build the leadership and develop representatives from the minority communities. Do 
not neglect the white community who will also need to be involved in the change' (Home Office, 
2004c: 28). 
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where ethnic minority communities live in different areas to white communities' 
(Local Government Association, 2002: 28). It is worth noting in relation to the 
last sentence that while the problem is 'exacerbated' by those situations in 
which the geographical difference combines with ethnic difference this is not 
always the case. This implies that the 'marking' of inequality according to 
geography alone is enough to cause conflicts without the added factor of 
ethnicity. The solution is the same in both cases however: more sophistication 
is required in how the needs of disadvantaged people are met. For example, the 
Cantle Report calls for a 'change from area based initiatives [ABIs] to more 
thematic approachesEprogrammes targeted at young people involved with 
drugs, the development of literacy and communication skills, achievement 
through sport, or IT skills, irrespective of race, or area, might now be more 
appropriate and more inclusive' (Home Office, 2001a: 39). 
 
It should also be said that, within the community cohesion discourse, the 
problem with geographical approaches or ABIs is not simply the potential social 
conflict caused, but also the inability of geography to fully 'capture' inequality. In 
other words, just as we have seen how identity-based categories (race, gender, 
sexuality etc) can be insufficient to adequately respond to the complex nature of 
inequality, so the same can be said of geographical categories. A deprived 
area, for example, targeted by policy-makers, may include wealthy families; 
conversely wealthy areas excluded from equality policies may include 'pockets 
of deprivation'. Again, 'thematic approaches' are required: by targeting specific 
issues rather than geographical areas, these are a 'means by which more 
widespread deprivation or specific pockets of deprivation are addressed and 
communities are encouraged to work together' (Home Office, 2003b: 9). A 
concept of 'area focus' is also suggested that should be 'fully explored as a 
means of creating more flexible areas, recognising that some programmes can 
have different boundaries to reflect different needs whilst still maintaining an 
area approach'. The conclusion is that: '[w]ell-designed ABIs can have a 
positive impact on cohesion, whilst those which are not can exacerbate existing 
problems' (ibid). We can see from this last quote that, once again, the basic 
thrust behind the concept of cohesion is not to put in question equality policies 
deemed to be socially and politically necessary, the point is rather to attempt to 
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make these policies more sophisticated in light of concerns about their impact 





Both discourses featured in this chapter originate at a time when equality and 
diversity had become a well-established agenda, and both, in different ways, 
express concern that conflict may be a consequence of this development. For 
the EDF the problems and corresponding answers are much more about the 
equality and diversity field itself. In line with the aims of the organisation, the 
main concern is to ensure that the various different organisations that form the 
EDF's membership are able to come together in a relatively non-conflictual way. 
The emphasis on human rights, as an overarching legal framework within which 
different interests and identities can be negotiated, is a key part of the EDF's 
solution. For the New Labour government's community cohesion discourse, on 
the other hand, the main concern is with the broader quality of social relations. 
While the discourse is undoubtedly best known for its emphasis on the 
promotion of common values, and particularly on a reclamation of Britishness in 
order to prevent conflict among communities, I've also highlighted its attempts 
to modify the way equality policies function – policies that use both identity and 
geography to understand and respond to inequality. 
 
Before turning to the concluding chapter of this thesis, I want to make a final 
point about the general idea of cohesion at work in both the EDF and 
community cohesion discourse. While in previous chapters I've focused on the 
combination of equality and diversity as constituting the ideological framework 
whose development I have traced in a number of different contexts, we can now 
add cohesion to this model. As I've mentioned above, we can think of cohesion 
as a third value that combines with both equality and diversity forming a 
complex tripartite structure whose dynamics I have touched on in this chapter. 
As with diversity, cohesion can be understood as playing an important role in 
the integration and institutionalisation of equality measures in response to 
controversies surrounding their implementation. If, as we have seen in previous 
chapters, diversity adds an individualising dynamic – making the group identity 
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necessary to carry out equality policies part of the multifaceted individual – 
cohesion could be said to add a unifying dynamic, ensuring a common bond 
among the various groups recognised. 
 
Furthermore, just as I have traced in previous chapters not just the way in which 
'equality' and 'diversity' combine but the points where this combination appears 
to be unstable, we have seen the way in which an emphasis on cohesion can 
similarly put a strain on the coherence of the equality and diversity framework. 
Perhaps most obviously this is the case in the community cohesion discourse's 
concern for the group most commonly associated with a rejection of the 
framework: white disadvantaged communities. As I have explained, on account 
of the fact that they are of the majority ethnicity they cannot have the 
'groupness' of their inequality understood in ethnic terms without this putting in 
jeopardy a foundational aspect of the equality and diversity framework: the 
inequality between ethnic minorities and the white majority. Particularly striking 
are those passages in which this recognition of white disadvantage leads to 
policy recommendations that call for the involvement of white communities 
alongside non-white communities, without any qualification that would retain the 
asymmetry between them (such as adding 'working-class' to the category of 
white disadvantage but not to ethnic minority disadvantage, as we saw in the 
Runnymede discourse in chapter four). For example: 'the white community 
should be encouraged to develop a leadership capacity in the same way as the 
black and ethnic minority communities' (Home Office, 2001a: 40 – my 
emphasis). These points in the discourse can be interpreted as moments where 
the emphasis on cohesion, on the need to maintain a unified social field, 
stretches the framework and pulls it away from the logic implied by the concept 
of equality as it has evolved from anti-racist struggles (i.e. the recognition of a 
fundamental inequality or asymmetry between white and non-white). Again, we 
can draw a parallel with the concept of diversity and the tendency the latter has, 
as we have seen, to pull away from the concept of equality.161 However, neither 
concept appears to break with equality altogether, leaving an unstable and 
contradictory, but nonetheless relatively unified ideological framework. 
                                                 
161
 For example, we saw in chapter six the example of the diversity management discourse including 
differences within the equality and diversity agenda that obviously have nothing to do with 
inequality: '[t]he diversity I'm talking about includes not only race, gender, creed, and ethnicity but 
also age, background, education, function, and personality differences' (Thomas, 1990: 114). 
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Chapter Nine: Equality, Diversity and Integration 
 
In this final chapter I will offer a fairly substantial conclusion. My aim here is not 
only to summarise the theoretical and empirical findings presented in the main 
body of the thesis, but also to develop an argument about the ideological 
significance of diversity – an argument that emerges from these findings, but 
which still needs to be articulated. In order to do this I will generally structure 
this chapter around the previous ones, following the order in which they appear; 
the only exception to this is that here I will start with chapter four before going 
back to the earlier chapters. Throughout I will highlight those areas of my 
argument that I have not been able to develop further – for reasons of space or 
time – but which may prove to be fruitful avenues for future research. 
 
 
9.1 Hegemony and Multiculturalism 
 
My aim in chapter four was to describe a basic ideational framework common to 
the equality and diversity discourse as a whole. The picture of society that 
emerges is one made up of a number of groups that have a distinct identity 
based on a particular non-class characteristic such as race, gender, sexuality 
and so on; these groups are also disadvantaged in relation to a comparatively-
advantaged 'majority' group based on those same characteristics. While there 
are a variety of inequalities, I also noted that racism tends to be of particular 
significance and racial inequalities tend to be understood as threatening to 
society in a way that other inequalities are not. Furthermore, there is an 
important separation between two types of social inequality recognised within 
the discourse: identity-based and socio-economic. Class inequality, I argued, is 
split along these lines: it often falls into the second type of inequality; however, 
the idea of a disadvantaged class identity – especially with the prefix 'white' 
attached – is also present within the discourse. 
 
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of the framework to pin down is the idea of 
difference signalled by the term 'diversity'. In chapter four I suggested that the 
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variety or multiplicity that diversity refers to162 can be understood in relation to 
social groups defined by various characteristics or to individuals within those 
groups – in other words, it has both social and individual dimensions. Diversity 
can also refer to a variety of politicised differences, in which the difference in 
question serves as the basis of a temporary political mobilisation, as well as 
depoliticised group-state relations in which the minority group has a relatively 
stable, permanent place within society. Alongside the individual/social 
opposition, there is also, then, a conflict/integration opposition that serves to 
further complicate diversity as a concept. As well as helping to get across how 
complex the term is, these different nuances can also aid us in understanding 
the various developments that I trace in the following chapters. 
 
Also of help in understanding my findings are the ideas of Laclau, as discussed 
in the second chapter. As we saw, for Laclau hegemonic formations are 
produced along two axes: through an equivalence that constructs an identity in 
opposition to a threatening outside, and through the 'differential absorption of 
demands'. The latter describes the dissolution of potentially threatening 
identities, through the construction of a relationship between different elements 
comprising that identity, on the one hand, and the state, on the other (Laclau 
and Mouffe, 2001: 129-30). This second dimension of hegemony is of particular 
interest in relation to multiculturalism – more specifically, the link drawn 
between social differences and political integration. Laclau attempts to capture 
here, using an abstract model, a political process in which a relation of conflict 
or antagonism is translated into a relation of difference such that the element 
(say, a particular interest group) finds its place within society and is able to 
coexist with other groups and the state in a relatively peaceful manner. This 
model would seem to fit what we saw in chapter three quite well. There we saw 
a response to conflict on the part of various local councils that broke down an 
antagonistic 'black' identity by establishing relations with the latter's constituent 
parts. In other words, a relatively stable relationship was constructed between 
the state and a variety of distinct ethnic groups. 
 
                                                 
162
 The dictionary definition of diversity is 'the state of being varied', 'a range of different things' 
(Oxford University Press, 2001: 260). 
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Accompanying this development, we see the emergence of what I've generally 
called a framework but what we might equally call, following Laclau, a myth. 
Recall the first aim of Bradford Council's race relations document cited in 
chapter three: to 'bring about social justice' through establishing an '[e]quality of 
esteem between different cultures'. In response to a conflict-ridden social order, 
an ideational model is presented that depicts reality as composed of a number 
of culturally distinct, unequal groups. Harmony can be returned to society 
through establishing equality between such groups while, at the same time, 
ensuring their differences are recognised and respected. 
 
These ideas about identity, inequality and difference are key to the formulation 
and implementation of a variety of policies. As we saw, the latter included 
funding for community facilities, the promotion of activities to celebrate distinct 
cultural identities, as well as the establishment of channels of communication – 
that is, political relationships whereby 'leaders' or representatives of the 
communities would be involved in the decision-making process. Alongside 
these, we also find the kind of policies that concern me for much of the rest of 
the thesis: policies that place the goal of group equality over that of formal anti-
discrimination measures (the latter referring to the treatment of individuals 
without reference to characteristics such as race or gender). This kind of policy 
can take a variety of forms; the shared aim, however, is a redistribution of 
various social goods (resources, opportunities in employment, opportunities in 
education and business, participation in culture and sport, health levels and so 
on) from a privileged majority to a disadvantaged minority. 
 
Of course, as I have emphasised a number of times in this thesis, any historical 
process is best seen as one of both gradual drift as well as points of origin, and 
it is certainly the case that there are precursors to this course of action – 
multiculturalism did not arise out of nothing. Nonetheless, in terms of the 
urgency of the issue (in response to the riots and disturbances of the first half of 
the 1980s), and the willingness to address the problem using substantial 
administrative budgets, there is clearly an important shift here. This 
periodisation is also backed up through the findings from my case studies. We 
have seen, in the case of both Fawcett and the TUC, that it is in the texts of the 
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1980s that we first see references to the kind of redistributive equality policy just 
described. 
 
What we gain from combining this historical analysis with Laclau's concepts is 
both a formal theoretical model with which to capture the former, but also a 
stress on the hegemonic nature of multiculturalism, in the sense that Laclau, 
following Gramsci, has sought to give the term. This is an important point: in my 
opinion, critics – particularly left-wing critics – of multiculturalism can sometimes 
give too much weight to the role of autonomous elites in the rise of 
multiculturalism. Perhaps the best example of this is Brian Barry's (2001a: 292-
299) description of the ability of an elite cabal of 'academics, lawyers, 
politicians, civil servants and officials from think-tanks and quangos' (ibid: 294) 
to manipulate the political process and bypass the interests of the general 
public.163 Malik too (2009: chapter two) – while offering a much more detailed 
historical description of the rise of multiculturalism – can sometimes give this 
impression. He writes at one point that Birmingham local-council policies 'did 
not respond to the needs of communities, but to a large degree created those 
communities by imposing identities on people...They empowered not individuals 
within minority communities, but so-called "community leaders", who owed their 
position and influence largely to the relationship they possessed with the state' 
(ibid: 67). Both authors offer quite a 'top-down' interpretation of the origin of 
multiculturalism, then, in which the state, or elite groups connected with the 
state, impose an agenda on a seemingly passive population.164 
 
Laclau's Gramscian stress on hegemony – as a process in which consent is 
produced through a more active two-way process between the governed and 
the governing – enables a different interpretation: that the interests and 
demands of the anti-racist movement that the state confronted in the early 
1980s were not straightforwardly rejected in the pursuit of difference. Rather, 
utilising Laclau's theory we can ask how these demands were incorporated into 
                                                 
163
 Barry undoubtedly leaves himself vulnerable to criticisms from defenders of multiculturalism on 
this point. For example, Bhikhu Parekh (2002: 138) has (with, I think, some justification) attacked 
this argument as a 'naive conspiracy theory'. 
164
 A focus on hegemony can also improve on Michaels' (2006: 206) argument that the 'continuing 
success' of diversity 'is a function of its utility to neoliberalism'. This appeal to functionalism 
bypasses the need to explain the more precise mechanism through which individuals become 
attached to the ideological framework.  
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the political and social order as an aspect of the broader project of integrating 
minority groups. To incorporate a demand as part of a hegemonic project 
obviously differs from the straightforward rejection of that demand. At the same 
time, incorporation suggests a process through which that demand is made 
compatible with the wider social and political interests of the hegemonic agent. 
In this sense, the imposition of identities that Malik describes may have been 
made possible less by ignoring community needs – and the associated 
demands through which those needs were articulated – and more by meeting 
those needs, while at the same time altering the way in which they were framed 
in relation to other, more established, interests in society.  
 
This, I believe, is a good interpretation of my case study findings in relation to 
the specific demand for redistributive equality policies, and it is an interpretation 
I will expand on in discussing these findings in the following sections of this 
chapter. Before I do this though I want to return to Laclau's thought and, in 
particular, the relationship between, on the one hand, the ontological 
differences separating Zizek and Laclau and, on the other, their respective 
analyses of multiculturalism. This is important because while I have utilised 
some of Laclau's concepts, I have sought to link them with, what is for me, 
Zizek's convincing critique of Laclau's poststructuralism. 
 
Zizek, like Malik and Sivanandan in their respective historical analyses, stresses 
the importance, in analysing multiculturalism, of distinguishing clearly between 
an oppositional moment (of which left-wing critics of multiculturalism are often 
supportive) and the hegemonic response I have outlined on the part of the 
state. In responding to Judith Butler, for example, he argues that: 
 
I fully endorse queer politics in so far as it 'metaphoricizes' its specific struggle as 
something that – if its objectives were to be realized – undermines the very 
potentials of capitalism. However, I tend to think that, in the course of the ongoing 
transformation into the 'post-political' tolerant multiculturalist regime, today's 
capitalist system is able to neutralize queer demands, to absorb them as a 'specific 
way of life' (Zizek, 1999: 225).  
 
For Zizek, as we saw in chapter two, it is important to retain the Marxist 
emphasis on the 'capitalist system'; however, as he makes clear, this does not 
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mean that non-class struggles cannot be understood to have a very important 
impact in relation to this system. What we need to understand, in relation to 
multiculturalism, is how this initial disruptive potential comes to be replaced by a 
depoliticised recognition of difference.165 
 
For Laclau, on the other hand, all this constitutes a return to a naive Marxism. 
For him there isn't a critical political moment in which various antagonistic 
struggles are integrated into the system fundamentally transforming their 
nature. Rather, the plurality or diversity of antagonisms that emerges post-war 
puts the very idea of a 'capitalist system' into doubt. While there is nothing in 
Laclau's approach preventing the analysis of the institutionalisation of identity 
politics – or the identification of the general depoliticising trend in which diversity 
becomes more of a corporate buzzword than a rallying call for social justice – 
these developments do not put multiculturalism itself into question, as they do 
for Zizek and, following Zizek, for me. In other words, for Laclau it is the way in 
which multiculturalism has been combined with less progressive policies, rather 
than multiculturalism itself, that is to blame for the problems detected by Zizek: 
'the evolution of the parties of the Left has been such that they have become 
concerned mainly with the middle classes, to the detriment of the workers', 
however 'this is due to their incapacity to envisage an alternative to neo-
liberalism and their uncritical acceptance of the imperatives of "flexibility", not to 
a supposed infatuation with issues of "identity"' (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: xviii). 
 
In chapter two I suggested that we might utilise Laclau's distinction between 
dislocation and antagonism in order to capture the significance of various post-
war, non-class struggles for Zizek (the new social movements [NSMs]). 
Whereas for Laclau these struggles are understood as a plurality of 
antagonisms in response to the dislocations wrought by the effects of late 
capitalist development and the growing commodification of social relations,166 
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 Another critic, Todd Gitlin (1995: 141), is similarly careful to distinguish the different stages in 
the rise of identity politics, suggesting a three-stage process: 'first, the discovery of common 
experience and interests; next, an uprising against a society that had imposed inferior status; finally, 
the inversion of that status, so that distinct qualities once pointed to as proof of inferiority were 
transvalued into the basis for positive distinction. It is only this third stage – where the group 
searches for and cultivates distinctive customs, qualities, lineages, ways of seeing, or, as they came 
to be known, "cultures" – that deserves to be called identity politics'. 
166
 See Laclau (1990: 41-59) for an extended analysis of the relationship between dislocation and 
capitalism. 
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for Zizek, I argued, these same struggles serve to initially dislocate the capitalist 
system, before being domesticated as differences consistent with, even 
necessary for, the reproduction of that system. It is important to remember here 
the argument I made in chapter two regarding the concept of dislocation: for 
Laclau dislocations are generally understood as preceding social struggles. For 
Zizek, on the other hand, social struggles can themselves dislocate the social 
structure. 
 
This means then that class struggle has a very different role for each author. 
For Laclau it is simply one of the plurality of antagonisms that defines the 
contemporary social field – having now been joined by others, putting its 
previously privileged position into question. For Zizek, on the other hand, class 
struggle retains its 'overdetermining' role. Clearly this focus on the importance 
of class is key, then, to the critique of multiculturalism, and it is one I have 
sought to apply here. As we have seen (and will see in more detail below), what 
Zizek's theory allows us to grasp is the process through which initially 
oppositional demands are taken up and moulded into a new ruling capitalist 
hegemonic project. 
 
However here we reach a clear limit to this thesis in terms of the theoretical 
arguments underpinning it: the question of agency. How do classes become 
hegemonic agents? There are obvious parallels between some of the ideas I 
have sketched out and structuralist Marxism – in particular the idea of an 
interplay between systemic dislocations and the overdetermination or 
condensation of these into revolutionary ruptures that put the system itself into 
question. This is not surprising, of course, as Althusser is a key reference point 
for Zizek.167 However, while Althusser maintained an orthodox Marxist stress on 
economic determination 'in the last instance', Zizek has not – at least not 
explicitly. This I have followed by drawing a parallel with Laclau's theory of 
discourse in order to think through the place of the economic in Zizek's thought, 
stressing the importance, for the latter, of the commodity-form and its 
structuring role in relation to all social activity, not just the production of goods 
and services. However, while structural Marxists are able to theorise classes as 
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 Alex Callinicos (2001: 373) has described Zizek's work as operating at the 'confluence' of four 
discourses: film criticism, German idealism, Lacanian psychoanalysis and Althusserian Marxism. 
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stemming from positions within the relations of production, it is not clear (to me 
at least) how understanding the commodity-form as a 'socio-transcendental a 
priori' (Zizek, 2006: 56) enables a class schema to be generated. This, in turn, 
makes the question posed above – how to understand classes as hegemonic 
agents – a difficult one. 
 
It is worth noting that in my empirical account of the rise of equality and diversity 
I have located a number of different actors involved in this development: the 
state – through the activities of local councils and government departments; 
political parties – especially the Labour Party; civil society organisations 
generally; we might also mention individuals such as Rachel Ross and Robin 
Schneider, whose book, From Equality to Diversity, appeared to play a 
particularly important role in bringing US-style diversity management to the UK. 
However, as I say, I have not been able to provide a theory of agency to 
accompany this empirical data. This is a task that I envisage taking up more 
fully in future research and I will finish this section with some thoughts on the 
direction that I would see this research taking. 
 
There are two questions here. One is how we understand classes, and the 
second is how we understand classes as hegemonic agents. One direction that 
I have pointed to in relation to the first question is to see classes (the working 
class, more specifically) as constituted first and foremost by relations of 
inequality, rather than by relations of production. If dislocatory struggles – those 
that challenge the many, varied relations of inequality in society – threaten the 
formal equality that tends to define capitalist societies, class struggle can be 
understood as a response to this situation by providing an identity based on a 
different type of unequal relation: one that condenses these different 
inequalities into a single, exploitative class relation. In this sense, the Marxist 
idea of the 'relations of production' is the result of a political, hegemonic 
construction, rather than one that provides the underlying basis of social 
struggles. 
 
In relation to the question of a ruling hegemonic class, Balibar has argued for 
the constitutive role played by the state. In a useful contribution to a co-
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authored book with Immanuel Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Class, he has argued, 
drawing on Gramsci, that the 
 
bourgeois [i.e. hegemonic] class does not take over state power after being 
constituted as the economically dominant class but, on the contrary, that it 
becomes economically dominant (as well as socially and culturally) to the extent 
that it develops, utilizes and controls the state apparatus, and undergoes a process 
of transformation and diversification in order to achieve this...In the strict sense, 
then, there is no such thing as the "capitalist class"; only capitalists of different 
types...who form a class only on condition that, to an ever increasing extent, they 
unite with other social groups who are apparently outside the "basic social relation": 
intellectuals, civil servants, managers, landowners (Balibar, 1991: 172) 
 
Again, the economic class within the 'basic social relation' is constituted as a 
result of hegemonic activity. Here, the 'state apparatus' is at the heart of the 
interaction of a number of different groups, helping to coordinate and reproduce 
the capitalist social order. The 'intellectuals, civil servants [and] managers' that I 
have shown to be involved – through my case study organisations – in the 
promotion of equality and diversity could therefore be understood as playing a 
key hegemonic role in this way. However, this would require more empirical 
data to establish a fuller picture of this hegemonic activity, alongside the 
theoretical work obviously needed to expand on the thoughts offered here. 
 
 
9.2 Integrating Equality Policies: Business and the Law 
 
I've suggested above that the idea of difference at the heart of multiculturalism 
can be usefully linked to the 'differential absorption of demands' in response to 
dislocatory conflicts, such as those that arose in the first half of the 1980s. Over 
the next few decades there are, of course, many developments linking these 
early multicultural experiments to the present day and it's worth remembering 
that I have not attempted to provide a comprehensive empirical description of 
this process. My focus in this thesis has been on tracing the relationship 
between equality and diversity as an ideological framework, and equality and 
diversity as a particular type of multicultural policy aiming to equalise the 
conditions among various social groups. 
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In chapters five and six I focus on the relationship between the equality and 
diversity framework and two particular developments: the rise of a corporate 
take on equal opportunities (diversity management) and the changing nature of 
equalities legislation. Overall, the different features that I describe clearly fit 
within the overall narrative of integration that I have proposed above. However, 
so far in this chapter this process has been cast in terms of integrating groups – 
i.e. differentially absorbing the demands of ethnic minority communities. By 
contrast, in chapters five and six we see the integration of a particular kind of 
redistributive policy (as defined above) considered necessary to absorb those 
demands. In other words, what emerges from the chapters in question is a 
process through which, from an initial situation of conflict in relation to these 
policies, the latter are made compatible with, and given a permanent place 
within, society – at least that is the aim. 
 
The best evidence of this process emerges from the Schneider-Ross discourse. 
Here we see that by the end of the 1980s significant obstacles appear to stand 
in the way of equal opportunities. The central problem is that while, as we have 
seen, the more radical equality policies involve measures that treat individuals 
differently on the basis of group identity, overriding the principle of formal non-
discrimination among individuals, these measures are seen by an increasingly 
vocal opposition (led, particularly, by the right-wing media) to lack a universal, 
moral and non-political foundation. In simpler terms, the promotion of the group 
over the individual is seen as an illegitimate use of state power to push a 
partisan agenda.168 At the same time there is, despite such opposition, a clearly 
felt need for such policies. 
 
The answer to this dilemma involves various measures to integrate these 
controversial polices: this means continuing to implement the substance of the 
policy, while, at the same time, adjusting the relationship between that policy 
and wider society in order for the former to be accepted by the latter. The 
'business case' is a good example of this. As we have seen, it involves putting 
the rationale for equality policies in terms that will appeal to key decision-
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 'We know...that imposed change is likely to be resisted and causes a "backlash"' (Ross and 
Schneider, 1992: 50). 
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makers in charge of the workplace (i.e. managers and directors). Similarly, in 
both chapters we saw the idea of embedding or 'mainstreaming' equality 
policies in organisations; this helps to create the institutional conditions for 
those policies to operate unproblematically via a focus on cultural change and 
the creation of a legal framework in which organisations are obliged to tackle 
inequalities, not just respond to complaints of discrimination. Even the 
consolidation and streamlining of legislation in this area can be understood in 
terms of this broader process: creating a rationalised, unified legal framework 
helps to strengthen the place of this kind of legislation in the wider legal system, 
moving equalities law away from its fragmentary, 'ad-hoc' character. 
Furthermore, the overall trend captured is one of not only integration but also 
expansion, as the equality and diversity framework develops beyond its roots in 
local, specifically racial, politics – a good example, as I've suggested, of a move 
from a 'myth' to a 'social imaginary'. 
  
As I've also argued, the concept of diversity is central to this process; however, 
what is the precise role played by this concept? As this question stands at the 
centre of this thesis it's worth looking at in some detail. In the simplest terms, 
diversity changes the rationale for group-based equality policies: the differential 
treatment required for this kind of policy is justified in terms of incorporating 
different kinds of people, and the benefits that these differences can bring, 
rather than in terms of making society more equal. The idea is that if you want 
to, say, increase the number of women in banking (to take an example from 
chapter four), and it is clear that some kind of substantive action will be needed 
to do this (i.e. simply enforcing formal anti-discrimination measures will not be 
enough), this action will be best 'sold' through arguing that women can bring 
with them, if not stereotypical female qualities such as an aversion to risk-
taking, certain 'life-experiences' that can benefit the companies concerned. This 
way of justifying the policy will be more successful, so the argument goes, than 
putting forward equality between men and women as the reason. 
 
Why would this different rationale be more successful? The argument from 
Schneider-Ross is that the diversity-rationale helps to depoliticise these 
policies, and by depoliticising them they become less controversial and 
therefore more likely to be accepted. This is how we might understand the 
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stress on an individualised understanding of difference that we found in both 
chapters. The idea is that diversity helps to remove equality policies from the 
contested domain of group-based struggles over racial and other types of 
inequality, and focuses instead on the different qualities that each individual can 
contribute. There are two further, related advantages that this new rationale 
brings: 1) once the argument is put in terms of diversity, we can also talk about 
individuals being composed of a wide variety of differences, and not just the 
more politicised and intractable differences of race and gender; 2) it also 
enables an emphasis on the universal nature of equality policies. Once a policy 
is framed in terms of the unique difference an individual can contribute, rather 
than a politically-conscious response to social injustice, it can be said to operate 
for the benefit of all, not just a particular minority. As Thomas (1990: 108) puts 
it, this helps create 'a work setting geared to the upward mobility of all kinds of 
people, including white males'. 
 
There are, more specifically, two actors involved who are said to benefit from 
the move to a diversity approach. One is the decision-maker who, in 
implementing an equality policy under the diversity-rationale, is no longer taking 
a side in a conflict; they are instead making an apparently neutral decision 
based on the value of diversity – usually in terms of the economic or social 
benefits diversity is said to bring. The other actor said to benefit is the person 
who is on the receiving end of the policy: rather than the justification being that 
the group benefits 'through' them, so to speak (i.e. their promotion to the board 
of a company means that the group they represent is more equal in society), it 
is the individual that is being valued through having their unique differences 
recognised. This enables the individual, in theory at least, to feel more secure in 
relation to being treated differently, helping to avoid the accusations of 
'tokenism' and favouritism that may accompany that treatment. 
 
How does this focus on the depoliticisation or naturalisation of redistribution 
help explain the success of equality and diversity – and, by extension, 
multiculturalism – as an ideological phenomenon? To answer this we can ask a 
second question: who benefits? First of all, minorities materially benefit from 
redistributive policies (even if in a very limited sense – a point I return to below) 
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and this helps to bind those communities to the ideological framework used to 
justify those policies. As Malik (2009: 69) explains: 
 
Imagine that you are a secular Bangladeshi living in a run-down area of 
Birmingham. You don't think of yourself as a Muslim, you may not even think of 
yourself as Bangladeshi. But you want a new community centre in your area. It is 
difficult to get the council's attention by insisting that your area is poor or 
disadvantaged. But if you were to say that the Muslim community is deprived or 
lacking, then council coffers suddenly open up – not because the council is 
particularly inclined to help Muslims, but because being 'Muslim', unlike being 'poor' 
or 'disadvantaged', registers in the bureaucratic mind as an authentic identity. Over 
time, you come to see yourself as a Muslim and a Bangladeshi, not just because 
those identities provide you with access to power, influence and resources, but also 
because those identities have come to possess a social reality through receiving 
constant confirmation and affirmation. It is how you are seen, so it is how you come 
to see yourself. 
 
The opposition that Malik draws in the previous passage I have cited (ibid: 67), 
between the needs of communities and the imposition of identities, is here 
replaced with a more subtle explanation of how, through meeting material 
needs, diverse (i.e. differentiated) identities come to be more accepted by 
individuals and reproduced over time. 
 
The particular idea of redistribution that I've identified in the previous chapters 
goes deeper than the process Malik describes though. While the provision of 
economic resources, such as a local community centre, may help in explaining 
the success of multicultural ideas among particular minority communities, it 
does not explain the success it has had across society more generally. This is 
where the findings from this thesis can help: the redistributive policies that I've 
highlighted link material gains on the part of minority communities to a notion of 
substantive equality – positive action policies, for example, help not only 
individuals from minority communities, they also help to rectify larger 
inequalities across society by bringing disadvantaged groups level with 
comparatively advantaged ones. The significance of this is that it represents a 
solution to an obvious problem about a contemporary capitalist society such as 
Britain (as mentioned in chapter two): that while there is widespread acceptance 
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of the idea that citizens should be thought of as equal, they nonetheless 
continue to live very obviously unequal lives. As Zizek (1999: 203) has put it: 
 
the post-political liberal establishment not only fully acknowledges the gap between 
mere formal equality and its actualization/implementation, it not only acknowledges 
the exclusionary logic of 'false' ideological universality; it even actively fights it by 
applying to it a vast legal-psychological-sociological network of measures, from 
identifying the specific problems of every group and subgroup...up to proposing a 
set of measures ('affirmative action', etc.) to rectify the wrong. 
 
In this sense, then, equality and diversity offers not just material gains for some, 
but also the idea that the failure of the system, and its promise of equality for all, 
is being corrected – that something is being done for the disadvantaged over-
and-above the very limited right to formal equality. This ultimately helps to add 
legitimacy to the system by appearing to be a promise of justice for those that 
lose out. 
 
As I've argued (along with many critics) this is an extremely limited form of 
redistribution however, one that aims to make non-class groups more equal in 
society while leaving class and socio-economic inequalities largely intact. While 
there are material gains for minority communities then, as I've said, these tend 
to accentuate and reproduce inequalities within these communities by benefiting 
some but by no means all. With this in mind, we can explain the attraction of the 
equality and diversity framework by the fact that it manages to bring together 
three important elements: a limited accommodation of material interests, an 
idea of substantive equality that patches up the failures of the system, and a 
compatibility with historically high levels of socio-economic inequality. These 
three elements help to explain why equality and diversity appeals to more than 
just members of minority communities, as well as local council officers dealing 
with social disorder. There is a much broader idea of social justice on offer, 
capable of appealing to ethical sensibilities as well as political practicalities, but 
without threatening entrenched material interests. 
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The redistributive aspect of equality and diversity is also key to understanding 
its specificity as an ideology of difference.169 It is not just the link with liberal-
democratic ideas that is novel, then, there is also an obvious connection with 
social-democratic ideas, and the latter connection explains why equality and 
diversity has been successful among the Left particularly. This is a point I 
expand upon in the following section, but we can add here that what Zizek 
describes as a feature of the 'post-political liberal establishment' (meaning the 
era of neoliberal multiculturalism) need not be thought of as historically unique. 
Rather we can think of post-war social democracy as a similar response to the 
failure of the system to guarantee equality for its citizens, as a regime that also 
acknowledged the gap between a 'mere formal equality and its 
actualization/implementation'. The difference of course lies in the 
disadvantaged group that embodies this gap: the working class is replaced by 
the identity-based groups of multiculturalism. 
 
There are two further ways in which I have sought, in this thesis, to expand on 
Zizek's understanding of equality and diversity (and, by extension, 
multiculturalism) as a way of bridging the gap between the formal equality 
promised by the system and the reality of inequality in society: 1) a detailed 
empirical analysis of the discourse behind the 'vast legal-psychological-
sociological network of measures' that Zizek mentions, as these measures have 
developed in Britain over the last 30 years or so; 2) the specific role that the 
diversity-rationale plays in helping to depoliticise this 'network of measures', and 
the more general attempt, which I have traced in this thesis, to integrate these 
ideas into the day-to-day running of society. As I have argued, while we can 
explain why the limited redistribution that equality and diversity offers might 
                                                 
169
 I should mention here that Zizek's idea of ideology as a 'displacement' of class struggle is 
undoubtedly an interesting and potentially useful theory, and Zizek (2000a: 97) has himself applied 
it to multiculturalism. I have not used it here though as I have wanted to focus on the specificity of 
equality and diversity as an ideological phenomenon, and the idea of the displacement of class 
struggle is a more general one that applies as much to Nazi Germany as multiculturalism (see, for 
example, Zizek's analysis of the former, 2005). Hasan (2010: 212-24) has also offered an interesting 
contribution to the understanding of ideology, relating specifically to multiculturalism: 'white liberal 
post-colonial guilt'. The argument is that white liberals have, through guilt about past colonial 
domination, been unwilling to criticise ethnic minority cultural practices or claims to cultural 
difference more generally. However, there are, it seems to me, two fairly obvious limitations in 
using this idea to explain the hold of multiculturalism as an ideology: 1) it focuses on only one group 
in society, white liberals, and is not applicable to other groups who have accepted multicultural ideas 
(such as ethnic minorities themselves); 2) as a psychological explanation it fails to link subjectivity 
with broader material and social conditions (as I have tried to do here). 
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make the ideas attractive to some, we also need to pay attention to the way in 
which this redistribution has been made more compatible with those in society 
who do not find the idea of a more substantive equality ideologically attractive – 
those such as the business leaders that Schneider-Ross sought to win over in 
the early 1990s by 'rebranding' equal opportunities in terms of the business 
benefits offered by diversity. 
 
There is, in other words, an important distinction here between the content (the 
policies) and the form they are presented in (the diversity-rationale) – a 
distinction that is often not made in the literature.170 In order to grasp the novelty 
and specificity of equality and diversity it is important to think through the way in 
which the form and content combine. If, for example, we take only the diversity-
rationale – that workplaces need to value and incorporate different types of 
people – while this may do nothing for inequality, and could be critiqued on that 
basis, it is also difficult to see why it would be controversial. As we saw in 
chapter five, colleges in the United States had a long tradition of taking 
geographical diversity into account before diversity was used as a defence of 
affirmative action, yet these policies did not generate the kind of controversy 
that the contemporary idea of diversity has.171 At the same time, while equality 
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 The recognition/redistribution debate, which often provides the terminology for discussion 
around these issues, tends to be structured around a distinction between recognition and 
redistribution as two types of injustice: whether this distinction is justified (Fraser, 1995), 
problematic in relation to sexuality (Butler, 1997) or class (Bernans, 2002), or wrong in that 
redistribution can be reduced to recognition (Honneth, in Fraser and Honneth, 2003) or vice-versa 
(Barry, see discussion below). Anderson's contribution to the debate is a useful exception to this, 
pointing to the specificity of the diversity-rationale as involving a distinction between redistribution 
and recognition, but overlaid with a further distinction between a type of injustice and a way of 
justifying or rationalising a response to that injustice. She provides a useful summary of why it is 
wrong to think that the 'diversity' remedy ignores the question of distribution: '[f]irst, whether 
affirmative action is rationalized by redistributive or recognitional rationales, it has first-order 
redistributive effects: it gives disadvantaged racial groups access to elite education, and to the 
networks of connections that lead to elite careers upon graduation. Second, mainstream 
multiculturalism's advocacy of race as a dimension of merit has helped to transform American 
business culture, which now to a surprising extent embraces "diversity" as a productivity-enhancing 
feature of organizations rather than as a demand for justice... This has the second-order redistributive 
effect of shifting criteria of merit to favor disadvantaged racial groups, while defusing backlash 
misrecognition. Thus, redistribution gets a free ride on an overtly recognitional remedy' (Anderson, 
2008: 165). 
171
 Similarly, while no doubt more controversial than this example, it could be argued that the kind 
of policies for which multiculturalism is perhaps best known – adapting national customs to 
incorporate minority cultures (e.g. providing for minority dietary requirements in schools or the 
workplace, celebrating minority religious festivals, and so on) – has been much less controversial 
than the redistributive policies I have focused on in this thesis. For example, Tiryakian (2004: 10) 
argues that the former 'sort of adjustment...has been made with relative ease'; in contrast, it is only 
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polices before the diversity-rationale were controversial (as we have seen this 
appears to be the reason for the rise of diversity in the first place), the 
justification used is social equality in response to a historically specific injustice 
(i.e. racism or sexism). The resulting conflicts surrounding the issue are, then, 
likely to put this principle (the idea of equality for a disadvantaged group) into 
question, rather than race or sex as distinct identities or lifestyles. 
 
In a similar fashion, I would argue that it is this combination of a diversity-
defence and an underlying redistributive policy that is a crucial factor in why, 
despite the rhetoric of individualism, individuals can become more rather than 
less trapped within reified identity categories as a result of diversity (a common 
criticism of diversity that we have seen in a number of different forms 
throughout this thesis). On the one hand, the idea that diversity is about 
individuality is belied by the redistributive nature of the policies carried out in its 
name. Redistribution is not about multiplicity, variety and so on, but is rather 
about equalising, or at least narrowing the gap between, a disadvantaged group 
and a comparatively advantaged group in relation to resources or opportunities 
of some kind. Clearly redistribution, in this sense, requires broadly defined, 
disadvantaged groups (women, ethnic minorities, the disabled and so on) and a 
broadly defined majority group (men, white-British, able-bodied and so on) in 
order to measure inequality and any progress towards its amelioration. 
Importantly, individuals here can count only as members of a group and are 
treated as such. Redistribution between social groups, by its very nature, 
cannot take into account the kind of multifaceted, intersecting inequalities that 
constitute an individual's actual identity.172 On the other hand, it is only when 
diversity is used to justify this redistribution that this categorisation of individuals 
becomes, as we have seen, a permanent, rather than temporary, feature of 
society.173 
                                                                                                                                               
when 'demands that call for significant economic and political resources' are made that 'cultural 
nationalism receives serious opposition'. 
172
 This point helps to explain some of the moments of instability that I have highlighted in the case 
studies, and the balancing act that results between the promotion of substantive equality and its 
diversity guise. 
173
 The same argument can be made in relation to the diversity-based promise of 'upward mobility' 
for all groups. In fact, only the disadvantaged will be helped, in order to bring them level with the 
relatively advantaged. At the same time, the idea that all groups are helped obviously serves to make 
this arrangement permanent. If all groups stand to gain then why would you stop? It should be added 
that, of course, the older (pre-diversity) equality-rationale can appeal to a kind of enlightened self-
interest: the idea that everyone ultimately gains from equality between groups – in terms of a lack of 
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This distinction – between redistributive equality policies and the way that those 
policies are justified – is also important if we move on to consider the critique of 
equality and diversity. Zizek's argument that I've just cited – that equality and 
diversity represents a 'post-political' solution to inequality that is content to 
adjust outcomes for minority groups while leaving the overall capitalist 
framework intact – applies to the measures themselves, rather than the way 
those measures are justified. This is also the case for Walter Benn Michaels – 
whose work I've cited at a number of points in this thesis. Michaels argues that 
these policies simply aim to correct 'horizontal' inequalities between men and 
women, white and ethnic minority, at the expense of class or economic 
inequality.174 Affirmative action and other, similar policies simply offer a 'zero-
sum game' (Michaels, 2010) that aims to share huge inequalities within society 
equally among black and white, men and women. While The Trouble With 
Diversity (Michaels, 2006) offers an interesting and perceptive account of the 
way that diversity rationalises affirmative action, and the specific consequences 
that this rationale brings, for Michaels the original policy and the later diversity-
rationale are equally problematic. 
 
This can be contrasted with the less radical critique that comes from within the 
equality and diversity agenda itself. Of my case studies, the TUC was the best 
example of this – this was to be expected, perhaps, given the organisation's 
left-wing origins. Here the main problem is the new diversity-rationale rather 
than the policy: diversity, and associated ideas such as the 'business case', are 
a danger to what is otherwise a progressive equality agenda. The 
depoliticisation and individualisation of the issue of inequality, that is for 
Schneider-Ross a positive effect of diversity, is, for these voices, its central 
danger.175 
                                                                                                                                               
social conflict, for example. However, this is different from the idea that all groups are actually 
helped by the policies themselves; rather, with the equality-rationale it is transparent that some 
groups are to be helped in the short term in order for all to gain in the long term. 
174
 Michaels treats these two terms (class and economic inequality) as entirely synonymous, which 
is, for me, a significant failing of The Trouble with Diversity. While he does admit towards the end 
of this book that 'accounts of class ought to be more sophisticated than mere facts about wealth and 
income' (Michaels, 2006: 202), he does not appear to (in this book or, as far as I know, elsewhere) 
take this advice. 
175
 It is worth repeating the point I made in chapter five that these concerns about the impact of 
diversity on equal opportunities is a relatively widespread, mainstream phenomenon and, by no 
means, the exclusive property of the political fringes. This is perhaps the reason why, despite the fact 
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We can perhaps add an additional angle here that develops this critique:176 this 
is the question of what is lost with a switch to a diversity-rationale even if the 
redistributive policies themselves remain, and even if, as I have argued, the 
latter actually become more deeply embedded in society. By no longer using 
equality as a justification for social action, the idea becomes further removed 
from the public realm at a time when it is needed more than ever to challenge 
the high levels of inequality that exist in British society. By accepting, say, the 
business case argument for equal opportunity policies, you accept not just a 
different way of achieving the same goal, you also accept the logic that social 
policies should at all times be adjusted to fit with the demands of business – a 
logic that, if allowed to go unchallenged, may do far more damage in the long-
run than turning away the chance to have equality policies 'mainstreamed' into 
the corporate environment. This, of course, is unlikely to worry those, such as 
Schneider-Ross, whose goal is limited to the smooth running of organisations. 
However, it should worry, and therefore be challenged by, those who have more 
progressive political concerns. As Zizek (2012) himself has argued recently: 
'[t]rue victory over your enemy occurs when they start to use your language, so 
that your ideas form the foundation of the entire field'. 
 
My own view is that we need a position somewhere in between the two critiques 
that I have outlined. It would seem mistaken to reject out of hand any non-class 
redistributive measures. There are surely specific times and places where it can 
be justified – I think Michaels is wrong therefore to completely oppose, in the 
way that he does, this kind of identity-based equality with social equality. In this 
sense, then, the problem is the diversity-rationale: as I've argued in the previous 
paragraph, it represents a fundamental acceptance of powerful established 
interests by seeking to adapt an agenda to the language and influence of the 
latter rather than using that agenda to challenge their position. It is also a 
dangerous game to be playing: by disingenuously 'selling' controversial equality 
policies in terms of valuing distinct identities and lifestyles the whole debate 
                                                                                                                                               
that Schneider-Ross argue for a move 'from equality to diversity', the reference to equality has not, in 
fact, been eliminated and retains its place alongside diversity (i.e. the 'equality and diversity agenda' 
is generally a more common term than just 'diversity agenda'). As I've shown in the case studies, 
there is primarily an attempt to balance the two concepts rather than replace one with the other. 
176
 I am grateful to Alex Callinicos for providing me with this additional angle. 
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around these policies becomes distorted, and the original reasons for the 
policies becomes lost. What began as a response to a historically specific 
injustice, such as, say, sexism, becomes an exercise in the permanent valuing 
of supposedly unique feminine qualities. This invariably leads to the 
politicisation of these differences, such that opposition to, say, positive action 
becomes rationalised through a negation, rather than affirmation, of the value of 
difference.177 In other words, the diversity-rationale leads to a distortion of the 
politics of inequality that undoubtedly makes a rational, progressive intervention 
more difficult. 
 
However, at the same time, Michaels is surely right to point to the limitations of 
the policies themselves. In essence, the central aim behind these policies is 
simply to establish a middle-class that is less white, male, able-bodied and so 
on. If this aim is accepted without criticism political horizons become limited and 
a broader critique of class society will be lost. As Zizek has argued so forcefully 
over the last 20 years or so, politics should be about more than just what is 
possible (i.e. trying to correct inequalities within a particular set of social 
relations through the gradual adjustment of material outcomes): 'the political act 
(intervention) proper is not simply something that works well within the 
framework of the existing relations, but something that changes the very 
framework that determines how things work'. What Zizek calls 'authentic politics' 
should be understood as the 'art of the impossible – it changes the very 
parameters of what is considered "possible" in the existing constellation' (Zizek, 
1999: 199 – emphasis removed from the second quote). In relation to equality 
and diversity, then, this means being prepared to go further than critiques of the 
diversity-rationale alone, and instead question the long-term viability of, and 
highlight the contradictions that will inevitably result from, any attempt to 
equalise social groups within a highly unequal social structure. 
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 Further research would be useful here to see if empirical evidence could be found to support this 
argument. This would involve an investigation of 'backlash' phenomena to see if the shift to a 
diversity-rationale has indeed changed the form that opposition to equality policies has taken. As is 
the case in much of the literature, Roger Hewitt's study (2005) of the emergence of a critique of anti-
racist policies in south-east London, while useful, does not clearly distinguish between the different 
rationales given for equality policies, and therefore is not able to highlight the effect that diversity 
may have had. 
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9.3 Class and Integration 
 
My central aim in chapters seven and eight was to add further detail to my 
overall argument, building on both its empirical and conceptual dimensions. In 
chapter seven my focus was on the question of class and socio-economic 
inequality and, as we saw, the two case studies used for this chapter divided 
quite neatly in relation to these two terms. The TUC gave us a useful look at the 
impact of diversity on a class-based equality discourse. Here we saw the 
declining importance of class struggle and working-class identity in relation to 
the issue of inequality, which, given the well-documented decline of class, was 
unsurprising. Important here are not only the social changes underlying this 
decline (some of which I highlighted in chapter three), but also the strategic 
decision by trade unions to adjust to a changing official discourse. 
 
With this in mind, while we saw some evidence of a struggle over the concept, I 
would emphasise the generally widespread acceptance of diversity within the 
TUC discourse. In terms of drawing a picture of the rise of diversity across 
society, this is a useful addition to the corporate and governmental take on the 
concept seen in previous chapters. It is also worth remembering, as mentioned 
above, that the criticisms of equality and diversity that I did find do not attack the 
policies themselves, only diversity as a rationale. More specifically, I couldn't 
find in any of the TUC texts, or in the articles I cited on trade unions and 
equality, evidence of any disquiet over the non-class nature of the groups that 
are helped by this type of policy, or, in a related sense, that class was in danger 
of losing out to these other inequalities. This is surprising, perhaps, given the 
class-based nature of the organisation. 
 
This argument – that diversity, and multiculturalism more generally, leads to the 
neglect of class – is a familiar one in the literature.178 While not dealing with the 
issue of class specifically, Barry has also made a related argument that the 
politics of recognition is a threat to redistributive struggles, with detrimental 
consequences. More specifically, he argues that the recognition of difference is 
not a distinct type of injustice that comes to replace distributive concerns, but 
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 Alongside those already cited – such as Michaels (2006), Sivanandan (1990) and Zizek (2000a) – 
see Gimenez (2006). 
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rather that it acts as a different way of justifying much of the useful content of 
the 'distributive paradigm'. For example, Barry argues that Iris Marion Young 
unjustifiably reduces distribution to an economistic notion that applies only to, 
using Young's words, 'wealth, income and other material goods'. Once this 
reductive definition is in place, very important elements of distributive justice of 
a 'nonmaterial' kind – rights, power, opportunities, and so on – seem to belong 
naturally to 'recognition'. For Barry, once many of these nonmaterial aspects of 
inequality are theoretically reclaimed for the distributive paradigm, there is little 
left of substance in the idea of 'recognition' to worry about; the 'affirmation' of a 
way of life – once disconnected from discrimination (direct and indirect), 
oppression, marginalization, socio-economic inequality and so on (all legitimate 
areas of distributive justice) – is perfectly acceptable as part of an individual's 
freedom of expression, but not a legitimate area of state intervention (Barry, 
2001a: 271-4). The implication of all this is that the struggle for equality 
becomes fractured as equal access to these goods (rights, opportunities etc) 
becomes bound up with the valorisation of a distinct identity rather than the 
universal demand of equality for all (ibid: 325). 
 
Barry's argument that theorists of recognition, such as Young, instigate a 
damaging split between social, 'nonmaterial' aspects of inequality (rights, 
opportunities etc) and economic aspects (wealth, income etc) is one I would 
fully concur with. As an argument, it also has obvious parallels with a central 
theme of this thesis: the separation within the equality and diversity framework 
between identity-based and socio-economic inequality. This theme was most 
closely explored in the second half of chapter seven: the social exclusion 
discourse undoubtedly gave us the best view of this distinction between the two 
types of inequality and the way in which it affects the nature of redistributive 
policies. Of particular interest were the different categories used to identify and 
respond to the two types of inequality. 
 
It is worth mentioning here that, of course, any attempt to redistribute involves 
group categories of one kind or another and differential treatment on the basis 
of that category. Income brackets, for example, are categories necessary for a 
country's tax and benefits system that amounts to a modest form of 
redistribution. Clearly some categories carry greater social significance than 
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others however. While income boundaries capture relatively little about who 
people are and how they relate to others, the 'identity' categories of equality and 
diversity appear, in contrast, to capture more socially and politically relevant 
distinctions. Interestingly, while Barry (2001a: 114-6) points out problems with 
using identity categories to implement redistributive equality policies because of 
their tendency to cut across the reality of disadvantage (they include middle-
class blacks and exclude poor whites), he also offers criticisms of the use of 
income categories for the purpose of redistribution. These criticisms include the 
fact that income is only one of a number of factors involved in material 
deprivation and therefore a poor surrogate for capturing the latter. He also notes 
that income levels tend to fluctuate from year to year and this would cause 
problems in the administration of affirmative action programs. Perhaps most 
interestingly, he argues that even if income was 'perfectly stable and a perfect 
surrogate for material deprivation, [it] would still suffer from the difficulty that it is 
a continuous variable. Any cut-off point would therefore leave children on either 
side of it with unequal prospects despite a difference of only one dollar in their 
parents' incomes' (ibid: 116). 
 
In light of these criticisms it is interesting to see that the social exclusion 
discourse is presented by its advocates as a more sophisticated way of tackling 
disadvantage ('social exclusion is about more than income poverty...', SEU, 
2004: 3). Of particular importance in doing this are geographical categories; the 
idea being that these capture, more adequately than income, the full range of 
material factors that constitute disadvantage (poor housing, high crime rates, 
unemployment and so on). However, as was illustrated in chapter eight, 
geography, just like income, can fail to accurately capture disadvantage leaving 
'pockets of deprivation' outside the boundaries drawn. While it is perhaps less of 
a continuous variable than income then (i.e. we can talk in a more socially 
meaningful way about geographical areas than income brackets), geographical 
categories may nonetheless leave people arbitrarily on the wrong side of the 
boundary. 
 
Clearly there are some big questions here regarding the relationship between 
inequality and the categories used in constructing policy responses to the 
problem. My focus in this thesis is more specific however and, as I've said, of 
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principal interest is the contrast between the use of geographical categories and 
the use of identity-based categories, such as race or ethnicity. This difference 
was most clear in relation to the different aims put forward in the report, Jobs for 
All: while both types of category define disadvantaged and unequal groups of 
people, the aim in relation to identity-based groups is to raise them, as a group, 
to an equal level with a comparatively advantaged group (e.g. White-British); in 
contrast, the more modest aim in relation to geographically-defined 
disadvantage is to reduce inequality to a certain point. 
 
What defines the point at which inequality between areas becomes 
unacceptable? As we saw, the quantitative answer in the report was 50 per cent 
of the current gap. From a conceptual point of view, I suggested it can be 
understood as the point at which the inequalities that naturally accompany a 
'dynamic economy' stop being consistent with individual autonomy, and instead 
trap the individuals concerned – we saw the metaphor of a 'cycle' used as a 
way of describing this idea. What is identified in the social exclusion discourse 
is a process in which inequality takes a social, and thereby illegitimate, form, 
giving rise to a group: the 'socially excluded'. Here geography obviously has a 
relevance that a category such as income lacks: it is one of the dimensions, 
alongside the generational link, in which disadvantage is transmitted – i.e. 
passed on to others. 
 
One way of understanding the difference between the types of inequality I have 
identified is whether this process I've just described (through which 
disadvantage is transmitted between individuals) is treated as permanent or not. 
Tackling socio-economic inequality involves treating this process as temporary 
and reducing levels of inequality to the point where this transmission of 
disadvantage is avoided. One way of thinking about identity-based inequality is 
that, in contrast, this process is seen as irreversible. Equality must therefore 
take the form of lifting the group as a whole from its disadvantaged position, 
while respecting that group's distinct identity, rather than reducing levels of 
inequality to the point where this social category is dissolved. 
 
This is simply another way of putting the assimilation/multiculturalism 
opposition, but in terms of inequality and its social effects rather than cultural 
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difference. As a way of understanding the rise of equality and diversity, it has 
the benefit of cutting across the redistribution/recognition distinction, which, as 
I've argued above, is clearly complicated by the existence of policies that do the 
former but are justified with reference to the latter. A redistributive policy such 
as affirmative or positive action can appear on either side of the distinction: it 
can be employed temporarily in order to reduce, say, racial inequality to the 
point at which the category is dissolved (the earlier equality/assimilationist 
rationale),179 or it can be employed more permanently under the guise of the 
'recognition' of a unique difference in society (the diversity/multiculturalist 
rationale). 
 
This distinction can also be used to highlight some of the complexities of the 
place of class in contemporary equality and diversity discourse. As I have 
argued at a number of points in this thesis, one way of understanding the 
declining importance of the working-class in equality discourse is that, as a 
category, it does not fit into either type of inequality. This is most obviously the 
case in relation to identity-based inequality, as numerous authors have pointed 
out.180 The common thread running through these arguments is that classes are 
constituted as unequal in a way that the various identity groups are not. Put 
extremely simply, it is possible to imagine men and women as equal (even if, in 
reality, they are not), but not the working-class and the middle-class – the latter 
pair are defined by their unequal position in relation to each other. 
 
We can apply this argument more specifically to equality and diversity. While 
the working-class can be the subject of group-based redistributive policies and 
have their distinct 'lifestyle' recognised and celebrated, they cannot have this 
difference used as a way of justifying redistribution in the way that we have 
seen in the equality and diversity discourse. It obviously makes no sense to talk 
about the unique 'life experiences' (to use Fawcett's phrase) that working-class 
people can bring with them to enhance the workplace, such as banking or 
company boards, because the working-class is constituted as an identity, in part 
at least, in opposition to these positions of social privilege. In terms of the 
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 This would not necessarily mean the end of black, as a cultural category, as a form of 
identification that individuals freely pursue, but the end of racial distinctions as invidious social 
categories that imprison individuals and dictate their life chances (see Barry, 2001a: 70-1). 
180
 Alongside Michaels (2006) and Eagleton (1996), see Sayer (2005: 14). 
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distinction I've made above, then, in order to benefit the working class this kind 
of redistribution must involve something of the assimilationist attempt to reverse 
the transmission of disadvantage between individuals within the disadvantaged 
group, by creating the conditions for talented individuals to leave the group and 
join the middle class. This is, of course, one way of characterising the post-war 
social-democratic response to inequality, before the advent of multiculturalism. 
 
The much less examined area is how class inequality in pre-multicultural social 
democracy differed from the socio-economic inequality we see in equality and 
diversity texts. One hypothesis that emerges here is that working-class 
inequality had something of the permanence we now find embodied in the 
identity-based groups (women, ethnic minorities etc). In other words, what 
characterises older equality texts, such as we have seen in the Fawcett and 
TUC discourse, is that the working-class represents a disadvantaged social 
category that is to be both integrated as a difference, as a group with relatively 
strong social ties that are not to be completely dissolved through the reduction 
of inequality (unlike the socially excluded, for example), and also prevented 
from becoming a closed 'identity' through the creation of paths to enable 
individuals to escape that group and move up the social ladder. 
 
I would emphasise that this argument, about the historical shift from a working 
class-centred equality discourse to a multicultural one, is intended as a 
hypothesis for future research and not a finding from the results presented in 
this thesis, due to the relatively small sample of texts I looked at from the period 
before the rise of equality and diversity.181 It follows Rex (2004) and Kymlicka 
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 With this in mind, it's worth giving a more specific example of a question that could be raised in 
relation to this hypothesis: what are the points of tension and instability in the older social-
democratic discourse and how do they compare with those I've highlighted in contemporary equality 
and diversity discourse? One possibility, based on an observation in Anthony Crosland's famous 
text, The Future of Socialism, is that social mobility designed to pull people out of the working-class 
may have clashed with the group-ties that are simultaneously accepted and maintained under 
corporatist arrangements. Crosland complains of the 'deep hostility, couched in the language of class 
betrayal ("he's gone over to the boss's side"), shown to the worker who takes a supervisory or 
managerial post, and the antagonism towards Trade Union leaders, previously trusted figures, who 
"go over" by becoming members of Nationalised Boards'. The contradiction is nicely captured by 
Crosland when he notes that this ideology (of class betrayal) is 'wholly inconsistent with the 
reiterated claims, often made by the very same class "patriots", that more managerial posts should be 
filled by workers, and more Trade Unionists be appointed to Nationalised Boards' (Crosland, 1956: 
153-4). In contrast, this is obviously not a source of tension in relation to the promotion of social 
mobility for minorities, under the diversity-rationale, as these individuals do not lose their 
disadvantaged identity. 
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(1995: 179-81) in interpreting multiculturalism as a form of integration based on 
T. H. Marshall's post-war social citizenship model, which seeks to include 
disadvantaged groups within the polity.182 My difference with these authors is 
that, in my analysis, the working-class is excluded from the multicultural 
settlement rather than simply joined by other disadvantaged groups. 
 
One way of capturing this idea theoretically would be to use the distinction I 
drew in chapter two between class struggle and dislocation in order to 
understand the difference between these two regulatory regimes (i.e. post-war 
social democracy and neoliberal multiculturalism). The hypothesis would be that 
in both regimes group-based inequality is recognised; however, in the case of 
post-war social democracy the inequality dealt with is embodied in class 
struggle, to the extent that social inequalities are condensed into a single 
disadvantaged group that is internal to the social structure: the working class. 
With neoliberal multiculturalism, in contrast, the inequality dealt with is better 
captured by the concept of dislocation. Here the inequality is embodied in a 
variety of disadvantaged groups understood to lie outside, or be excluded from, 
the mainstream social structure by virtue of this disadvantage. 
 
I would argue then (or, more accurately, hypothesise) that the shift to neoliberal 
multiculturalism is not just a shift away from class, but a deeper shift towards 
the recognition of a different type of inequality altogether, one in which 
disadvantaged identities are treated as one among many manifestations of a 
highly heterogeneous and unstable social structure. This is a shift that is clearly 
captured in the thought of Laclau, and poststructuralism more generally. 
However, I would follow Zizek (2000a: 108) in arguing that this thought lacks a 
critical edge, that the 'plural contingency of postmodern political struggles and 
the totality of Capital are not opposed', and that 'today's capitalism...provides 
the very background and terrain for the emergence of shifting-dispersed-
contingent-ironic-and so on, political subjectivities' (emphasis from second 
quote removed). I have sought in this thesis to try to elaborate on this idea, to 
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 A very interesting paper by Jenny Williams also adds evidence to this argument, showing the 
similarity between educational policies designed to help ethnic minorities and those they replaced 
that were designed to help the working-class. Williams (1986: 135) argues that the former 'mirror 
very clearly the earlier, class based, definitions of problems, explanatory paradigms and policy 
recommendations'. 
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show the way in which multicultural redistributive policies operate on the basis 
of a separation of the social groups that are integrated, as beneficiaries of those 
policies, from the question of socio-economic inequality. In this sense, it is not 
simply that the working-class are excluded from contemporary equality 
discourse, it is that the very logic of the latter prevents them from being 
recognised as a group in the first place. Applying this to the broader social 
context, the idea that the working class have been 'demonized' (Jones, 2011) in 
recent times may be somewhat misleading, as it suggests that they have been 
recognised as a distinct group in the first place. The problem may go deeper: it 
may be dissolution rather than 'demonization' that more accurately captures the 
state of class relations in Britain today.  
 
 
9.4 Conflict, Cohesion and Beyond 
 
I've suggested above a way of explaining why the rise of diversity as a rationale 
for equality policies might lead to a hardening, rather than the desired softening, 
of group identities. The purpose of chapter eight was to show the impact that 
this kind of commonly-made criticism has had on equality and diversity 
discourse, and to highlight the solutions offered from within the discourse itself. 
In both case studies we found an emphasis on the need to provide a shared 
reference point – formal legal principles and 'thicker' cultural values respectively 
– that would help link distinct identities and therefore avoid conflict. While I've 
highlighted above the fact that the diversity-rationale presents equality policies 
as 'geared to the upward mobility of all kinds of people' (Thomas, 1990: 108), 
here the problem is how to unify these different 'kinds'. It is worth reiterating the 
significance of the timing here: both case study discourses emerged at the 
beginning of the 2000s, at the end of the period I've identified as an important 
time of growth in equality and diversity in Britain. It seems clear that, given this, 
cohesion is a response to conflicts surrounding this rise of equality and diversity 
in society, giving us three interlocking values at the core of the discourse I have 
been analysing. 
 
I would argue, then, that the EDF is not just the result of the growth of the 
equality and diversity field during the 1990s – the kind of umbrella group that 
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often emerges out of any shared endeavour (the TUC being an obvious 
example of this in the trade union movement); it is also, at the same time, a 
response to a specific problem of conflict and competition within that field – this 
is, at least, part of the ongoing rationale for its existence. Organisationally, it 
provides a shared space for groups representing different interests and 
identities – this alone serves to bring together an otherwise fragmented field. 
However, as I explored in detail, there are also attempts by the EDF to provide 
more general solutions both at the practical and theoretical level. 
 
As I pointed out, the human rights agenda has an important role in their thinking 
on this issue. Human rights provide a shared framework of rights and 
obligations that, for the EDF, all parties can sign up to, without giving up their 
particular identity and interests. As we saw, in order to play this role they have 
to be 'non-negotiable'; in this sense, human rights help provide a precise limit to 
group variation: no appeal to group differences in values can be made in order 
to defend practices that contravene these rights. This is, of course, a standard 
liberal response to conflict: the provision of a neutral space able to 
accommodate a plurality of conflicting views and interests.183 
 
The community cohesion discourse, for its part, offers something of a mid-way 
point between the critics of multiculturalism and the more uncritical (in relation 
to multiculturalism and diversity) liberalism of the EDF. Community cohesion 
offers something of an internal critique of multiculturalism: links are drawn 
between the latter and the phenomena of inter-group conflict in a much 
stronger, more explicit way than in the EDF discourse. However, 
multiculturalism is never directly named as the problem (the term is simply 
dropped), nor is the importance of equality and diversity ever challenged. 
 
The emphasis on a shared British identity is, of course, the headline-grabbing 
feature of the community cohesion discourse, further distinguishing it from the 
EDF discourse. These shared values can be seen as an attempt to offer 
something more concrete than the formalism of universal human rights 
principles – though, as I showed, not too concrete so as to override legitimate 
cultural differences. There remains within the discourse not only a sensitivity to 
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 I am grateful to Alex Callinicos for making this point to me. 
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cultural diversity, but even, in places, a very strong affirmation of its importance. 
We could put this return to a nationalist discourse in Laclauian terms. I've 
suggested above that multiculturalism can be understood in relation to the 
production of a system of differences, or the 'differential absorption of 
demands', in response to conflict. The focus on cohesion can be understood, in 
contrast, as an attempt to construct a unified identity out of these differences – 
the construction of an 'equivalential chain'. For Laclau an equivalence is formed 
in order to exclude a threatening adversary: this fits the findings of chapter eight 
where we saw the need to oppose those elements that refuse the shared values 
offered – whether the 'non-negotiable floor' of human rights or fundamental 
British values. This process becomes more explicit with the growth, after the 
terrorist attacks in 2001 and 2005, of a government discourse on preventing 
extremism. 'Extremism' often refers, in this context, to radical Islamic 
movements, but right-wing nationalism – particularly the growth of the BNP 
(British National Party) over recent years – has also been the cause of concern 
(see Pitcher, 2006: 545-7). 
 
We also saw, particularly in the community cohesion discourse, a concern with, 
what we might call, the blunt nature of equality policies. This picks up on the 
discussion above regarding the categories used to enact redistributive policies 
and the way in which these categories can fail to accurately capture the reality 
of inequality in society. Furthermore, and this is particularly a concern for the 
community cohesion literature, this failure can then generate resentment and 
conflict as disadvantaged people not included in the category lose out in the 
distribution of scarce resources. Though there was evidence that 
geographically-based approaches could be problematic in this regard, the most 
obvious concern here relates to ethnicity. More specifically, it is clear from the 
texts that disadvantaged white communities are of particular concern. 
 
In the community cohesion discourse these communities embody a number of 
the problems that I have mentioned: a hardening of identity, a sense of 
exclusion from equality policies despite the obvious disadvantage of these 
communities, and the increasing popularity, in some of these areas, of the 
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BNP.184 The problem for the equality and diversity agenda, as I've argued, is 
that the two social categories that define these communities – white-British and 
working-class – are not generally recognised within the framework for the 
purposes of redistribution: the former because it is an advantaged majority 
identity, the latter because it is a class identity (not an 'identity' category such as 
race or gender – as explained above). In response, alongside the increased 
attention to socio-economic inequality towards the end of New Labour's time in 
office, we saw calls within the community cohesion discourse to encourage the 
participation of these communities, for group representatives to be established 
that articulate the concerns of the 'white community' in a similar manner to 
ethnic-minority community 'leaders'.185 This may seem surprising – and certainly 
I did not find recommendations of this sort elsewhere in the literature – but in 
reality it is simply an extension, to community politics, of Thomas' argument 
about the need to meet the interests of 'all kinds of people, including white 
males' (Thomas, 1990: 108). The question might be asked: if all communities 
are to be included, white as well as non-white, why continue with racial 
identifications at all? However, as I've argued in relation to diversity, cohesion-
strategies are best seen as a way of justifying, of rationalising rather than 
replacing, identity-based redistribution, and the latter, by its very nature, 
requires the continued treatment of individuals according to their race. 
 
While the change of government in 2010 provided a useful end-point for my 
investigations, it's worth briefly considering the impact of the coalition 
government and what the future may hold more generally. Two things can be 
said with a degree of certainty. Firstly, whatever impact Labour's renewed 
attention to socio-economic inequality may have had in the short-term for 
disadvantaged areas, the fall-out from the global financial crisis and consequent 
austerity program pursued by the successor government will surely serve to 
entrench already high levels of inequality. At the same time, large cuts in public 
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 See Ford and Goodwin (2010) for a detailed analysis of BNP support. 
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 The need to establish links between these communities and the state is well brought-out in the 
title of a Labour government program, initiated in 2009: 'Connecting Communities'. This program 
cost £12 million and explicitly targeted disadvantaged white areas in order to 'connect with resentful 
white working-class communities in 130 wards across England and undercut rightwing extremism' 
(Guardian, 2009). 
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expenditure make the kind of social policy measures pursued by Labour 
throughout their time in office much less likely.186 
 
In contrast, I don't think the general developments I've charted in equality and 
diversity will be particularly affected by the change of government. It is true that 
when it comes to specific conflicts of interest between business and the equality 
and diversity agenda – say, in relation to whether equal pay audits should be 
mandatory – the coalition may be more likely to side with the former (though, as 
I noted in chapter six, the New Labour government was hardly hostile to 
business interests). Nevertheless, the deep-rooted nature of the developments 
I've described, as seen through the eyes of my case study organisations, 
should not be underestimated. To repeat my central argument: equality policies 
that aim to redistribute resources and opportunities in order to bring social 
groups level to one another have not been rejected in favour of diversity and 
cohesion; rather, the latter two ideas have been crucial in integrating the former. 
The representation of these policies as a means of recognising and valuing a 
range of distinct, yet unified, identities has undoubtedly helped to embed them 
in a hostile social body. So while policies that aim to rectify class inequality will 
no doubt continue to be proposed,187 a key argument of this thesis is that these 
policies will not and, indeed, cannot be integrated into society while the equality 
and diversity framework that I have described remains in place. Any class-
based equality policies must remain peripheral, then, and prone to the 
exigencies of the situation and the party in government, rather than sown into 
the fabric of institutional practices in the way that identity-based measures are – 
as I have described in detail in this thesis. 
 
I began by distinguishing between multiculturalism and the narrower domain of 
equality and diversity in order to specify the object of my analysis, I'll end by 
returning to the bigger picture. If what I have said is correct, while periodic 
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 'As benefit cuts bite and real incomes fall, the unjust distribution of pain gets plainer for all to see. 
For all his speeches on social justice and social mobility, the thrust of Cameron policy is to make the 
country more unequal at an accelerating pace. By 2015, the IFS estimates, at least 500,000 more 
children will fall below the official poverty threshold: this compares badly with Labour who took a 
million out of poverty' (Toynbee and Walker, 2012). 
187
 These may even include measures that recognise and seek to include the working-class as a 
specific social group, in an analogous sense to the identity-based groups of equality and diversity. 
Denis MacShane, for example, has recently suggested that political parties should reserve 10 per 
cent of their seats in parliament for the working-class (defined by MacShane as those on the 
minimum wage) (BBC, 2012). 
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criticisms of multiculturalism will no doubt continue to be voiced, the reality in 
Britain is that multiculturalism includes a deeply institutionalised use of identity 
in administering a limited, but nonetheless significant, form of redistribution, 
which no mainstream party will want to challenge. As I've said, from the point of 
view of minority groups there are some real, material gains to be made for a 
select few through enhanced chances for social mobility; for the middle-class 
and elites there is the sense that some, more substantive equality is being 
provided without actually impinging on their privileged class position. For the 
working-class however, particularly those that do not fall within the 'protected' 
identity categories, there is no (even limited) material gain. For this group, 
efforts to change the colour and gender of an unequal social order188 must look 
like, and in my view ultimately are, an attempt to more firmly cement the 
subordinate social position of the working class. 
 
Perhaps the more significant issue in the future, however, will not be the lack of 
challenge to the agenda from the mainstream parties, but the lack of challenge 
from left-wing parties outside the mainstream. Few have been willing to 
politically challenge multiculturalism from a progressive perspective,189 linking 
its institutionalisation of identity categories, and associated consequences,190 to 
the continuing neglect of the working class. The consequence of this is that the 
opposition to diversity (understood, it should be remembered, as a political 
rather than a social fact), which undoubtedly exists within working-class 
communities (and is, in my view, justified), has been articulated by the Right 
instead. The latter have done this by linking this opposition to the other 
significant identity-category that tends to conflict with multiculturalism: white-
British. 
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 Gitlin (1995: 237) has written of the way in which multiculturalism 'struggles to change the color 
of inequality'. 
189
 Though a very small party in size, the Independent Working Class Association (IWCA) are a 
notable exception here. 
190
 While I have not had space here to discuss the empirical evidence behind the claim that 
multiculturalism leads to worsening community relations, I should add here that, in my view, this is 
correct. I would agree therefore with those critics of multiculturalism that have made this claim (e.g. 
Malik, 2009 and Hasan, 2010). I find it hard to understand how institutionalising differential 
treatment according to ethnic identity, especially in relation to scarce resources, would not lead to 
increased tensions between ethnic groups – even if there are, undoubtedly, other significant causal 
factors involved in explaining community dynamics. As I've argued, I believe that this conclusion is 
resisted by many – especially on the Left – because of the redistributive aim behind many 
multicultural policies. 
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There are then strategic, as well as normative reasons, for the Left to articulate 
a critique of multiculturalism. It looks likely that the combination of high levels of 
socio-economic inequality and the continued pursuit of equality and diversity will 
serve to sharpen the contradictions in those disadvantaged white communities 
most at odds with that agenda. As time goes on, the effect of the redistributive 
policies pursued will be to further narrow the inequalities between majority and 
minority, while inequality that cuts across those groups will remain high, thereby 
making the initial reason for those policies (inequality between majority and 
minority) less and less plausible. At the same time, the diversity-rationale for 
those policies, as I have suggested above, only serves to spread further 
confusion and tension among different identity-based groups. All this means 
that multiculturalism and diversity may represent an increasingly significant 
point of vulnerability of the ruling neoliberal ideology, particularly in those 
communities that the Left has traditionally targeted as a potential source of 
support. The key task then, for those on the Left, is not the production of more 
normative critiques of multiculturalism. Instead, the need is for the translation of 
those critiques into a concrete political strategy, a strategy capable of 
recapturing the concept of equality from those that aim to refine, rather than 
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